Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

JORMAN v. VETERANS ADMIN.

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, E.D


February 3, 1984

JURELLENE JORMAN, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS,
v.
VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Shadur, District Judge.

  MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Six representative plaintiffs remain in this class action against the Veterans Administration and its Administrator (collectively "VA"). Plaintiffs allege VA, through its home mortgage Loan Guaranty Service ("Service"), has caused or contributed to actual and threatened systematic racial transition (in the vernacular, "white flight") in parts of Marquette Park, Chicago, in violation of VA's duty to promote fair housing under Fair Housing Act of 1968 ("Act") § 808(d), 42 U.S.C. § 3608(c) ("Section 3608(c)").

Both sides have now moved for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule") 56. Apparently concerned lest plaintiffs' summary judgment affidavits pose factual issues, VA has also moved to strike those affidavits as not meeting the requirements of Rule 56(e). For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order, all three motions are denied, except that plaintiff Edward Keate ("Keate") is dismissed for lack of standing.

Facts

This action was filed February 18, 1977 by 21 Marquette Park area plaintiffs against both VA and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and its Secretary (collectively "HUD"). HUD was dismissed without prejudice October 14, 1977 when it agreed, in connection with its Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") insured mortgage program, to institute a purchaser counseling program intended to promote integration in housing.

On October 3, 1978 plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint (the "Complaint"). Count I charged VA, through Service, with failing to fulfill its affirmative duty to Marquette Park residents as imposed by Section 3608(c):

  All executive departments and agencies shall
  administer their programs and activities relating to
  housing and urban development in a manner
  affirmatively to further the purposes of [the Act,
  42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619] and shall cooperate with the
  Secretary [of HUD] to further such purposes.

Count II claimed VA had engaged in or condoned housing discrimination or racial steering*fn1 in violation of various provisions of the Act. As a result of various 1982 dismissals only Count I and six representative plaintiffs remain.*fn2

Plaintiffs say Service falls under Section 3608(c)'s phrase "programs and activities relating to housing and urban development." It was established as part of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 284, and is now codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1801-1829. Under Service the VA guarantees 60% of a home loan for any qualifying veteran (up to a $27,500 limit), reducing the down payment that otherwise would have to be made.

VA acknowledges it does not take into account Service's effects on the integrated or segregated condition of the neighborhoods in which it operates. Instead VA points to its efforts to assure Service is operated in a nondiscriminatory manner. Service collects housing discrimination complaints from participating veterans, requires institutional participants such as lenders to certify they do not discriminate, and publicizes those efforts. In addition it analyzes racial, ethnic and gender data collected from participating veterans to assure no groups of veterans are under-represented and institutional participants comply with their certifications of nondiscriminatory practices.

Plaintiffs challenge Service's operation in one area ("Area A") that has experienced white flight in the past decade. Area A is a long (1 1/2 miles), narrow (about 3/16 of a mile) tract of residential housing in Marquette Park between a major traffic artery, Western Avenue, on the west and a rail corridor on the east.*fn3 For comparison's sake plaintiffs have designated as "Area B-1" an adjacent and identically shaped tract of housing immediately to the west of Area A.*fn4 Statistics depict the tumultuous nature of white flight in Area A: During the decade beginning in 1970 its population changed from 4,101 whites and 2 blacks to 535 whites and 4,458 blacks. Over the same decade Area B-1 began with 5,193 whites and 1 black and ended with 5,042 whites and 1 black.

Tables 1-6 in the Appendix set out the statistical underpinning for plaintiffs' argument Service contributed to white flight in Area A. Over the 7 years for which plaintiffs submitted data, the rate of turnover in Area A was 111% (that is, homes were sold an average of 1.11 times per home), while turnover in Area B-1 was 48.5%. Notably in 1976, when 36.9% of the homes in Area A changed hands (compared with 7.6% in Area B-1), VA financed 28.0% of those transactions (compared with 6.8 in Area B-1). Put another way, 1 in 10 homes in Area A changed hands with VA financing in 1976, while at the same time only 1 in 200 homes in Area B-1 changed hands with VA financing.

Many of the plaintiffs reside not in Areas A or B-1 but elsewhere in the area designated "Area B," made up of Area B-1 and most of the Marquette Park community.*fn5 While the plaintiffs who live or have lived in Area A claim they have experienced white flight and have been injured by it, plaintiffs residing in Area B*fn6 assert a different concern. They do not now live in an integrated community (their neighborhood is 99.6% white), but they claim fear of white flight and its attendant neighborhood deterioration is an obstacle to integration.

