The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bua, District Judge.
The case at bar involves allegations of breach of contract
and tortious behavior against Edward C. Mange Trading Co.
(Trading), a Texas corporation, and Edward C. Mange, an
individual who resides in Texas. Before the Court is the
defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Transfer
Venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For the reasons stated
herein, the Motion to Dismiss or Transfer is denied.
The complaint of plaintiff Hunter Douglas Metals, Inc.
(Hunter) is in eight counts which the complaint styles as
"Causes of Action." The first count alleges that Mange and
Trading tortiously interfered with the business relationships
of Hunter and Ed Mange International (International), a
corporate entity of which Mange is an officer which is not a
party to this lawsuit. Counts two, three, four, and five
allege that Trading breached its contract with Hunter and in
so doing acted willfully, maliciously, and in wanton disregard
of the rights of Hunter. The sixth count alleges that Mange
tortiously interfered with the business relationships of
Hunter and Trading so as to cause the breaches of contract
alleged in the other counts. Counts seven and eight allege
that Trading breached its contract with Hunter by delivering
nonconforming goods, which were rejected by Hunter, and by
thereafter failing to deliver any further goods.*fn1
Mange argues that because he has had no contacts with
Illinois sufficient to amount to the transaction of business
in the state, this Court lacks jurisdiction over him. Mange
admits that he was briefly present in Illinois, but only in a
fiduciary capacity, and only after the dispute had arisen, not
during the formation of the transaction out of which the
dispute arose. While there may be merit to Mange's argument,
this Court need not decide the issue as it is apparent that
the allegations against Mange are allegations of tortious
conduct which appear to have been committed in Illinois.
Under the Illinois Long-Arm Statute, one instance of
tortious conduct is sufficient for the courts of this state to
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. According to the
(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this State, who in person or through
an agent does any of the acts hereinafter
enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if
an individual, his or her personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this State as to any cause of action rising
from the doing of any of such act;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this
State . . .
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, ¶ 2-209(a)(2)(1983).
In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), the court held personal
jurisdiction existed in Illinois over an Ohio manufacturer of a
valve which was shipped to Pennsylvania for incorporation into
a hot water heater which was then sold to an Illinois consumer
in the regular course of commerce. In Illinois, the water
heater exploded, causing injury to the plaintiff. According to
the court, the key consideration as to whether, in light of the
requirements of due process, it would be reasonable to require
a defendant to litigate in the chosen forum, is whether the
"act or transaction itself has a substantial connection with
the State of the forum." 22 Ill.2d at 438, 176 N.E.2d 761.
In the case at bar, Mange contends that no personal
jurisdiction exists in Illinois because any tortious acts he
may have undertaken took place in Texas. This contention is
made despite the fact that it is apparently conceded that the
breaches of contract occurred in Illinois.
In support of his argument, Mange relies upon Green v.
Advance Ross Electronics Corp., 86 Ill.2d 431, 56 Ill.Dec. 657,
427 N.E.2d 1203 (1981), in which the court held that the courts
of Illinois had no jurisdiction where the only connection with
the state was the diminution of the funds of a corporation
organized or headquartered in Illinois. However, such reliance
is misplaced as Green is plainly distinguishable from the case
In Green, the court noted that the place of a wrong is that
place where the last event takes place which is necessary to
render the actor liable. 86 Ill.2d at 437, 56 Ill.Dec. at 661,
427 N.E.2d at 1207. Applying this analysis, the Court found
that Texas was the place where the tort had occurred as that
was where the misappropriation of funds which formed the basis
of the suit transpired. In so finding, the court noted that the
diminution of plaintiff's funds in Illinois was too tenuous of