The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bua, District Judge.
Before the Court is defendant's motion to transfer this case to
the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For the reasons stated herein,
defendant's motion to transfer is granted.
The following facts are set forth in the First Amended
Complaint filed by plaintiff on July 19, 1984, and an affidavit
filed by defendant on July 9, 1984.
The Fund brings this three-count complaint against Brown,
invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 502(e)(1)
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), and Section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
The Fund alleges that Brown has breached the terms of various
agreements which require Brown to make monthly pension
contributions to the Fund on behalf of Brown's employees. Brown
is allegedly delinquent in the amount of $80,148.26 to the Fund.
In support of the breach of contract claim for the period of
May 1, 1980, through April 30, 1983, the Fund attaches a copy of
a collective bargaining agreement ("the 1980-83 agreement")
executed by Teamsters Local No. 347 and Egyptian Truck Owners
Association, Inc. ("the Association"). Apparently in an attempt
to establish that the 1980-83 agreement obligates Brown to make
payments to the Fund, the Fund alleges that Brown granted the
Association a power of attorney and authorized the Association to
negotiate and sign the 1980-83 agreement on behalf of Brown.
Brown, however, denies that he ever granted the Association a
power of attorney and further denies that he was ever a member of
the Association. The Association's Secretary, B.R. Waldren,
possesses the books and records of the Association, and resides
in Herrin, Illinois.
Section 1404(a), 28 U.S.C. provides:
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought.
Id. In order to show that transfer of venue is proper, the moving
party must establish that (1) venue is proper in the transferor
court; (2) venue is proper in the transferee court, and (3) the
transfer is for the "convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice." Midwest Precision Services v. PTM
Industries, 574 F. Supp. 657, 659 (N.D.Ill. 1983) (quoting
Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Igoe, 212 F.2d 378, 379 n. 1 (7th
Cir. 1954)). Although the party seeking transfer bears the burden
of establishing that a transfer of venue is proper, the burden
under § 1404(a) is substantially less than a transfer under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick,
349 U.S. 29, 75 S.Ct. 544, 99 L.Ed. 789 (1955).
Jurisdiction for the Fund's complaint is grounded upon
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) and 1132(e)(1). Claims brought solely against an
employer under § 185(a) are subject to the general venue statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1391. Stith v. Manor Baking Co., 418 F. Supp. 150, 155
(W.D.Mo. 1976); 1 Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 0.144 [14.-16] (2d
ed. 1984), at 1568. Venue is proper under § 1391 in the judicial
district where all defendants reside or in which the claim arose.
28 U.S.C. § 1391. Claims brought under § 1132(e)(1) are subject
to the specific ERISA venue statute contained in
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), which provides that venue is proper in the judicial
district "where the [employee benefit] plan is administered,
 where the breach took place, or  where a defendant resides
or may be found. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).
In this case, the Fund is administered in the Northern District
of Illinois; the claim arose in the Southern District of
Illinois; the "breach took place" in the Southern District, and
the defendant resides in the Southern District. Thus, venue,
under ERISA, is proper in both the transferor and transferee
districts. Furthermore, since Brown has failed to object to
improper venue in the Northern District of Illinois on the §
185(a) claim, venue is also proper under § ...