The opinion of the court was delivered by: Baker, Chief Judge.
On September 25, 1984, the plaintiff filed this action pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., charging the defendant, Danville Metal Stamping, with
employment discrimination. In particular, the plaintiff claims
that she was denied proper wage increases and eventually was
discharged because of her race and sex. The plaintiff also claims
that she was subjected to racial harrassment by her supervisor.
This matter is before the court on the defendant's "Motion to
Dismiss and for Summary Judgment."
The plaintiff, Carol Parker, was the complainant in the case of
Carol Parker v. Danville Metal Stamping Company, charge No.
1981SF-0445 (Illinois Human Rights Commission). On March 23,
1981, the plaintiff filed her charge of employment discrimination
with the Illinois Department of Human Rights ("the DHR") claiming
that the Danville Metal Stamping Company had discriminated
against her on the basis of her race, sex, and "physical
handicaps." The DHR conducted an investigation and held a
fact-finding conference on September 11, 1981, which was attended
by both parties and their witnesses. After reviewing the
evidence, the DHR dismissed all of the charges for lack of
The plaintiff then filed a request for a review of the DHR's
decision with the Illinois Human Rights Commission ("the HRC") on
April 21, 1982. On August 18, 1982, the HRC ruled that a hearing
should be held to consider three of the plaintiff's allegations.
Accordingly, the HRC issued a complaint on September 2, 1982, and
assigned the matter to an administrative law judge ("ALJ") for an
On September 30, 1982, the defendant answered the complaint and
initiated the discovery process. The plaintiff's counsel answered
the defendant's discovery requests and initiated discovery on the
plaintiff's behalf, filing both a request for the production of
documents and a set of interrogatories. The plaintiff's attorney
also prepared a pre-hearing memorandum which was submitted to the
HRC on December 21, 1982.
On December 28 and 29, 1982, an evidentiary hearing was held to
adjudicate the merits of the plaintiff's complaint. During the
two-day hearing, each party had an opportunity to examine and
cross-examine witnesses under oath pursuant to the Illinois Rules
of Evidence. The plaintiff's attorney made an opening statement,
called five witnesses for examination, and offered six exhibits,
all of which were admitted into evidence.
In its "Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment", the
defendant urges the court to follow the decision of the Northern
District of Illinois in Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola General
Bottlers, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D.Ill. 1984), and to bar this
Title VII action by the doctrine of res judicata. In Buckhalter,
the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged from his employment
because of his race. The plaintiff first filed a charge of racial
discrimination with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Commission ("the FEPC").*fn1 After a full hearing, an ALJ dismissed
the plaintiff's claims. The full HRC affirmed the dismissal. The
plaintiff then was issued a right to sue letter from the EEOC and
filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and
42 U.S.C. § 1981. As in this case, the plaintiff in Buckhalter made
the same claims as were considered and decided upon by the HRC.
The district court in Buckhalter held that the plaintiff's claims
were barred by the res judicata effect of the state
The district court in Buckhalter held that it was required to
give "full faith and credit" and preclusive effect to a state
administrative determination if the administrative tribunal was
acting in a "judicial capacity" in rendering a decision.
Buckhalter, 590 F. Supp. at 1149. The court thus distinguished the
findings of a state agency in its investigative capacity from an
agency's determinations in its "judicial capacity". Buckhalter,
590 F. Supp. at 1149. The district court further read Kremer v.
Chemical Construction Corporation, 456 U.S. 461, 470 n. 7, 102
S.Ct. 1883, 1891 n. 7, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982), as foreclosing res
judicata effect only to those state administrative decisions
which are investigative or purely administrative in nature and
not to the determinations of an agency when acting in a "judicial
capacity". Buckhalter, 590 F. Supp. at 1148-1149.
The district court then noted that the HRC has no equivalent in
the federal system, insofar as it is empowered to act in a
judicial capacity. Buckhalter, 590 F. Supp. at 1149. Indeed, the
HRC may grant several forms of relief upon a determination of a
civil rights violation. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, Par. 8-108. HRC
decisions are given preclusive effect in Illinois courts and may
be overturned only if contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, Par. 8-111. A HRC holding may be
appealed to the Illinois Circuit Courts pursuant to the
Administrative Review Law (Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, Par. 3-101 et
seq.). Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, Par. 8-111(a). In finding that the
HRC determination should be given preclusive effect, the district
court in Buckhalter also placed emphasis on the fact that the
plaintiff was afforded due process before the HRC.
The court, however, disagrees with the Northern District of
Illinois' interpretation of Kremer and its holding in Buckhalter.
The court holds that the determination of the HRC in this case is
not to be given preclusive effect in the plaintiff's subsequent
Title VII action. The United States Supreme Court, in Kremer v.
Chemical Construction Corporation, 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883,
72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982), held that a district court was required
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, United States
Constitution, Article IV, § 1, and its implementing statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1738, to give preclusive effect to a state court
decision upholding a state administrative agency's rejection of
an employment discrimination claim. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 485, 102
S.Ct. at 1899. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, implemented by
§ 1738, is the means by which state adjudications are made res
judicata. Batiste v. Furnco
Construction Company, 503 F.2d 447, 457 (7th Cir. 1974). The
focus of the Supreme Court's attention in Kremer was on the state
court's decision on review of the state administrative
determination. The failure of the plaintiff in this case to fully
pursue state procedures does not indicate the inadequacy of the
procedures, Kremer, 456 U.S. at 485, 102 S.Ct. at 1899, but her
failure to appeal the HRC's determination to a state circuit
court does not elevate the HRC's findings to the level of a final
state court judgment for res judicata purposes under Title VII.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Kremer found that Title VII is not
immunized from the applications of "full faith and credit" and
res judicata principles. The Supreme Court correctly recognized
that no "affirmative showing" of a "clear and manifest"
legislative intent exists behind Title VII to deny res judicata
or collateral estoppel effect to a state court judgment affirming
a state agency determination. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468-76, 102
S.Ct. at 1890-94. An exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 will not be
recognized unless a later statute contains an express or implied
partial repeal. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99, 101 S.Ct. 411,
417, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). No claim is made that Title VII
expressly repealed § 1738, and repeals by implication are not
favored. See Radzanower v. ...