The opinion of the court was delivered by: Shadur, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Wallace Clark ("Clark") and his wife Lucille ("Mrs. Clark") sue the
City of Chicago ("City"), Donald T. Podgorny ("Podgorny"), Stephan J.
Wilke ("Wilke"), Richard J. Brzeczek ("Brzeczek") and Francis A. Nolan
("Nolan"), claiming injury from the issuance of a parking citation and
Clark's ensuing arrest and detention on charges of disorderly conduct and
resisting a law enforcement officer. Their nine-count Complaint asserts
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985 and 1986, several theories of
pendent state law claims by Clark, and two pendent loss-of-consortium
claims by Mrs. Clark.
Defendants have moved under Fed.R. Civ.P. ("Rule") 12(b)(6) to dismiss
the Complaint entirely as to City, Brzeczek and Nolan and to dismiss all
but the Section 1983 claim as to Podgorny and Wilke. In an oral bench
ruling June 28 this Court (1) struck all Complaint references to Sections
1985 and 1986 and (2) refused to dismiss City, Brzeczek and Nolan from
Count I's Section 1983 claim.*fn1 This opinion deals
with the Complaint's various state law claims.
In April 1982 Clark and his grandson were seated in his lawfully parked
automobile near 34th and Halsted Streets in Chicago. Chicago police
officers Podgorny and Wilke first falsely cited Clark for illegal
parking, then — without probable cause — forced Clark to go to
the district police station, subjecting him in the process to unprovoked
physical and verbal abuse. They then — again without reasonable
cause — charged Clark with disorderly conduct and resisting an
officer and detained him for a period of time. All charges against Clark
have been decided in his favor.
City, Brzeczek and Nolan have engaged in a pattern of failures in the
training and discipline of Chicago police officers. Those failures have
created a climate that has encouraged the unlawful conduct exemplified by
Podgorny's and Wilke's actions against Clark.
As a result of the conduct already described, Clark has suffered and
will continue to suffer serious physical and mental injury. Mrs. Clark
has in turn sustained a loss of consortium.
Clark's Pendent State Law Claims*fn3
Whenever plaintiffs stray from the mandates of Rule 8(a)(2) ("a short
and plain statement of the claim") and Rule 8(e) ("simple, concise, and
direct" averments), both the defendants and the court are disadvantaged
in dealing with the complaint. Clark's Complaint is no exception. Its
factual allegations are unduly repetitive, and it multiplies a single
episode into a plethora of claims besides the Count I claim already upheld
under Section 1983:
1. Count II asserts all defendants violated Clark's
rights under the due process clause of the Illinois
Constitution, Ill. Const. art. I, § 2.
2. Count III advances a claim against all defendants
for false arrest and imprisonment.
3. Count IV charges all defendants based on the
Podgorny-Wilke assault and battery.
4. Count V is a malicious prosecution action against
5. Count VI runs against City for negligence of its
duties in the hiring, training, supervising and
disciplining of police officers.
6. Count VII charges City with willful and wanton
disregard of its duties in the hiring, training,
supervising and disciplining of police officers.
Defendants' position as to Count II is summarized succinctly at R.
There is not [a] common law claim for violation of
one's state constitutional rights, just as there is
not [a] cause of action which may be brought ...