The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bua, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action is brought by Larry McCall-Bey against Michael
Lane and six other Illinois Department of Corrections
officials and employees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this
civil rights action, McCall-Bey alleges violations of his right
to procedural and substantive due process as guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and
seeks injunctive and monetary relief. Jurisdiction is based on
28 U.S.C. § 1343. Before this Court is McCall-Bey's motion for
summary judgment against Lane on Counts III and IV of the
Second Amended Complaint and Lane's cross-motion for summary
judgment on the same counts. For the reasons stated herein,
McCall-Bey's motion for partial summary judgment on Count III
is granted and Lane's cross motion for summary judgment is
denied. Also, McCall-Bey's motion for summary judgment on Count
IV is denied and Lane's cross motion for summary judgment on
Count IV is granted.
McCall-Bey is currently an inmate at the Stateville
Correctional Facility. He was an inmate at the Menard
Correctional Facility at the time of the incidents alleged in
the Second Amended Complaint. Lane was Warden of the Menard
Correctional Facility at the time of the relevant incidents.
On June 23, 1977, McCall-Bey was accused of deviate sexual
assault against another inmate. A third inmate had witnessed
the assault and provided a statement to prison officials. This
provided a basis for the statement of the witnessing officer.
In addition, an investigation was conducted and an
investigation report was prepared.
On July 14, 1977, the Adjustment Committee of the Menard
Correctional Facility (the Committee) conducted a hearing
regarding the alleged assault and found McCall-Bey guilty. The
Committee prepared a summary of the hearing which stated the
"basis for the decision/evidence relied upon" as the
Committee's review of the charges, the ticket processed, the
hearing held in compliance with A.R. 804, the statement of the
witnessing officer, and the facts confirmed through the
investigation report dated June 23, 1977. They then placed
McCall-Bey on segregation status, reduced his grade to "C" and
recommended that his job assignment be changed. On July 15,
1977, Lane approved the Committee's actions.
Count III of McCall-Bey's Second Amended Complaint is based
upon the constitutional right to procedural due process under
the fourteenth amendment. He alleges that the July 14, 1977
summary violated his constitutional rights because it provided
neither the reasons for the disciplinary action taken nor a
written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied
upon by the Committee.
Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint is also based on
the constitutional right to procedural due process under the
fourteenth amendment. McCall-Bey alleges that the summary
failed to meet administrative requirements and that such
failure rises to the level of a constitutional due process
violation. He claims Lane violated Illinois Department of
Corrections Administrative Regulation 804(II)(B)(9) which
requires that an inmate be given a written statement of the
evidence relied upon by the Committee, the specific
disciplinary action, and the reasons for the disciplinary
In an affidavit supporting his motion, McCall-Bey states
that he was never given, and has not seen, a copy of the
statement of the witnessing officer and that the witnessing
officer did not testify at the July 14, 1977 Committee
hearing. He also states that he was never given, and has not
seen, a copy of the June 23, 1977 investigation report.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, a motion for summary judgment will be
granted if the pleadings and evidentiary material show that
there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
burden is upon the moving party to show that there is no issue
of material fact in dispute. Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co.,
487 F.2d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 1973). All doubts as to the existence
of an issue of material fact must be resolved against the
movant. Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Electric, Inc., 295 F.2d 573,
577 (7th Cir. 1961). McCall-Bey's motion and Lane's
cross-motion will be evaluated according to these principles.
The protections of the due process clause are not lost when
a person is incarcerated. Prisoners may not be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974, 41
L.Ed.2d 935 (1973). Thus, in a prison disciplinary hearing, a
prisoner must be provided with "advance written notice of the
claimed violation and a written statement of the factfindings
as to the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken" in
order to satisfy the minimum requirements of procedural due
process. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563, 94 S.Ct. at 2978. The reasons
for these requirements are to protect an inmate from collateral
consequences based on a misunderstanding of the original
proceeding, to insure that administrators, faced with possible
scrutiny by the public, state officials, and the court, will
act fairly, and to prevent disadvantage to an inmate in
propounding his own cause or defending himself from others. Id.
at 565, 94 S.Ct. at 2979.
The contents of the summary are not in dispute. It merely
states that the decision was based upon the ticket processed,
the statement of the witnessing officer and facts confirmed
through the June 23, 1977 investigation report. The ...