On September 17, 1980 Judge Crowley (in the "Opinion," 500 F. Supp. 460) denied VA's motions to dismiss for lack of standing (Rule 12(b)(1)) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Rule 12(b)(6)). Those denials held plaintiffs had alleged the requisite injuries and violations of Section 3608(c). Now that discovery has closed, those issues arise again in proof terms: whether there are disputed issues of material fact sufficient to preclude judgment in favor of either side at this time.

VA's Motion To Strike Affidavits

VA's motion to strike tenders to this Court the singularly uninviting task of combing plaintiffs' affidavits for insufficient showings of personal knowledge and for inadmissible hearsay.*fn7 VA sets out dozens of examples of passages allegedly defective in those respects, then asks for not just those passages but for all 13 affidavits to be stricken in their entirety. Moreover VA's supporting memorandum (the only one this Court requested) makes no attempt to anticipate even the first and most obvious response any lawyer would make: VA has not addressed which statements not based on personal knowledge are actually helpful statements of opinion or belief based on an adequate factual foundation (see Fed.R.Evid. 701) and, at least as to some affiants, based on expertise (see Fed.R.Evid. 702). Nor has VA addressed which statements reporting declarations by persons other than the affiant were non-hearsay because they were presented for a purpose other than to show the truth of the matter declared (see Fed.R.Evid. 801(c)). Instead VA has cited every (or nearly every) paragraph containing either the word "believe" or its functional equivalent, or any statement of another's declaration, and has provided a dearth of further analysis.

VA's motion that all 13 affidavits be stricken in their entirety is denied for three reasons:

    1. That motion is formally deficient because its
  objections sweep much too broadly. In suggesting its
  objections apply to every word plaintiffs submitted
  via affidavit, VA stretches beyond the point of
  credibility any claim it has fulfilled its obligation
  to "state specifically the portions of the affidavit
  to which objection is being made, and the grounds
  therefor." 6 Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶
  56.11[1], at 56-1332 (2d ed. 1982). As Perma Research
  & Development Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 579
  (2d Cir. 1969) so colorfully put it, VA should "do
  more than swing its bludgeon wildly."

    2. Even were the motion well-founded, the
  appropriate relief would be to strike only parts of
  the affidavits. While perhaps "the entire affidavit
  may be disregarded if inadmissible matter is so
  interwoven or inextricably combined with the
  admissible portions that it is impossible, in the
  practical sense, to separate them" (Southern Concrete
  Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 F. Supp. 362,
  381 (N.D.Ga. 1975)), the mere assertion of that
  proposition does not make it applicable here. VA may
  rest assured this Court will consider neither
  inadmissible matter nor matter "inextricably
  combined" with inadmissible matter.

    3. This Court has already stated its ultimate
  conclusion summary judgment is inappropriate for
  either side, except as to Keate's obvious lack of
  standing. In that light judicial (and litigants')
  economy precludes issuance of an order forcing
  affidavits to be recast to cure merely formal
  deficiencies.*fn8 And clearly an opportunity to cure
  would be appropriate before foreclosing a formally
  deficient party's rights. Although Gordon v. Watson,
  622 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1980) concerned the failure of
  a pro se litigant to comply with the Rule 56(e)
  standards, its reasoning applies equally here (id. at
  123):

    Summary judgment is an excellent device by which
    district courts may make expedited dispositions of
    those cases in which a trial would be fruitless.
    When summary judgment is inappropriate because the
    supporting or opposing materials are improper, the
    district court has ample discretion to call upon
    the parties to remedy the defects, by submitting
    supplemental affidavits or otherwise.

  For the present, then, formal deficiencies may be
  ignored.*fn9

Standing

VA attacks the sufficiency of plaintiffs' evidence supporting their standing to enforce the Act, while conversely plaintiffs argue the evidence confirms their standing as a matter of law.*fn10 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) recently summarized the "irreducible minimum" constitutional standing requirements:

  Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's
  authority to "show that he personally has suffered
  some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
  putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,"
  Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
  441 U.S. 91, 99 [99 S.Ct. 1601, 1607, 60 L.Ed.2d 66] (1979),
  and that the injury "fairly can be traced to the
  challenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by
  a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
  Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41, 96 S.Ct.
  1917, 1924, 1925, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976).

There are also prudential limitations on the exercise of federal jurisdiction — limitations the Opinion, 500 F. Supp. at 463-64 found inapplicable to this case.

