This matter comes before the Court on the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment. Plaintiffs seek an order declaring
Illinois' Thoroughbred Rule 322 and Harness Racing Rule 25.19
unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
permanently enjoining defendants from engaging in certain acts
under the authority of those Rules, and holding defendants
liable for authorizing and conducting unlawful stops and
searches. Defendants oppose plaintiffs' motion and request
summary judgment in their favor. For the reasons which follow,
the plaintiffs' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The plaintiffs in this action are Don Serpas, Raymond
Johnson, and Carl Waters, individually and on behalf of the
class of all occupation licensees of the Illinois Racing Board
who serve as exercise persons, grooms, and hotwalkers at
Illinois race-tracks (the plaintiffs).*fn1 Each named
plaintiff lives in residential quarters at Arlington Park
Racetrack provided to him in connection with his work. The
defendants are former and present members of the Illinois
Racing Board, the director of the Illinois Department of Law
Enforcement (IDLE), and unknown agents of IDLE. On a motion
for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of certain searches conducted under the
authority of Thoroughbred Rule 322 and Harness Rule 25.19 (the
Rules).*fn2 The plaintiffs made three arguments against the
Rules' application and challenged: (1) the warrantless
searches of their residences; (2) the investigatory stops and
searches of their persons within the race track enclosure; and
(3) the conditioning of their occupation licenses upon their
consent to such searches. On June 16, 1983, this Court granted
the plaintiffs' motion and preliminarily enjoined the
challenged activities. Serpas v. Schmidt, Memorandum Opinion
(N.D.Ill. June 16, 1983) (hereinafter Mem. Op.).*fn3
Plaintiffs now move for summary judgment and defendants have
made a cross-motion for summary judgment as well. Summary
judgment shall be granted when the record shows that "there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The underlying facts and all inferences to
be drawn from them must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion. Fitzsimmons v. Best,
528 F.2d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 1976). A material question of fact is one
which is outcome determinative under the governing law. Egger
v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 1983). Whether there
is a disputed question of fact to be presented to the trier of
fact is, in the first instance, a question of law for the Court
The legal issues in the action fall into three parts: (1)
whether Fourth Amendment protection is afforded plaintiffs
during warrantless searches of their living quarters; (2)
whether the investigatory stops and searches of the
plaintiffs' person while in the race track enclosure are
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment; and (3) whether
the Rules unconstitutionally condition the occupation license
on consent to the searches.
I. Warrantless Residential Searches
In issuing the preliminary injunction, this Court placed the
burden upon the defendants to show their warrantless
residential searches, taken pursuant to the Rules, fell into
a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). In opposing the
plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, defendants now contest the
initial premise that the Fourth Amendment is applicable at all
to the plaintiffs' allegations. Defendants assert that the
searches take place within the context of the horse racing
industry, an industry with such a long history of regulation
that "no reasonable expectation of privacy exists within the
industry." United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir.
1980). Therefore, defendants argue, plaintiffs are without any
reasonable expectations of privacy and are necessarily outside
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. Defendants rely upon
a variety of factors — a long history of warrantless racetrack
searches, the public and plaintiffs' knowledge of the searches,
and the "commercial" nature of the plaintiffs' living quarters.
This reliance is misplaced.
Without doubt, defendants accurately assert that horse
racing is a highly regulated industry and that the State has
an interest in maintaining the industry's integrity.
Phillips v. Graham, 86 Ill.2d 274, 427 N.E.2d 550 (1981).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has clearly recognized that
warrantless searches in closely regulated industries can be
reasonable. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600, 101 S.Ct.
2534, 2538-39, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981). Under this exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, courts have found
that by accepting the benefits of a highly regulated trade, an
individual also accepts the burden of regulation and thereby
consents to administrative investigations or inspections.
Marshall v. Wait, 628 F.2d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1980).
Therefore, the individual operating within a highly regulated
industry can have no reasonable expectation of privacy as least
as to administrative inspections. Id. (emphasis added).
From this administrative inspection case law, defendants
conclude that plaintiffs cannot have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their living quarters located within the
racetrack grounds. To accept this conclusion, this Court must
accept defendants' necessary first premise — that the
warrantless searches of plaintiffs' living quarters are
administrative inspections. This court cannot accept the
characterization of the residential searches as administrative
inspections because: (A) the warrantless searches are conducted
on private, residential premises, not commercial premises; (B)
the statute's language in this case does not provide an
adequate substitute for a warrant; (C) the regulatory scheme
present does not provide an adequate substitute for a warrant;
and (D) a balance of plaintiffs' privacy interests and the
Government's enforcement needs favors the plaintiffs.
