The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bua, District Judge.
In the instant case, plaintiff alleges discrimination based on
his race and political activities. Before the Court is the Motion
of the various defendants to Strike and Dismiss the complaint.
For the reasons stated herein, defendants' motion is granted in
part and denied in part.
Plaintiff's complaint is in five counts alleging constitutional
violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, 1985, and 2000d.
Jurisdiction in this Court is based in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
Count I of the complaint is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. It
alleges as to both aspects of the demotion that defendants
Washington and Rice "knowingly and intentionally and
discriminatorily demoted the Plaintiff . . . because the
Plaintiff is white." Defendants Washington and Rice are black. No
other facts relating to the motivation behind the demotion are
The allegations contained in Count I are conclusory and
therefore cannot support a well-pleaded claim for relief. The
Seventh Circuit, in unequivocal language, has stated:
To sufficiently state a cause of action the plaintiff
must allege some facts that demonstrate that his race
was the reason for the defendant's [action]. His
failure to allege such facts rendered his
discrimination claim under § 1981 or § 1985
incomplete. (emphasis supplied)
Because it fails to provide any facts whatsoever in support of
the conclusory allegation of race discrimination, Count I must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
In Count II, plaintiff asserts a claim based in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The basis of that claim is that plaintiff, a registered
Democrat, supported defendant Washington's opponent, Jane M.
Byrne, in the Democratic Mayoral Primary Election and that, as a
result, he was demoted from his positions.
In connection with this Count, defendant argues that the City
of Chicago should be dismissed because the plaintiff has failed
to allege that his demotion was the result of the implementation
of a custom or policy. Under Monell v. Department of Social
Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56
L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), a municipality may be held liable as a
"person" under § 1983, but only for unconstitutional action which
either "implements or executes a policy statement . . ." or
"constitutes a governmental `custom' . . ." Id. at 690-91, 98
S.Ct. at 2035-36. Under Monell, municipal liability may not be
based on a theory of respondeat superior. Id.
As to the City of Chicago, no allegation of custom or policy is
made in Count II. Indeed, the only assertion even remotely
related to custom or policy is that by demoting plaintiff,
defendants Washington and Rice implemented "the patronage custom
of the Democratic party." Clearly, this allegation does not refer
to a custom or ...