process was "due," the Court looked to "`first, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used and probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.'" 431 U.S. at
112-113, 97 S.Ct. at 1727 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335,
96 S.Ct. at 903).
The Court concluded that the interest in a driver's license "is
not so great as to require [the Court] . . . `to depart from
the ordinary principle' . . . that something less than an
evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse
administrative action." 431 U.S. at 113, 97 S.Ct. at 1728
(quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 907). The risk
of an erroneous deprivation was "not great" since it followed
three full judicial hearings. Id. The appellee never
challenged the sufficiency of these hearings. Id. "Finally,
the substantial public interest in administrative efficiency
would be impeded by the availability of a predetermination
hearing in every case." Id. 431 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at
1728. The licensees might use a hearing request to delay
proceedings. Id. Therefore, a pre-suspension hearing was
The Court reaffirmed Dixon in Mackey v. Montrym,
443 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979), which held that the
Illinois law in Dixon was indistinguishable from the
Massachusetts law requiring suspension for refusal to undergo a
breathylzer examination for drunk driving. "Both cases
involve[d] the constitutionality of a statutory scheme for
administrative suspension of a driver's license for statutorily
defined cause without a pre-suspension hearing." Id. at 11,
99 S.Ct. at 2617.
This court finds that section 6-306.1 is similarly
indistinguishable from the statutes in either Dixon or
Mackey. The private interest is the same as in Dixon and
Mackey and does not by itself necessitate a pre-suspension
hearing. See 431 U.S. at 113, 97 S.Ct. at 1727. Paragraphs
6-306.1 and 2-118(a) provide numerous safeguards against
erroneous deprivation both due to unfounded traffic citations
and to clerical mistakes. The Secretary suspends the license
only after an Illinois court issues a warrant because the
licensee has at least ten outstanding parking tickets. The
clerk of the issuing court must send notice of the warrant to
the licensee at least sixty days before the Secretary receives
any information. The forms used to notify the Secretary whose
licenses should be suspended must contain detailed information
about the licensee.
These safeguards operate in two ways. First, they ensure that
the licensee gets many chances to challenge the underlying
allegations of parking violations. Ten tickets and a warrant
must issue at least sixty days before the Secretary even
receives the information leading to suspension. The licensee
has procedures to challenge both the tickets and the warrant.
Second, before the deprivation, several different state
agencies and many individuals review the licensee's file. At
least ten tickets issue, a court swears out a warrant, and the
Secretary gets notice of both. The different procedures provide
several opportunities to identify mistakes and preclude
The plaintiff argues that these protections are not enough
because there is no guarantee that the licensee receives notice
of the tickets and the warrant. This argument fails for two
reasons. First, the Constitution
provides only the right to an opportunity to be heard. E.g.,
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
171-72, 71 S.Ct. 624, 648-49, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Justice
Frankfurter concurring). The court concludes that the many
safeguards in the statute provide this opportunity. Second,
even if the court assumed that the statute has an
unconstitutional result when a licensee failed to receive
notice of the tickets or the warrant, Pempek's complaint lacks
any allegations that he was unaware of the pending tickets or
the warrant. If he was aware of these charges against him, he
lacks standing to raise the claim that the statute is
unconstitutional because, in fact, it denies some licensees an
opportunity to be heard.
The added value of a pre-suspension hearing before the
Secretary is minimal. Given the procedures in the statute and
sixty-day waiting period, the driver already has several
chances to plead his case before suspension. Adding another
notice and hearing procedure would only duplicate those
provided in connection with the ten parking ticket violations
and the warrant. If the driver learns of his suspension, the
chances are great that he knew of the warrant since the court
clerk and the Secretary direct their notices to the same
address. Requiring the Secretary to repeat what the clerk did
sixty days previously creates needless expense.
The State of Illinois (the State) has an interest in keeping
drivers off the road who flout enforcement of local parking
ordinances. Parking laws protect the smooth flow of traffic and
allow a city to make maximum use of limited parking spaces.
Those individuals who receive parking ticket after parking
ticket without paying the resulting fines or challenging their
validity show disrespect for parking laws. The State has an
interest in responding to such disrespect. The State needs to
retain some control over whom it licenses. Paragraph 6-306.1
requires the Secretary to suspend a license only when a driver
refuses to respond to repeated charges that the driver
interfered with the safety and efficiency of the roads.