Although the parties have addressed the standing requirements as threefold — injury, causation and redressability — the most problematic to plaintiffs is that of causation. Indeed, if causation is not shown they cannot establish injury and redressability either. As for injury, whatever injury plaintiffs assert must be "as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant." If the injury is only threatened, as in the case of plaintiffs residing in Area B, their subjective fear of injury does not qualify as an injury unless it actually is caused by VA. As City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1668 n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (emphasis in original) put it:

  It is the reality of the threat of repeated injury
  that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the
  plaintiff's subjective apprehensions.

And as for redressability, if VA did not cause the injury by act or omission it almost certainly cannot prevent or cure the injury by some other act or omission.

To show causation plaintiffs must show their injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action." Plainly that turns on disputed questions of material fact. Plaintiffs' statistics (set forth in the Appendix) show VA financing of persons engaged in white flight from Area A. While those statistics are undisputed except as to the manner of their presentation, the correlation they demonstrate does not in this case establish causation.

Plaintiffs' experts argue Area A was the victim of a massive influx of federal money in support of the evacuation of whites from the area.*fn11 VA's experts respond withholding VA funds would not have slowed, much less prevented, white flight. They argue plaintiffs have (1) overestimated the facilitating effect of VA guaranties on real estate transactions and (2) underestimated the power of the biases of individuals who create housing segregation in the first instance.*fn12

Existence of a material factual issue as to causation precludes judgment for plaintiffs. Half the battle on the current motions is thus ended. But VA could still win summary judgment if it shows one of the other elements of standing is absent as a matter of law. This opinion turns then to that inquiry.

Each named plaintiff has shown the first element: actual or threatened injury sufficient to raise a triable issue. Moore, a black residing in Area A, claims various specific deprivations of "social and professional benefits of living in an integrated society" (Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 98, 99 S.Ct. at 1607): deterioration of neighborhood businesses, city services and home resale value.*fn13 Keate, a white who moved from Area A to the suburbs after this action was filed (doing so because of racial incidents directed at him and his family), sold his home at a loss and now rents. Those verified claims obviously are a sufficient basis on which to go to trial, despite VA's arguments (1) Area A is still "pleasant"*fn14 and (2) Keate's loss on the sale of his home was suffered due to his own negligence.*fn15

All the remaining plaintiffs, who reside in Area B, rely on showings of threatened rather than actual injury. As with the more generalized issue of causation, the experts have joined issue on whether there is a real threat the white flight phenomenon will cross Western Avenue to invade Area B. Thus the standing of the Area B plaintiffs also raises disputed issues of material fact — unless of course the threat of injury, even as depicted by plaintiffs' experts, is not "real and immediate" as required by O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496, 94 S.Ct. 669, 676, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974).

White flight does not present an "immediate" threat to any Area B plaintiff as that term is used in everyday language. During the 10 years studied by plaintiffs' experts, the line of demarcation between black and white neighborhoods has moved only three blocks west. While the experts disagree on whether that westward pace will quicken or slow in the future, it cannot be disputed the boundaries of white flight have (at least until now) moved at a glacial pace. Of the Area B plaintiffs, Swiontkowski-DeNardis lives 8 1/2 blocks west of Western Avenue; Judickas, 17 blocks; and McManus, 20 1/2 blocks.*fn16 Thus the threat white flight will invade the blocks on which Area B plaintiffs live is (at least on the present showing) a long-term one that must be measured in years.

But temporal immediacy is not the hallmark of what is "immediate" in the legal sense. Cases such as Lyons and O'Shea, which were dismissed on standing grounds because the threat of injury was not "immediate," did not suffer such dismissal because the injury was too far in the future or too slow in its operation. Rather the lack of "immediacy" simply meant plaintiffs were no more in danger of harm than any of a large class of persons — the populace generally. By contrast here, according to plaintiffs' experts, Area B plaintiffs live in a part of Chicago in much greater danger of injury from white flight than most other areas. Accordingly the slow pace of white flight is not alone sufficient to defeat standing.*fn17

Redressability, the final element of standing, also presents a material factual issue as to all but one plaintiff. Only Keate fails on this score.

VA misconstrues the redressability requirement as meaning that if the prospect of framing an injunctive decree presents knotty workability problems, plaintiffs have no standing. That position is not supported by Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973),*fn18 a child support case. There the Supreme Court assumed for its analysis the decree sought by plaintiff would be effective (in the sense it would lead to prosecution of defendant) but found that result would not necessarily remedy the asserted wrong (defendant's failure to pay child support). If a decree actually is unworkable, this Court can decline to enter one for prudential reasons without denying standing in the first instance.*fn19

VA argues Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) requires dismissal for want of redressability because there as here action by defendants alone could not redress the injury claimed. Warth held citizens have no standing to challenge allegedly exclusionary zoning practices of a neighboring community. Both in Warth and here the situation can be corrected only if nonparties enter into real estate transactions, though defendants in each case were or are empowered to regulate the nature of those transactions.

