plaintiff's claim that they should be held personally liable for Fruit
Count II, after the dismissal of these defendants from Count I, now
calls upon the court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over not only an
additional claim but also over additional parties. While some circuits
have permitted the joinder of additional parties pursuant to the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction, See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693,
713-14 nn. 29 and 30, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 1797-98 nn. 29 and 30, 36 L.Ed.2d
596 (1973); the Seventh Circuit, which this court is bound to follow, has
held that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction cannot be extended to
allow the addition of new parties who are implicated only in the state
law claim. U.S. General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir.
1979); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973); Oakhill
Cemetery of Hammond v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp. 885 (N.D.Ill. 1981).
Therefore, because Count II is a state law claim over which the court
lacks independent federal jurisdiction, and because the parties to this
count are not parties to the federal law claim, this court lacks
jurisdiction over Count II. Accordingly, Count II must be dismissed.
Moreover, assuming arguendo, that the court had not dismissed these
defendants from Count I, it would still be compelled to dismiss Count
II. As noted in Gibbs, pendent jurisdiction is not a matter of right, but
rather, a doctrine of discretion. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. A court should only exercise pendent
jurisdiction when the two claims are derived from a common nucleus of
operative facts. Id. at 725. A review of the allegations of both counts of
the amended complaint discloses that the claim in Count II is not derived
from the same facts as alleged in plaintiff's first claim. Count I
relates to the reparation order; it only alleges facts which deal with
the sale of the cherries that culminated in the proceedings before the
Secretary of Agriculture. Count II, on the other hand, contains broad
sweeping allegations of corporate mismanagement not related at all to the
allegations of Count I. For example, plaintiff alleges, among other
things, that certain of the defendants have failed to conduct
arm's-length transactions with related entities, have misused corporate
assets, diverted corporate funds, and made large withdrawals out the
corporate bank account for personal use. Clearly, these allegations are
not derived from same core of operative facts as those alleged in Count
I. Therefore, even if the court had not dismissed all the parties except
Fruit Hill from Count I, it would still, in its discretion, decline to
exercise pendent jurisdiction over Count II. Accordingly, the motion to
dismiss Count II is granted.
In conclusion, for the reasons stated, defendants Wise Farms &
Storage, Inc., Greg Prillwitz, Wes Prillwitz, Robert Crows, James Adams,
Bryan Canney, and Thomas Adams, are dismissed from this suit; and Count
II of the Amended Complaint is stricken. Therefore, only Count I, with
Fruit Hill, Inc. as the sole defendant, remains pending before the
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