prosecutors' involvement in execution of the Warrant.
If Barsanti and Johnson may claim only a qualified immunity,
plaintiffs must allege and prove the prosecutors did not act
in good faith. Lenard, 699 F.2d at 884. Both prosecutors have
submitted affidavits reflecting good faith actions, at least so
far as the extension of the search to the unattached garage was
concerned. But a Rule 12(b)(6) motion limits this Court to the
facts as stated in the Complaint.*fn11 It is not clear
plaintiffs will be unable to prove any set of fact supporting
Barsanti and Johnson's lack of good faith as to the illegal
aspects of the search. For the moment — though admittedly it
may turn out to be a brief one — Barsanti and Johnson must
remain as defendants.
Plaintiffs' attempt to draw Morrow and Office into the suit
turns on the allegation that Morrow did not train his
employees to respect the constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures. That allegation is not so
well-craft-ed as one might like, but it conveys clearly enough
the claim that Morrow, through poor training, hiring and
supervision, has encouraged Assistant State's Attorneys
routinely to become involved in illegal searches. That
allegation (1) identifies a policy or custom and (2) indicates
how it caused the complained-of behavior and plaintiffs'
resulting harm. It suffices to state a claim under
Monell against Morrow.*fn12 See Padilla, 580 F. Supp. at 406.
Of course the vagueness of plaintiffs' allegations raises doubt
as to whether their claim can survive anything more than a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, but that is all they must do at present
(subject again to the caveat in n. 11).
Defendants have moved to strike plaintiffs' punitive damages
claims against Morrow and Kramer in their official capacities
and against County. Defendants correctly observe that after
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101
S.Ct. 2748, 2762, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), a local governmental
body is immune from punitive damages under Section 1983.
Moreover, the suits against Morrow and Kramer in their official
capacities are merely suits against County, Wolf-Lillie, 699
F.2d at 870, so the punitive damages claims against them must
be dismissed as well.
Shotgun Naming of Defendants
Finally defendants seek to dismiss the Complaint against 19
Sheriff's officers whose names were added on amendment of the
original complaint. It appears that rather than refer to
unknown deputies who participated in the search with Ramsey,
plaintiffs have chosen to name all officers who work for
Kramer. Accordingly defendants' motion is granted as to any of
the named officers who did not participate in the execution of
the Warrant. Department is ordered to supply a list of those
officers to plaintiffs on or before March 4, 1985.
Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied as to:
1. plaintiffs' Count I unreasonable search and
seizure claims; and
2. plaintiffs' Count IV claims against
Barsanti, Johnson and Morrow.
Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted as to:
1. plaintiffs' Count I equal protection claims;
2. Count II in its entirety;
3. Count III in its entirety;
4. plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages
against (a) Morrow and Kramer in their official
capacities and (b) County;
5. Office; and