While that aspect of the cases is parallel, it is equally clear the need for third party participation in real estate transactions at issue does not alone prevent standing. Gladstone, which permitted community residents to challenge racial steering by realtors, illustrates the point. Gladstone survived while Warth did not because the Warth plaintiffs sought to assert the rights of the third parties, while Gladstone plaintiffs asserted their own rights to an integrated community. Gladstone (not Warth) controls here because plaintiffs are asserting their own rights under Section 3608(c), not the rights of veterans seeking loans from the Service.

Keate's situation however is different. He has moved from Area A to the suburbs. Consequently not even complete integration of Marquette Park could remedy the wrong he claims to have suffered. It could be he is in danger of white flight where he now lives, but there has been no showing to that effect. His position thus is indistinguishable from that of the plaintiff who was the victim of a police "chokehold" in Lyons: He claims to have suffered an injury in the past, but his suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief, and he is no more likely to be reinjured than anyone else in the metropolitan area is likely to be injured in the first place.

In summary, every element of standing — injury, causation and redressability — is materially disputed as to every named plaintiff except Keate. Keate plainly has no standing because this suit seeks only prospective relief and only in Marquette Park, where Keate no longer lives.

Section 3608(c) Applicability

As was true of standing, the propriety of imposing a duty on Service under Section 3608(c) turns on the nature and extent of the relationship between Service's activities and white flight. For that purpose it is appropriate to turn to the virtually identical fair housing duty imposed on VA by Section 3608(c) and on HUD itself by Act § 808(e)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)(5) ("Section 3608(d)(5)").*fn20 As to the latter the leading case is Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 821 (3d Cir. 1970), which held HUD "must utilize some institutionalized method whereby, in considering site selection or type selection, it has before it the relevant racial and socioeconomic information necessary for compliance with its duties under the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts."*fn21 Plaintiffs similarly seek to require VA to adopt an "institutionalized method" of data collection.

Plaintiffs brought this action not under the Act directly as authorized by Section 810, 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972)) or Section 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (see Gladstone), but rather under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701-706. VA admittedly does nothing to monitor or regulate the effects of its Service on the integration or segregation of neighborhoods. Under the APA that decision by VA is subject to reversal and a declaration of unlawfulness if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).*fn22

As an initial matter, Section 3608(c) clearly applies to Service. That section addresses "programs and activities relating to housing and urban development." City of Camden v. Plotkin, 466 F. Supp. 44, 53-54 (D.N.J. 1978), perhaps the only reported decision (other than the Opinion in this case) ever to construe Section 3608(c), declined to apply it to the Census Bureau because (id. at 54) there was "no allegation of direct involvement . . . in a housing project." No such threshold problem is posed here. By any standard Service is engaged in "activities relating to housing." Instead the real issue is the extent of the duties imposed by Section 3608(c).

VA's arguments against imposition of a Shannon-type duty can be framed in the form of three contentions:

    1. Section 3608(c)'s statement of duty is so vague
  and broad, any fair housing efforts by the Service
  fulfill it.

    2. VA has no discretion to impose requirements on
  applicants other than those expressly set forth in
  the underlying statute, 38 U.S.C. § 1801-1829.

    3. Because of the nature of Service's activities,
  its effect on integration is not "an important aspect
  of the problem" that it "entirely failed to
  consider," Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v.
  State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., ___ U.S.
  ___, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2867, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983).

Although the third contention presents a disputed issue of material fact (enough to defeat summary judgment), the first two do not.

VA rests its first argument on an unsound foundation: cases showing statutes setting forth general housing goals do not give rise to specific obligations. For instance, Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078, 1082 (2d Cir. 1974) held Section 3608(d)(5) does not require agencies to assure residential housing is located near sites at which many federal employees will work. Similarly Alexander v. HUD, 555 F.2d 166, 171 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 39, 99 S.Ct. 1572, 60 L.Ed.2d 28 (1979) held Congress' declaration of housing policy in 42 U.S.C. § 1441 ("Section 1441") does not imply a warranty of habitability to tenants of the United States government.

Those cases however are only examples of situations in which those statutes do not apply. Cases on the other side of the issue — more directly applicable here — are far weightier. Trafficante and Gladstone certainly suggest the Act should be viewed generously. Alschuler v. HUD, 686 F.2d 472, 476-82 (7th Cir. 1982) permitted review of HUD public housing site selection under Section 3608(d)(5). And United States v. Winthrop Towers, 628 F.2d 1028, 1034-36 (7th Cir. 1980) permitted review of HUD mortgage foreclosure under Section 1441. By analogy Section 3608(c), like Sections 3608(d)(5) and 1441, is surely more than precatory in terms of judicial enforceability.

