United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, E.D
July 17, 1985
LYDIA HORBACZEWSKY, PLAINTIFF,
SPIDER STAGING SALES COMPANY AND ERIC M. ROEMISH, DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Rovner, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Presently pending before this Court is defendant's motion to
dismiss Counts I
and IV of plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff alleges, inter alia,
that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor in violation
of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The motion to dismiss
Count I is based on the plaintiff's failure to plead that the
corporate defendant knew of the alleged sexual harassment,
which the plaintiff argues is an essential element of a Title
VII claim founded on the supervisor's sexual harassment. This
argument has been soundly rejected by the Seventh Circuit in
Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604-605 (7th Cir. 1985), in
which the Seventh Circuit stated that "[e]very circuit that has
reached the issue has adopted the EEOC's rule imposing strict
liability on employers for the acts of sexual harassment
committed by their supervisory employees. . . ." Accordingly,
defendant's motion to dismiss Count I is denied.
Plaintiff asserts that Count IV, although pled on the theory
of breach of an implied covenant of good faith in an
employment contract, in fact asserts a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge based on the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124,
52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). This Court agrees
that a common law cause of action for retaliatory discharge
might be available to plaintiff as a violation of clearly
mandated public policies against sexual discrimination if the
plaintiff had no other means of legal redress. Here, however,
the plaintiff has alleged violations of both Title VII and of
the Illinois Human Rights Act. Both of these statutes provide
"comprehensive mechanisms for the enforcement of their
substantive provisions." McCluney v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing
Co., 489 F. Supp. 24, 26 (E.D.Wisc. 1980). This Court, like the
court in McCluney, declines to "imply a private cause of action
to uphold a public policy when [Congress] and the state
legislature have already provided enforcement mechanisms to
vindicate such policies." Id. Accordingly, defendant's motion
to dismiss Count IV is granted because it is duplicative of
plaintiff's federal and state statutory remedies.
It is so ordered.
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