the claim of a violation of Schoepf's privilege against
B. Due Process Claim
Plaintiff argues that his employment with defendant school
board constituted a property or liberty interest which could
not be taken away from him without due process. This Court
finds that plaintiff's resignation was voluntary and, thus,
any due process rights to which he otherwise would have been
entitled are waived. Accordingly, the Court grants defendants'
motion for summary judgment as to the due process claim.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his resignation was
obtained by external coercion or duress. As Christie v. United
States, 518 F.2d 584 (Ct.Cl. 1975), notes, "[d]uress is not
measured by the employee's subjective evaluation of a
situation. Rather, the test is an objective one." Id. at 587.
(Citing McGucken v. United States, 407 F.2d 1349, 1351 (Ct.Cl.
1969); Pitt v. United States, 420 F.2d 1028, 190 Ct.Cl. 506,
513 (1970).) Therefore, the Court must ignore the plaintiff's
subjective state of mind and ignore the personal tragedies to
which plaintiff was exposed. Thus, the issue presented is
whether the plaintiff was objectively coerced into resigning or
was he merely faced with "two unpleasant alternatives[?]" See
Christie, supra, 518 F.2d at 587. Here, as in Christie, the
plaintiff was merely faced with two unpleasant alternatives.
The court in Cosby v. United States, 417 F.2d 1345 (Ct.Cl.
1969), found that "[e]ven where the employee is told that he
must choose between resignation and separation, the subsequent
choice of resignation is not coerced unless the employee can
show that his superior knew or believed that the reasons for
the proposed separation could not be substantiated." Cosby,
supra, 417 F.2d 1355. There is no evidence in the record to
suggest that the defendants would not have reasonably
considered Schoepf's alleged theft from the Xerox machine good
cause for discharge. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the
record to suggest that Superintendent Keeling did not
reasonably believe that the theft could be proved. Accordingly,
Schoepf's choice of resignation was not coerced under Cosby.
There is no question of material fact that the defendants
reasonably believed that Schoepf's proposed separation could be
substantiated by the events that occurred on March 1, 1983.
Therefore, this Court finds that plaintiff's resignation was
made voluntarily and that any denial of due process claim has
been waived. This Court grants defendants' motion for summary
judgment on this issue.*fn5
C. Equal Protection
The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to plead
sufficient allegations of fact to assert a claim under the
equal protection clause. There is no evidence in the record
that suggests that anyone else was treated differently from
Schoepf. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact as
to the equal protection claim. This Court grants defendants'
motion for summary judgment of this issue.
III. REMAINING COUNTS II, III, AND IV
Since this Court grants summary judgment as to all the
federal claims raised in
Count I before trial, Counts II, III, and IV are dismissed
without prejudice for lack of pendent jurisdiction. See Buethe
v. Britt Airlines, Inc., 749 F.2d 1235, 1239-41 (7th Cir.
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count I of
plaintiff's complaint is granted. Counts II, III, and IV are
dismissed without prejudice for lack of pendent jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.