These factors all support the constitutionality of paragraph
6-306.1. Plaintiffs claim that the issuance of a warrant does
not mean that the licensee will get a predeprivation hearing
because, before the hearing, the person "must surrender to the
custody of police and post a bail bond equivalent to the cash
fines of all outstanding tickets." Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 2.
What plaintiffs misunderstand is that the suspension of the
license is the deprivation at issue in this case. If
licensees fail to receive notice of the warrant or the tickets
before they are arrested, the constitutional problem, if any
exists at all, is with the ticket and warrant procedure, not
the suspension procedure.
Therefore, the court finds that paragraph 6-306.1 survives
plaintiffs' constitutional challenge under the due process
The charge that paragraph 6-306.1 is a bill of attainder poses
novel questions. Article 1, section 10, of the United States
Constitution states that "[n]o State shall pass any Bill of
Attainder." "A bill of attainder is a legislative act which
levies punishment against specified individuals or groups of
individuals without a judicial trial." E.g., Benboe v.
Carroll, 494 F. Supp. 462, 465 (W.D.Ky. 1977), aff'd,
625 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1980). This court has noted before that "[a]
law of general applicability is not unconstitutional merely
because its enactment was inspired by a specific example of the
evil which it seeks to suppress." Collin v. Smith,
447 F. Supp. 676, 682 n. 4 (N.D.Ill.) (Judge Decker), aff'd,
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916, 99 S.Ct.
291, 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978).
Pending before the United States Supreme Court is the case of
Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 3348, 82 L.Ed.2d 632 (1984). In
that case, the district court held that plaintiffs demonstrated
a probability of success on the merits of their claim that
section 1113 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act
(the Act) is a bill of attainder. Doe v.
Selective Service System, 557 F. Supp. 937, 941-46 (D.Minn.
1983). That portion of the Act requires male college students
to certify they have registered for the draft before they
qualify for federal financial aid. Id. The Supreme Court
heard arguments on April 23, 1984.
This court feels that the Supreme Court's disposition of
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group will clarify whether
section 6-306.1 is a bill of attainder. See 52 U.S.L.W.
3813-14 (U.S. May 15, 1984). Therefore, the court will stay
further proceedings on plaintiff's bill of attainder claims
against Edgar until the Supreme Court acts on Minnesota Public
Interest Research Group.
B. Constitutionality of Chicago's Bail Bond Policy
The complaint alleges that the City's bail bond policy violates
the due process clause because the policy conflicts with
Illinois law regarding bail. Paragraph 7 of the amended
complaint states that "[u]nder Illinois Supreme Court Rule 528,
the bail for ordinance violations shall be $50.00 and Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 503(a) governing multiple charges
specifically provides that bail shall be set at the amount
required by only one offense, that offense requiring the most
bail." Rule 503(a) applies only to those cases where "the bail
is established for [the] . . . offense under Rule 526, 527, or
528." Ill.Sup.Ct.R. 503(a). Therefore, Pempek argues, his
$400.00 bond was excessive.*fn3
Pempek fails to explain that the following precedes the bail
schedules that he discusses:
PART B. BAIL SCHEDULES
NOTE: The bail provisions of Rules 526, 527, and 528 do not
apply to arrests on warrant. . . . When the accused is actually
brought before a judge, the bail amounts specified in these
rules do not control.
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110A; see also Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, 110-5
(establishing criteria for determining the amount of bail). The
first paragraph of the complaint alleges that Pempek was
arrested pursuant to a warrant. Therefore, Pempek's arguments
about his bail being excessive under the due process clause are
The bill of attainder arguments are similarly meritless. Pempek
asserts in his brief that the bail bond scheme is a mere sham
because the bail notice merely refers the driver to a clerk who
forces the driver to sign a guilty waiver and pay his
delinquent tickets. The complaint, however, alleges that, in
fact, Pempek appeared before a judge who continued the trial.
The court refuses to incorporate Pempek's memorandum into his
complaint that contains a completely different description of
the procedure. A single continuance because the City was
unprepared hardly violates the bill of attainder clause. The
single continuance was not a legislative act and did not
deprive Pempek of a trial.
The court dismisses the claims against the City.