(A) Residential Nature of Plaintiffs' Quarters
The administrative inspection exception to the Fourth
requirement extends to commercial or public premises. An
administrative search of commercial premises and a warrantless
search of a private residence are afforded very different
degrees of protection. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 598-99,
101 S.Ct. at 2537-38. Defendants acknowledge these differences,
but justify the warrantless searches of plaintiffs' living
quarters by describing the quarters as commercial premises.
Defendants highlight the temporary, cramped, limited nature of
the quarters. The rooms are: only provided to employees;
adjacent to barns or above horse stalls; accessible by track
authorities who have a master key; and very small — providing
only one or two person occupancy. No cooking is permitted and
some licensees do not choose to stay in the dorm room.
The detailed description of the dorm rooms does not persuade
this Court that they qualify as a commercial premise for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The crucial quality which
the rooms possess is their exclusive residential use.
Serpas v. Schmidt, Mem.Op. at 8-10. The other details of the
plaintiffs' living conditions cannot deprive them of their
constitutional rights to be free of unreasonable searches in
their homes. The courts have viewed rooms similar to
plaintiffs' quarters as homes. These rooms include hotel rooms,
boarding house rooms, and college dormitory rooms. See, e.g.,
Stoner v. State of California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11
L.Ed.2d 856 (1964); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777
(W.D.Mich. 1975). Such private rooms have been found to be
homes and residences although they share the very qualities the
defendants argue make them "commercial": they are small,
temporary, and accessible by a master key. The plaintiffs'
rooms' proximity to the barns and stalls do not make them
commercial; they are used for residential purposes exclusively.
Defendants, however, analogize the warrantless searches of
plaintiffs' rooms to the warrantless searches of the baggage
of persons boarding airlines, United States v. Bonstein,
521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 918, 97 S.Ct.
1121, 47 L.Ed.2d 324 (1976); of persons entering courtrooms,
McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978); of prison
guards, United States v. Sihler, 562 F.2d 349 (5th Cir.
1977); and of a parolee's residence pursuant to a consent
provision in his parole terms, United States v. Dally,
606 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1979). These cases do not change the nature of
the plaintiffs' quarters. The cases generally involve searches
on public property — an airport, a courtroom, a prison. The
search of a parolee in Dally was governed by the terms of a
search consent which was a condition of a prisoner's parole.
The Dally search was not characterized as an
administrative inspection. Plaintiffs' situation is not
analogous to individuals on parole from prison.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' living quarters are residential,
not commercial. Their temporary and crowded conditions do not
change their nature. Although employed in a highly-regulated
industry, the plaintiffs possess the constitutional right to
be from unreasonable searches in their homes.
(B) Statutory Authority for the Searches
In other highly regulated industries, warrants are not
required where statutory language authorizes the terms and
conditions of searches of particular premises. Donovan v.
Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981)
(mining industry); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92
S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (gun dealers); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25
L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (liquor industry). The applicable statute in
the Illinois horse racing industry reads, in pertinent part:
(c) The Board, and any person or persons to whom
it delegates this power, is vested with the power
to enter the office, horse race track, facilities
and other places of business of any organization
licensee to determine whether there has
been compliance with the provisions of this Act
and its rules and regulations.
Illinois Horse Racing Act of 1975, 8 Ill. Ann.Stat. § 37-9
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980).
Defendants argued earlier and again urge the Court to find
that the terms "race track" and "facilities" must include the
dormitory rooms. Such a conclusion is said to be dictated by
the track's ownership of the rooms, the rooms' location within
the racetrack, the track's accessibility to the room for
health and safety inspections, and the track's provision of
the rooms to licensees at no charge. Defendants' Memo. at
19-20. None of these allegations change the exclusive
residential nature and purpose of the rooms themselves.
Nor does the language of the statute support defendants'
conclusion that the rooms are a "facility" or a "racetrack."
The sentence specifically lists a series of places and ends
with the general phrase — "and other places of
business. . . ." This concluding phrase labels the earlier
places as places of business. The most reasonable reading of
"facility" or "racetrack" within the sentence is to find that
they are examples of places of business. Therefore, as this
Court found earlier, there is "a complete dearth of statutory
authorization for searches of residences or statutory
limitations on any searches." Therefore, this Court "will not
authorize what the legislature has not." Mem.Op. at 17.
