FLSA, and that it is subdivision 207(k) that applies to police
and firefighters. Under this subdivision, defendants contend that
plaintiffs are not entitled to overtime pay rates. Finally,
defendants argue that plaintiffs' final count for declaratory
relief seeks an advisory opinion as to the future effects of a
change in the law, and that the policy plaintiffs complain of is
no longer in effect.
The threshold issue presented to this court is whether the
Supreme Court's ruling in Garcia removing the constitutional
barriers to the application of the FLSA to municipalities should
be applied retrospectively. First, however, the court must decide
whether it has jurisdiction over this matter. The court finds
that a case or controversy does exist between the parties at this
point in time. Plaintiffs claim to have suffered an injury and
this injury would be redressed by the relief requested. The
requirement of ripeness is therefore satisfied. Stewart v.
Hannon, 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982).
With regard to the retrospective application of Garcia, the
court must look to three factors in determining whether
non-retrospective application is proper. Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971); see also
Northern Pipeline Const. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982). First, the decision to be
applied non-retrospectively must establish a new principle of law
either by overruling clear past precedent on which the litigants
may have relied, or deciding an issue of first impression.
Second, the prior history of the rule in question must be
examined to determine whether retrospective application will
further or retard the operation of the rule. Third, the
inequities of retrospective application must be balanced.
Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. at 355.
In Garcia, the Supreme Court overruled the clear past precedent
of National League of Cities which held that the tenth amendment
limited Congress' power to enforce FLSA against municipalities in
areas of traditional government functions. Plaintiffs argue,
however, that defendants cannot establish their prior reliance on
National League of Cities because the overtime policy of the
department had been in effect prior to 1976 when that case was
decided. This does not establish that defendants did not rely on
National League of Cities in believing that their overtime pay
policies would not be subject to the requirements of FLSA. On
January 3, 1980, when defendants' policies were put into writing,
National League of Cities represented the law governing this
case. The court cannot assume that defendants could have foreseen
that National League of Cities would be overturned. Thus, the
first factor favoring non-retrospective application has been met.
As to the second factor, retrospective application of FLSA to
municipalities would cause substantial problems that would retard
the application of the Garcia ruling. As defendants point out,
plaintiffs' salaries are appropriated and expended by the village
on an annual basis. Retrospective application of Garcia would
wreak havoc on municipal budgeting and create unanticipated
financial liability for already strapped municipalities. Such a
result cannot be said to further the application of the Garcia
ruling, which merely sought to remove an unworkable standard of
municipal immunity from federal law.
Finally, the retrospective application of Garcia would create
substantial inequities. Until the Garcia decision, National
League of Cities constituted clear authority that FLSA could not
be applied to municipalities in areas of traditional government
functions. It would be unjust to hold defendants to a rule that
did not exist at the time their policies were in effect. The
court therefore holds that the Supreme Court's decision in Garcia
removing municipality tenth amendment immunity to FLSA should not
be applied retrospectively. Plaintiffs' claim in Count I based on
the retrospective application of FLSA must therefore be
Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that FLSA applies to the
Village of Lincolnwood and that Order # 48 violates FLSA. It is
clear from the Supreme Court's decision in
Garcia that municipalities are no longer immune from the
application of FLSA. However, this court has held that Garcia is
not to be given retrospective effect. The issue therefore is
whether defendants' policy in effect from the time the rehearing
in Garcia was denied on April 15, 1985, until this policy was:
changed on April 29, 1985, is a proper subject for declaratory
The court will enter a declaratory judgment only when such
relief will serve a useful purpose. Cook County Legal Assistance
Foundation v. Pauken, 573 F. Supp. 231 (N.D.Ill. 1983). Because
Order # 48 is no longer in effect and Order # 89 which is now in
effect seeks to comply with the requirements of FLSA, a
declaration by this court that Order # 48 violated FLSA would
serve no useful purpose. Plaintiffs have not alleged that
Department Order # 89 fails to comply with the FLSA. For these
reasons, the court declines to enter a declaratory judgment;
Count III is therefore dismissed. Since plaintiffs' federal
claims have been dismissed, the court declines to exercise
jurisdiction over the pendent state law claim for breach of
contract. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct.
1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Accordingly, defendants' motion is
granted; this suit is dismissed in its entirety.