The opinion of the court was delivered by: Shadur, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Court's December 7, 1983 opinion rejected defendants'
Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule") 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Green's
federal claims advanced in Complaint Counts I and II. Now
various of the individual doctor defendants have moved (1) for
summary judgment on the pendent state law claims in Counts
VIII through XIV and (2) to dismiss the pendent claim in Count
XV. For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and
1. Summary judgment is granted as to Counts
VIII through XIV, which are dismissed with
2. Green is given leave to amend Count XV as
proposed in his response to the motion to dismiss
that count (subject however to the application to
Count XV of the principles expressed in this
opinion as to the other counts).
Green complains of allegedly racially-motivated, invidiously
discriminatory revocation of his staff privileges at Silver
Cross. Complaint Counts VIII through XIV charge seven of the
Silver Cross staff physicians with defamatory statements
impugning Green's competence as a doctor. Count XV says Silver
Cross and the individual defendants engaged in conduct
interfering with Green's justified business expectations as a
Though all the individual physicians named in Counts VIII
through XIV filed what they label as motions for summary
judgment, their supporting affidavits do not even address the
truth or falsity of their statements the Complaint charges as
false and defamatory. Instead they say only the statements
were made as testimony at an April 14, 1983 hearing before
Silver Cross's Credentials Committee, which met at that time
to consider the prior suspension of Green's hospital
Defendants' Summary Judgment Motions
Defendants' motions for summary judgment were really
ill-advised. Rule 56 is not designed for a motion addressing
only one or more issues in a separate claim, as distinct from
the claim itself. SFM Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 102 F.R.D.
555, 558-59 (N.D.Ill. 1984). Rather summary judgment is
supposed to be a substitute for trial where no questions of
credibility or other factual disputes pose "a genuine issue as
to any material fact" (Rule 56(c)). 10 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure. Civil 2d § 2712, at 564-67 &
567 n. 6 (1983). To the same effect, see the Advisory Committee
on Rules comment on the 1963 amendment to Rule 56(e):
The very mission of the summary judgment
procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to
assess the proof in order to see whether there is
a genuine need for trial.
It is therefore the movant's obligation to support its motion
by advancing all the relevant facts, without holding back
evidence that would be presented at trial. Keene Corp. v.
International Fidelity Insurance Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665-66
(N.D.Ill. 1983) (on motion for reconsideration), adopted and
affirmed 736 F.2d 388, 393 (7th Cir. 1984).
For those reasons, had this Court disagreed with defendants'
position as to the Illinois Medical Studies Act (the "Act")
dealt with hereafter, defendants might well have been
foreclosed from disputing the falsity of their statements
about Green. Of course they did not intend any such result,
but fortunately this Court does not have to decide that
question in light of its conclusion as to the scope of the
Act. That misperception by defendants' counsel, and the
matching errors by Green's counsel (see n. 3), have been just
another illustration of a frequently-encountered phenomenon
fundamental misunderstanding of what summary judgment practice
is really about.
This opinion turns to the issue on which defendants thus
staked their all (though they did not mean to): the effect of
the Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. ...