For the reasons above, the court grants the City of Chicago's
motion to dismiss and dismisses the claims against the City. In
accordance with the above, the court stays further proceedings
with respect to the claims against Edgar.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Raymond Pempek (Pempek) and Gary Sternberg (Sternberg) brought
this section 1983 action against the City of Chicago (the City)
and Jim Edgar, the Illinois Secretary of State (Edgar or the
Secretary). Plaintiffs claim that Edgar violated their civil
rights by revoking their driver's licenses under Ill.Rev.Stat.
ch. 95 1/2, ¶ 6-306.1 (1983). That statute requires the
Secretary to revoke a person's license when Edgar
receives notice that the person has ten or more unpaid parking
On June 6, 1984, the court concluded as a matter of law that
the statute withstood a procedural due process challenge under
the fourteenth amendment. To avoid repetition, the court
incorporates the factual discussion in that opinion into this
one. Decision was stayed, however, on whether the statute
constituted a bill of attainder in violation of art. 1, § 10 of
the United States Constitution. On July 5, 1984, the Supreme
Court decided Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public
Interest Research Group, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 3348, 3358,
82 L.Ed.2d 632 (1984) [hereinafter MPIR] and clarified what
constitutes a bill of attainder. The parties briefed the
applicability of that case to Pempek's complaint and
defendants' motions to dismiss.
In MPIR, plaintiffs challenged section 1113 of the Department
of Defense Authorization Act of 1983 which denied male college
students federal financial aid if they failed to register for
the draft. The district court found that the law constituted a
bill of attainder. 104 S.Ct. at 3352. The Supreme Court
disagreed. Id. at 3352-58. After reviewing the history of the
bill of attainder clause, the Court listed "three necessary
inquiries [to determine whether a statute is a bill of
attainder]: (1) whether the challenged statute falls within the
historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the
statute, `viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens
imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive
legislative purposes'; and (3) whether the legislative record
`evinces a congressional intent to punish.'" Id. at 3355-56.
The statute conformed with none of the three criteria that
define a bill of attainder. 104 S.Ct. at 3356-58. First,
section 1113 imposed no burden historically associated with
punishment because it only denied "a non-contractural
governmental benefit." Id. at 3356. In addition, the denial
of the benefit was only temporary, and the students could avoid
the sanction by registering. Id. Second, Congress furthered
the non-punitive goal of encouraging young men to register.
Id. at 3356-57. Section 1113 was a rational means of
achieving this goal. Id. at 3357. The provision also
facilitated fair allocation of resources by limiting aid to
students willing to discharge their responsibility as citizens.
Id. Finally, Congress evinced no punitive intent. Id.
Comments by Congressmen demonstrated a desire to regulate all
non-registrants, including those who unintentionally neglected
to register. Id.
As in MPIR, paragraph 6-306.1 possesses none of the three
characteristics of a bill of attainder. First, Pempek and
Sternberg have the power to avoid forfeiture of their licenses
by "satisfying" the warrants. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 95 1/2; ¶
6-306.1. Satisfying the warrants means either paying the
tickets or posting bond. The loss of the license is not a
punitive or permanent confiscation that legislatures
historically used to punish. See 104 S.Ct. at 3356. As with
section 1113, the statute in this case punishes no one for
getting too many tickets. It encourages individuals to pay
their tickets and removes from the road individuals who,
according to state records, have too many citations.
For similar reasons, the statute furthers non-punitive goals.
As discussed in the court's first opinion, paragraph 6-306.1
allows the state to retain control over whom it licenses.
Memorandum Opinion and Order of June 6, 1984 at 10. The law
provides a way for the Secretary to react against disrespect
for traffic laws and procedures. By providing this tool to the
Secretary, the legislature ensures that only qualified drivers
possess driver's licenses. Paragraph 6-306.1 also provides a
rational incentive to aid the Secretary in tracing delinquent
drivers and resolving pending traffic tickets.
Plaintiffs provide no persuasive argument that the drafters of
paragraph 6-306.1 evinced a punitive intent. The legislature
incorporated a simple means for the licensee to avoid the loss
of his license:
satisfaction of the warrant. Had the legislature intended to
punish ticket scofflaws, it would have precluded them from
recovering their licenses. It would have confiscated licenses
without a way to secure their return.
The MPIR analysis clarifies that paragraph 6-306.1 fails to
qualify as a bill of attainder. Based on the allegations in the
complaint, the court is unable to conclude that this statute,
on its face, is a bill of attainder. Because this was the only
claim remaining in the complaint, its dismissal ends the case.
For the reasons above, the court grants the motion to dismiss.
The case is dismissed.