The opinion of the court was delivered by: Aspen, District Judge.
 Because plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed Count II, Count I is
the only remaining portion of the complaint. Plaintiff asserts that Count
I, though "admittedly inartfully drawn" in some ways, properly states the
requisite elements of the tort of intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage. Under Illinois law, this tort has four
(1) Plaintiff has a reasonable expectancy of entering
into a valid business relationship
(2) Defendant knows of plaintiff's expectancy
(3) Defendant intentionally interferes in plaintiff's
expectancy, preventing it from ripening into a valid
(4) Plaintiff suffers damages from defendant's
E.g., Knapp v. McCoy, 548 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D.Ill.
1982). Viewing the complaint's allegations in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, as a court must do when
faced with a motion to dismiss, Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90
(1974), plaintiff fails in at least two respects to
state a cause of action.
[2, 3] As to the first element of tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage,
plaintiff alleges that he entered into a valid business
relationship with Harbor Management Corporation
("Harbor"). Plaintiff claims that under their agreement
he would receive a sales commission if and when Harbor
succeeded in purchasing certain property from
defendants. Plaintiff's expectation of receiving a
commission, however, was contingent upon Harbor's
purchasing the defendants' property. However, Harbor
failed to do so. In fact, the exhibits to the complaint
demonstrate that although plaintiff and his clients
repeatedly expressed their interest in defendants'
property, they never made an unconditional offer to
purchase. Each communication indicated that they
contemplated further negotiations on key provisions,
such as the amount of the purchase price to be paid
initially and the applicable interest rate for the
remaining payments. "Where an offer contemplates action
or deliberations beyond acceptance in order to create a
binding contract, it is an offer to negotiate rather
than an offer to purchase." Casati v. Aero Marine
Management Co., Inc., 43 Ill. App.3d 1, 6, 1 Ill.Dec.
544, 548, 356 N.E.2d 826, 830 (1st Dist. 1976). Under
these circumstances, defendants did not act improperly
by accepting another buyer's firm offer and not selling
the property to Harbor.*fn1 Plaintiff's desire for a
commission was not a reasonable expectancy in this
 Plaintiff also fails to plead adequately that
defendants intentionally interfered with his opportunity
to earn a commission. Plaintiff alleges that the
defendant Foundation acted "for the express purpose of
selling [its] property to Defendant, First Winthrop."
From this, plaintiff infers an intent to interfere with
his business relationship with Harbor. Such an
inference, however, is not permissible.*fn2 At most,
the allegations in the complaint show that defendants
ignored plaintiff's offers to negotiate and decided at
some point to deal with First Winthrop rather than any
other buyer. Although defendants may have known about
plaintiff and his commissions
contract with Harbor, no allegation or exhibit in the
complaint suggests that defendants were anything but
indifferent to him. To state a cause of action,
plaintiff "must allege facts which indicate that the
defendants acted with the purpose of injuring
plaintiff's expectancies." Crinkley v. Dow Jones and
Co., 67 Ill. App.3d 869, 880, 24 Ill.Dec. 573,
385 N.E.2d 714 (1st Dist. 1978) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to do this.
Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state an actionable claim ...