Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Before WOOD, POSNER, and FLAUM, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Refugio Marquez-Medina seeks review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen deportation proceedings. The BIA, in a per curiam order, summarily affirmed the decision of the immigration judge. The judge determined that Marquez-Medina had failed to demonstrate extreme hardship to himself or his United states citizen child. This Court has jurisdiction under section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). See Diaz-Salazar v. INS, 700 F.2d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1367, 103 S. Ct. 3112 (1983). We uphold the decision of the BIA.
Marquez-Medina is a fifty-one year old native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection in July of 1975.*fn1 On August 25, 1976, an immigration judge found Marquez-Medina to be deportable due to his entry into the United States without inspection by an immigration officer as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). In lieu of deportation, the immigration judge granted Marquez-Medina's request for voluntary departure. He overstayed the voluntary departure date and an order of deportation was entered. However, he remained in the United States with indefinite voluntary departure status until May 7, 1982, pursuant to a restraining order in Seiva v. Levi.*fn2
In July 1982, Marquez-Medina filed a motion to reopen deportation proceedings and for a stay of deportation supported by his affidavit and other documentary evidence. The immigration judge denied the motion to reopen. By per curiam order dated July 17, 1984, the BIA summarily affirmed the immigration judge. Marquez-Medina petitioners for review of the BIA decision.
Section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a), accords the Attorney General discretion to suspend the deportation of otherwise deportable aliens to prevent "extreme hardship." INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 78 L. Ed. 2d 401, 104 S. Ct. 584 (1984); INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 67 L. Ed. 2d 123, 101 S. Ct. 1027 (1981) (per curiam); see also Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1982). To be eligible for discretionary suspension of deportation, the alien must show: (1) that he has been physically present in the United States for continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such application; (2) that during all such period, he was and is a person of good moral character and (3) that his deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or his spouse, parent or child who is a citizen of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a). The Act does not expressly provide for a motion to reopen, but regulations promulgated under the Act allow such a procedure. Title 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1984) provides in pertinent part:
Motions to reopen in deportation proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; nor shall any motion to reopen for the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief be granted . . . unless the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances which have arisen subsequent to the hearing.
The regulations also provide that the motion to reopen shall "state the new facts to be proved at the reopened hearing and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material." 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1984). A motion to reopen should only be granted where the petitioner establishes a prima facie case of eligibility for the relief requested. See Wang, 450 U.S. at 141; Diaz-Salazar, 700 F.2d at 1159. In the present case, neither side disputes that Marquez-Medina has established the first two statutory requirements for suspension of deportation. The issue in this case is whether the BIA abused its discretion in determining that Marquez-Medina had failed to establish "extreme hardship."*fn3
Marquez-Medina contends that the immigration judge, upon whom the BIA relied, erred in determining that his deportation will not cause extreme hardship to himself or his family.*fn4 Allegedly, economic and emotional hardships to Marquez-Medina, as well as detriment to his citizen child's, Angelica, health and welfare constitute extreme hardship such that his deportation should be precluded. The determination of what constitutes extreme hardship is a task left "in the first instance to the Attorney General." Wang, 450 U.S. at 144. "The Attorney General and his delegates have the authority to construe 'extreme hardship' narrowly should they deem it wise to do so. Such a narrow interpretation is consistent with the 'extreme hardship' language which itself indicates the exceptional nature of the suspension remedy." Id. at 145; see also Diaz-Salazar, 700 F.2d at 1159.
An examination of the immigration judge's decision reveals that he carefully and cumulatively considered Marquez-Medina's allegations of extreme hardship. Marquez-Medina's argument that his deportation would result in a de facto deportation of his citizen child has been flatly rejected by the courts. Nor can the petitioner benefit from the argument that should be deported his daughter would be deprived of the other privileges and benefits of United States citizenship. An illegal alien cannot gain a favored status merely by the birth of a citizen child. See, e.g., Bueno-Carrilo, 682 F.2d at 146. The citizen child admittedly may face difficulties in adjusting to Mexican life. However, as the judge noted, such difficulties do not materially differ from those encountered by other children who may relocate with their parents, especially at Angelica's young age. See Diaz-Salazar, 700 F.2d at 1160. While Marquez-Medina raises Angelica's medical problems to support his claim of hardship, her physician's letter,*fn5 submitted to the immigration judge, is simply inadequate to establish medical hardship. There is no indication how serious the problems may be or what treatment is necessary. if indeed the problems are treatable. Moreover, Marquez-Medina presented no evidence that Angelica will not receive adequate treatment in Mexico. On appeal, he makes the conclusory statement that "health care is for the most part unavailable in the Marquezes' home town in Mexico and the cost for treatment where available is excessive." Clearly, such a claim is insufficient to constitute extreme hardship even if supported by competent evidence. See, e.g., Bueno v. INS, 578 F. Supp. 22, 25 (N. D. Ill. 1983) (will consider availability of medical care nationwide).
Addressing the issue of economic detriment, the immigration judge noted that Marquez-Medina "has not shown that he suffers from any physical or mental impairment which would restrict his employment or limit the type of employment he could perform in Mexico." Due to his limited education and lack of skills, petitioner asserts that his inability to obtain employment in Mexico will result in extreme economic hardship. It is well settled that economic detriment is a factor for consideration when determining extreme hardship. See, e.g., Diaz-Salazar, 700 F.2d at 1160; Mendoza-Hernandez v. INS, 664 F.2d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 1981). Apparently his unsupported claim relies on general economic conditions in Mexico, not on any condition or circumstance unique to him. As such, the claim is insufficient. The other economic hardships, loss on the sale of his home and the loss of his present employment and its benefits, similarly do not constitute extreme hardship. The record shows he purchased the home, after a deportation order was entered, for $22,000 in 1978 and four years later, in his application for suspension of deportation, he listed the value of his real estate assets at $47,000. Additionally, the loss of a job along with its employee benefits does not entail extreme or unique economic hardship. ...