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People v. Allen





Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, the Hon. Richard E. Eagleton, Judge, presiding.


Defendant, Terry B. Allen, was charged by information in the circuit court of Peoria County with the crimes of unlawful restraint and deviate sexual assault. The State then filed a petition to have defendant declared a sexually dangerous person pursuant to article 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 105-1.01 et seq.). While the sexually dangerous person petition (petition) was pending a preliminary hearing was held on the information, and the charges were dismissed for lack of probable cause. Defendant was then indicted and the petition reinstated.

Before trial on the indictment, a bench trial was held on the petition. The trial court found defendant to be a sexually dangerous person. After his post-trial motions were denied defendant appealed. The appellate court, with one dissent, reversed, holding that (1) the trial court had improperly relied upon testimony obtained in violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, and (2) the State was required to prove multiple acts of sexual assault in order to show that defendant was a sexually dangerous person as defined in the statute. (123 Ill. App.3d 669.) We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal.

On appeal the State raises three issues, but two of these issues present the identical question. They can therefore be condensed as follows: (1) Are Miranda warnings required before a defendant may be examined by a psychiatrist pursuant to a court order in a sexually dangerous person proceeding? and (2) Did the defendant waive any privilege against self-incrimination which he may have had? The defendant, on cross-appeal, raises a third issue: Did the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a sexually dangerous person as defined by statute?

Defendant was formally charged with unlawful restraint and deviate sexual assault. The State then filed the sexually dangerous person petition. With the defendant and defense counsel both present, the court ordered defendant to submit to two psychiatric examinations. No court reporter was present at this hearing, but the written order for the hearing states that the procedure and rights under the sexually dangerous persons statute were explained to the defendant and the defendant indicated that he understood the nature of the proceedings.

On March 4, 1983, the defendant was tried under the petition in a bench trial. The State presented three witnesses, but the defendant did not produce any evidence. The State's first witness was Dr. Bradford Colen, a psychiatrist who had interviewed defendant. Defendant objected to Dr. Colen's testimony, claiming that the doctor had elicited information from him in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. Aside from some observations about the defendant's appearance and his apparent confusion and vagueness, Dr. Colen's testimony was based almost entirely upon defendant's statements and admissions made during the interview. The trial court ruled that defendant's statements to Dr. Colen were not admissible into evidence, but allowed the doctor to give an opinion based upon his overall interview with defendant. His opinion was that defendant was mentally ill with criminal propensities to commit sex crimes.

The State's next witness was Dr. Mortimer Beck, another psychiatrist, who had examined defendant. The trial judge again refused to allow into evidence the defendant's statements to the psychiatrist, but allowed Dr. Beck to express an opinion which was based "to a great extent" upon defendant's statements and admissions during his interview. Dr. Beck's opinion was that defendant was suffering from a mental disorder and had criminal propensities toward committing sexual assaults.

The State's final witness was Christine Ray, the victim of the alleged assault. Ray worked at a McDonald's restaurant in Peoria, and had noticed the defendant in the restaurant on October 11, 1982. She had spoken briefly to him while she was cleaning tables. After she got off work, at about 6 p.m., she sat down in a booth. Defendant came up and asked Ray if he could join her. She agreed, and the two talked for approximately 30 to 45 minutes. At some point in the conversation Ray described her automobile to defendant and mentioned the general location at which it was parked.

After ending the conversation Ray went into the rest-room. When she emerged defendant was no longer in the restaurant. She went out to her automobile, where she discovered that she had left one of the doors unlocked. She got in, started the car, and pulled out of the parking lot. When she stopped at the first stop sign she noticed that defendant was in the back seat of her car.

At this point, Ray testified, defendant asked her to take him to "a romantic place." She asked him where to go and he replied "a romantic place — or else." His tone of voice, she testified, was "kind of threatening type."

At defendant's request, Ray drove to the airport. After reaching the airport she drove around the parking area a few times until defendant told her to pull into the parking lot. She pulled up to the parking gate and opened the door to reach for the parking ticket. As she reached for the ticket defendant reached over and grabbed her on the neck or shoulder. He let go, however, and she got back in the car. Defendant then climbed over into the front seat.

Ray parked the car, and defendant asked her to lift the steering wheel and put the seat back. After doing so, Ray testified, defendant "grabbed me by the legs, set them up in the front seat." He then pulled her to a prone position and lay on top of her, simulating intercourse even though both were fully clothed.

Next, Ray testified, defendant took off his pants and asked her to take hers off also. She said no, whereupon "he reached for them, tugged them off a little bit. I finally decided to take them off." When asked by the prosecutor why she took off her pants Ray replied, "Due to the ...

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