(C) Regulatory Powers as Authority for the Searches
In the absence of specific statutory authority, the
defendants argue that the power to conduct the warrantless
searches of plaintiffs' living quarters may be inferred or
implied from the broad regulatory powers of the Illinois Racing
Board. Defendants rely upon Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753,
765 (9th Cir. 1984), to argue that the Board has been given
extensive regulatory powers from which the power to search may
be inferred. Other courts have viewed a warrantless
administrative search as permissible only when the search is
specifically authorized by a statute. See, e.g., United States
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596, 32 L.Ed.2d
87 (1972); Bionic Auto Parts and Sales, Inc. v. Fahner,
721 F.2d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 1983). This Circuit does not appear
to recognize implied statutory authority for warrantless
administrative searches. Even if this Circuit should determine
to recognize inferred authority, the regulatory scheme in this
case is inadequate.
Under Balelo, to determine whether warrantless searches in a
closely regulated industry are reasonable, the court "must
decide whether the regulatory scheme `in terms of the certainty
and regularity of its application, provides a constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant.'" Balelo v. Baldridge, 724
F.2d at 765-66, quoting in part, Dewey v. Donovan, 456 U.S. at
603, 101 S.Ct. at 2540. The Balelo court found that a program
of observers of fishing vessels, which collected data pursuant
to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, was sufficiently regulated
to provide an adequate substitute for a warrant. The court
based its decision on several grounds: published regulations
which clearly defined the objective and purpose of the
observer; regulations which limited the scope of the observer's
activities; written manuals to define the observer's role;
standardized forms to record observations; advance notice to
the vessel's owner of an observer's presence; a pre-departure
conference; and the manual's specific limits which "do not
authorize the observers to conduct searches of the persons,
personal effects, or living quarters of the Captains and their
crews." Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d at 767. Moreover, no
alternative method of enforcement existed aboard the vessel.
Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d at 768 (Nelson, J., concurring).
The defendants urge the Court to find that the Board's
regulatory scheme offers similar "certainty and regularity" of
application and provides an adequate substitute for a warrant.
In contrast to the Balelo regulations, however, the agents who
conduct the living quarters' searches are not given written
manuals, but "given instructions" on "how to carry out the
No further details of the nature of the instructions are
offered. The search procedures include: having the agent
identify himself; signing a written consent form or where no
consent is given, the individual is reported to the steward;
and providing individuals with a receipt if the agents take any
property. Generally, rooms are searched only when an occupant
is present and the agent has permission to enter.
These practices, however, do not impose any meaningful
limitations on the agents' discretion. The searches may be
focused or random and are not restricted to particular times
nor restricted to particular areas or items in those areas
which are in plain view. Unlike the observers in
Balelo, the agents here may search plaintiffs' living quarters
and personal effects as extensively as they wish. Plainly, the
agents have an unrestricted scope of search; requiring them to
hand out receipts or consent forms does not affect or limit the
agent's discretion to undertake an exhaustive search of every
personal effect in an individual's room. These practices fall
short as an adequate substitute for a warrant.
(D) Balance of Privacy Interests and Enforcement
In determining the reasonableness of a warrantless search,
the Court must balance the enforcement needs of the government
and the privacy interest of the plaintiffs. See, e.g., Marshall
v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 at 321, 98 S.Ct. 1816 at 1825,
56 L.Ed.2d 305. The plaintiffs' interest is strong. "[P]hysical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording
of the Fourth Amendment is directed. . . ." United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125,
2134-35, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). Because of the constitutional
protection afforded the home, the warrant requirement has been
strictly applied to searches of the home. Illinois Migrant
Council v. Pillod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1021 (N.D.Ill. 1982).
Therefore, governmental authorities may not search the home
without a warrant showing probable cause unless there are
exigent circumstances. Id. at 1022. In Camara v. Municipal
Court, the Court found that administrative warrants could
authorize searches of dwellings for building code violations.
387 U.S. at 537-40, 87 S.Ct. at 1735-36. The Court articulated
several factors which made the search reasonable, including:
public interest in preventing or abating dangerous conditions;
the history of such inspections; good alternate techniques to
discover violations were not available; the searches were not
personal in nature; and the searches were not directed toward
discovering evidence of a crime. 387 U.S. at 536-37, 87 S.Ct.
The defendants contend that although plaintiffs' privacy
interests are great, the government's enforcement needs are
greater. They argue the warrantless residential searches are
reasonable and cite the long history of such warrantless
searches in Illinois and elsewhere. But, primarily, defendants'
arguments are focused on the public and the State's interests
in maintaining the integrity of the horse racing industry
— an industry prone to abuse by "undesireable elements."
Feliciano v. Illinois Racing Board, 110 Ill. App.3d 997, 66
Ill.Dec. 578, 443 N.E.2d 261 (1st Dist. 1982). Specifically,
defendants justify, the warrantless searches because they serve
as deterrents to violations, are justified by the "positive
results" — contraband found during searches, and because less
intrusive methods would be ineffective.
