The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bua, District Judge.
The defendants, Marianne Y. Thomas, Barbara Rowan, Anthony Moore,
Marianne Green, William Olson, James O'Grady, Richard Brzeczek, and the
City of Chicago move for summary judgment in their favor pursuant to Rule
56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated
below, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and
denied in part.
Construing all facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
following facts are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. On
August 7, 1982, plaintiff Nancy J. Doe learned that a warrant had been
issued for her arrest. The arrest warrant was based on Doe's failure to
appear in state court on July 29, 1982 with respect to a misdemeanor
indictment charging violations of the Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, § 17-1(B)(a). Bond was set at $200. Doe
then traveled to the Jefferson Park Police Station with $200 in cash,
prepared to post bond. At the Jefferson Park Police Station, Doe
identified herself to the desk officer and advised him of both the arrest
warrant and the $200 bond.
Doe was taken immediately into an interview room, handcuffed to the
wall, and asked general questions by Officer Green,
Officer Moore or Officer Richard Roe.*fn1 The questioning officer then
left the room. Upon returning, the officer informed Doe that she was
under arrest and would be transported to another facility. Doe again
requested to post bond, but was denied that request. Doe was not informed
of her Miranda rights either when she was handcuffed to the wall or when
she was informed of her arrest.
Doe's handcuff was detached from the wall and placed upon her
unhandcuffed wrist. Fully handcuffed, Doe was then transported from the
Jefferson Park Police Station to the Grand and Central Police Station.
Upon arrival, Doe was transferred to a policewoman's care. Doe again
informed the officer (either Officer Rowan, Officer Thomas, or Officer
Moe) of the warrant and offered to post bond. The policewoman refused the
offer. The policewoman then "shoved [Doe] against a wall so that the back
of her head hit the wall, intimidated and frightened her and snapped her
picture with a camera." Plaintiff's Affidavit, at ¶ 4. Doe was then
"led to a table and her fingerprints [were] taken with much force." Id.
at ¶ 5.
After Doe was fingerprinted, a policewoman ordered Doe to undress and
submit to a body cavity search. The policewoman conducted the strip
search and body cavity search while another policewoman watched. During
the search, the policewomen "started to punch and beat [Doe] and kicked
her with great force in an injured leg, struck her in the head [,] beat
her about the arms and body and stunned her." Plaintiff's Affidavit, at
¶ 5. As a result of the search, Doe incurred both internal and
external injuries, including bruises to her face, arms and legs. Doe was
then left in a cell without concern for her injuries and without food for
more than eight hours before her family came to the station and posted
bond for her. Doe was then released from custody.
The named defendants have moved pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure that summary judgment be granted in their
favor. Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment will be granted if there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact. Cedillo v. International
Association, etc., 603 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1979). The Court gives the party
opposing the motion the benefit of any reasonable inferences which can be
drawn from the facts in the materials submitted. United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962).
Count I of Doe's Amended Complaint charges that Officer Green, Officer
Moore or Officer Richard Roe unconstitutionally "seized" Doe's person by
handcuffing her to the wall of an interrogation room at the Jefferson
Park Police Station. Also, Doe alleges that the police officers
deliberately denied Doe her state constitutional rights under Ill.
Const. Art. I, § 9 and her statutory right to post bond under
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, §§ 110-7 and 110-9. The officers, according to
Doe, violated Doe's rights to be free from unreasonable seizures, her
right to equal protection under the law, and her right to due process.
Doe seeks compensatory and punitive damages from Officers Moore, Green,
and Richard Roe under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, and 1988; U.S. Const.
Amendments VIII and XIV; Ill. Const. Art. I, § 9; and Ill.Rev.Stat.,
ch. 38, §§ 110-7 and 110-9.
Count II charges that Officers Thomas, Rowan, and Moe deprived Doe of
her liberty without due process of law, her right to equal protection of
the laws, her right to be free of false arrest and imprisonment, her
right to bail, and her right to assistance of counsel. Doe claims further
that she was denied the right to make any telephone calls as guaranteed
under the Illinois Constitution. Doe seeks compensatory and punitive
damages against Officers Thomas, Rowan, and Moe under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and 1983; U.S. Const. Amendments V, VI, and XIV; Ill. Const. Art. I,
§ 9; and Ill. Rev.Stat. ch. 38, §§ 103-3(a) and (b).
Count III alleges that the strip search and body cavity search of Doe
denied Doe of her liberty without due process of law, her right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, her right to be free from
the use of excessive force, and her right to privacy. Doe seeks
compensatory and punitive damages against Officers Rowan, Thomas, and Moe
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983.
Count IV alleges that the City of Chicago and the Superintendent of
Police failed to provide the training, educating, and regulating of
police officers with regard to strip searches and body cavity searches.
Doe charges that defendants have a pattern or practice of strip searching
and body cavity searching arrestees as part of the general booking
procedure. Thus, Doe charges that the City of Chicago and the
Superintendent deprived Doe of her right to privacy and her right to be
free from unreasonable searches. Doe seeks compensatory damages against
the City of. Chicago and the Superintendent under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Count V alleges that the City and the Superintendent of Police violated
their duty to train, supervise, and educate the police officers, and
thus, Doe was denied her constitutional right to post bond, her right to
equal protection of the laws, her state constitutional right to telephone
her attorney, her right to counsel, her right to be free from
unreasonable searches, and her right to be read her Miranda ...