The deterrent effects of the searches cannot render them
constitutional. Proof of such deterrence is speculative. The
statistics of positive results from searches of the plaintiffs
do not readily support the defendants' position. During
1981-1983, there were 361 reported searches of the plaintiffs'
residences and persons. The stated purpose of such searches is
to find illegal "buzzers" and drugs which could affect the
results of the horse race. There appear to be approximately
seven searches which produced these items. Affidavit of Leonard
Becika, Exhibits A, B, C. These statistics do not justify the
warrantless searches. While the individual character
and integrity of the Board's licensees may reflect upon the
character of the horse racing industry, this does not justify
warrantless residential searches to insure that licensees
possess no drugs used by humans in their homes.
The defendants also contend that these unannounced
warrantless searches are the most effective method of
enforcement and that other less intrusive methods would be
ineffective. The element of surprise is deemed crucial to
enforcement. The element of surprise and a warrant to search,
however, may co-exist in an ex parte warrant. Marshall v.
Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. at 319-20, 98 S.Ct. at 1824. This
alternative would accommodate enforcement needs and the
plaintiffs' privacy rights. The rest of defendants' enforcement
scheme does not involve warrantless searches and can prevent
the wrongs they seek to prevent. Defendants may continue to
detain horses and conduct metal detector searches of them
before the race, make searches of the commercial premises of
the racetrack, and use drug testing techniques.
The defendants' enforcement needs do not outweigh the
plaintiffs' privacy interests. The additional Camara factors —
that the search not be personal in nature nor directed towards
discovery of criminal evidence — are plainly not present here.
Therefore, having considered both parties' interests fully,
this Court finds the plaintiffs' privacy interest is superior
and renders the warrantless searches of their homes
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
II. Stops and Searches of Plaintiffs' Persons
The plaintiffs have also challenged the warrantless
investigative stops and searches of their persons, which take
place anywhere within the racetrack enclosure. Defendants argue
that these searches, like the residential searches, are
sanctioned under the administrative search exception to the
Fourth Amendment. Once again, defendants have the burden of
showing statutory authority or even implied statutory authority
for the warrantless searches. The statute authorizes the search
of "facilities" and other commercial premises, but nowhere is
there authorization for the search, not of a place, but of a
person.*fn4 There is no statutory authority for the searches
nor any limits placed on the searchers' discretion. The
"orders" and procedures of the agents do not supply the
requisite limits on discretion. See supra, at 9-12.
Moreover, as Judge Prentice Marshall noted in Illinois
Migrant Council v. Pilliod, the Supreme Court has stated that
administrative warrants authorize searches of commercial
premises or property only — not the search of persons found on
the premises. 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1020-21 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
Finally, this Court has distinguished this case from Willey v.
Illinois Racing Board, et al., 74 C 3524, aff'd, 423 U.S. 802,
96 S.Ct. 9, 46 L.Ed.2d 23 (1975), and there are no reported
opinions which permitted administrative searches of commercial
premises and warrantless searches of licensees on the premises.
Mem.Op. at 18-23.
III. Conditioning License on Consent
The plaintiffs' last challenge is directed to the
conditioning of their occupation licenses upon their consent to
be searched. Defendants argue that the plaintiffs have
voluntarily consented to the searches by signing a statement to
abide by Board Rule 332 and 25.19, which are printed on the
application form. The defendants rely upon the doctrine of
implied consent — that when plaintiffs entered their
occupation, they agreed to abide by the industry's regulation.
This Court has found, however, that the issue is not whether
consent can be implied, but whether, absent the condition, the
challenged searches are constitutional. Mem.Op. at pp. 23-28.
Standing alone, the searches of
the residences and persons have been found to be
unconstitutional because they violate plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment rights. Because these searches are unconstitutional,
the license applications requiring consent to such searches are
also unconstitutional. The Racing Board cannot issue a license
conditioned on the applicant's consent to waive his or her
Fourth Amendment protections. Frost v. Railroad Commission,
271 U.S. 583, 592-594, 46 S.Ct. 605, 606-07, 70 L.Ed. 1101 (1926).
Defendants argue, however, that the question of consent by
plaintiffs raises a disputed question of material fact which
bars plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The facts
demonstrate that plaintiffs' signature and compliance was
motivated by their fear of losing the license and the
livelihood that could be available to them only through that
license.*fn5 The forms cannot make reasonable the warrantless
searches of plaintiffs' persons and homes. Schneckcloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
IV. Requirements for Permanent Injunction
To gain injunctive relief, the plaintiffs must demonstrate
that they have no adequate remedy at law and will suffer
irreparable harm without an injunction. The plaintiffs have
shown that in the absence of permanent injunction, they will
continue to have their homes and persons searched without a
warrant. Fourth Amendment violations have been deemed
"irreparable harm" for purposes of gaining injunctive relief.
Illinois Migrant Council v. Pillod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1023
(N.D.Ill. 1982). Additionally, the public has an interest in
securing the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The defendants
will retain their full complement of enforcement procedures and
will only be precluded from making unlawful searches and
seizures. Therefore, plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are
entitled to permanent injunctive relief.
V. Defendant's Liability for Unlawful Acts
Plaintiffs seek to have this Court hold defendants liable for
authorizing and conducting the unlawful stops and searches of
the named plaintiffs. Summary judgment is sought only on the
issue of liability, not damages. Both parties agree that the
applicable law of government official's qualified immunity is
set out in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727,
73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The Supreme Court stated: "On summary
judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the
currently applicable law, but whether the law was clearly
established at the time."
To establish this qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense, the defendants must demonstrate that the searches of
the named plaintiffs were authorized when they were made. The
standard requires the defendants to establish that their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known. Defendants argue that the law of warrantless
administrative investigations in closely regulated industries
plainly authorized their searches. Reasonable people could have
concluded they had the authority to conduct the searches.
Donovan and Camara permitted administrative searches and
defendants could have believed there were sufficient limits on
the discretion of those conducting the search. Therefore, this
court holds the defendants are not liable for authorizing and
conducting the unlawful stops and searches of the named
VI. Discovery Sanctions
Defendants have asked this Court to dismiss plaintiffs'
action because plaintiffs failed to answer discovery demands.
Plaintiffs invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to
defendants' interrogatories about plaintiffs' possession or use
equine drugs, buzzers or mechanical devices, and cocaine or
marijuana. Defendants assert that the information is requested
to show the need for their searches and to develop a possible
equitable defense of unclean hands. At a minimum, defendants
ask the Court to dismiss plaintiffs' damages claim.
Without addressing the necessity or relevance of the evidence
requested, this Court finds that the plaintiffs' invocation of
the Fifth Amendment does not warrant the extreme remedy of
dismissal. Case law indicates that dismissal is an option only
where the invocation of the right is improper and pretextual
and the plaintiff has refused the court's order compelling
discovery. See, e.g., Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054,
1057-58 (9th Cir. 1979). Neither element is present here;
plaintiff's invocation is not improper and no court order
issued. Plaintiffs have replied to discovery completely with
this exception. Defendants are not entitled to dismissal.
VII. Scope of the Injunction
The defendants also raise an issue concerning the scope of
this Court's injunction, if it issued. The plaintiffs seek
relief against the named defendants and this Court's injunction
binds them and "those persons in active concert or
participation with them who receive actual notice of the order
by personal service or otherwise." Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). At this
time, the Court grants the injunction against the named
VIII. Probable Cause Requirement
In its earlier decision, this Court conducted an extensive
analysis of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct.
1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) and concluded that under its
rationale, an administrative warrant would be inappropriate and
that defendants must procure a warrant based upon "the more
vigorous standard of `probable cause' used in criminal cases."
Mem.Op. at 29-37. At that time, the Court indicated that it
would entertain a motion to modify the type of warrant required
if further evidence were forthcoming. The evidence developed
during discovery has not disturbed the Court's initial
findings. Therefore, the Court finds that: (1) the harm
resulting from violations of racing requirements is not
comparable to the harm from "an epidemic or an uncontrollable
blaze" in Camara; (2) there is no showing that defendants will
be unable to regulate the industry effectively if probable
cause is required for a warrant; (3) there are important
privacy interests at stake and the searches are personal and
aimed at discovery of criminal evidence; (4) there are no
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards" for the
searches. See supra at 8-12.
For the foregoing reasons the Court declares: that
Thoroughbred Rule 322 and Harness Racing Rule 25.19 are
unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution.
The Court permanently enjoins defendants from engaging in
these acts pursuant to the Rules:
a. Conducting or authorizing searches and
seizures of the persons and residential quarters
of plaintiffs and the class they represent
without warrants and probable cause;
b. Conducting or authorizing investigatory
stops of plaintiffs and the class they represent
without at least a reasonable suspicion, based on
specific, articulable facts, that the person
stopped is engaged in criminal activity; and
c. Conditioning the issuance of occupation
licenses upon applicants' forfeiture of their
constitutional right to be free from the searches
authorized by Rules 322 and 25.19.
Finally, this Court holds that defendants are not liable to
the named plaintiffs for authorizing and conducting
unconstitutional searches of named plaintiffs' persons and