Not only has the foundation for VA's first contention collapsed, but its superstructure is unsound as well. VA argued from Clients' Council v. Pierce, 532 F. Supp. 563, 576-77 (W.D.Ark. 1982), that "myriad efforts to promote fair housing" can overcome apparent neglect of duties in other areas. But since VA filed its initial brief the Eighth Circuit reversed (711 F.2d 1406 (8th Cir. 1983)), summarily finding a constitutional violation and remanding only to determine a remedy. While the Court of Appeals did not deal expressly with the District Court's finding of compliance in other areas, it did state (id. at 1425):

  Because we have found HUD liable for a constitutional
  violation, it certainly cannot have met its
  responsibility [under Section 3608(d)(5)] to promote
  fair housing.

Thus Service's anti-discrimination efforts cannot alone meet its Section 3608(c) obligations if its failure to consider its effects on neighborhood integration is itself a violation of that Section.

VA's second contention rests on the premise Service operates in a nondiscretionary manner and therefore is not entitled to withhold mortgage guaranties from veterans to promote fair housing. Judge Crowley's Opinion disposed of that premise, 500 F. Supp. at 463:

  [38 U.S.C.] Section 1804(d) belies the rigidity which
  defendant would read into the statutory duty of the
  Veterans Administration. Because the VA may consider
  whether a prospective applicant or lender has
  "engaged in practices . . . detrimental to the
  interests of veterans or of the government," it is
  responsible as an "executive agency" to the
  requirements of § 808(d) of the Fair Housing Act,
  42 U.S.C. § 3608(c).

VA's citation to Wells v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 537 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) is inapposite. Although that case does say (id. at 477) "the VA has no statutory mandate, implied or expressed, to promote the betterment of neighborhoods," that was said only in the sense that VA has no duty to maintain homes it acquires by foreclosure as rental units. Wells simply declined to expand Service into the rental business, but it did not address whether Service conducts or should conduct its current statutory activities to promote fair housing.*fn23

Only VA's final contention requires factual development at trial. It argues its decision not to consider Service's effects on neighborhood integration is not arbitrary and capricious under the APA. As Motor Vehicle Manufacturers recently said (103 S.Ct. at 2867), an agency's failure to consider data is arbitrary and capricious if it entirely fails "to consider an important aspect of the problem."

Plaintiffs build a convincing argument neighborhood integration generally is an important aspect of administration of housing programs. First they show the Act was designed to promote integration as well as other goals. That is by no means self-evident from a mere reading of Sections 3601 and 3608(c), which speak only in terms of "fair housing." But when introducing the Act as a bill in the Senate, Senator Mondale not only suggested the Act was intended to promote integration but also blamed VA for white flight. Immediately after World War II, he said (114 Cong. Rec. 2278 (1968)), "the FHA, the VA, and other Federal agencies encouraged, assisted, and made easy the flight of white people from the central cities of white America, leaving behind only the Negroes and others unable to take advantage of these liberalized extensions of credits and credit guarantees."*fn24

Case law also supports integration as a goal of the Act. Shannon led the way in that respect, finding (436 F.2d at 820) the Housing Act of 1949 required only nondiscriminatory disbursement of benefits, but by 1968 the Act required administration of housing programs in a manner that would promote integration. Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973) followed:

  We agree with the parties and with the district court
  that the [New York City Housing] Authority is under
  an obligation to act affirmatively to achieve
  integration in housing. The source of that duty is
  both constitutional and statutory.

See also Alschuler, 686 F.2d at 475 n. 1.

Just because integration is a goal of the Act, however, does not mean it is an "important aspect" of the problem of administering Service. As discussed above it is hotly disputed whether Service has in any way promoted white flight in Area A. For plaintiffs to have standing they must show injuries stemming from white flight are "fairly traceable" to Service. In like manner, for plaintiffs to prevail on the merits they must show effect on neighborhood integration is "an important aspect of the problem" of administering Service. This Court need not now decide just what quantum of proof would succeed under each of these standards. What controls on the current motions is that either side could still prevail on both.

Conclusion

In light of the diametrically opposing opinions of plaintiffs' and VA's experts, summary judgment for either side is plainly inappropriate here. Both Rule 56 motions are denied. VA's attempt to tip the balance in its favor by moving to strike all of plaintiffs' affidavits fails as well, and that motion too is denied. Because the evidence reveals plaintiff Keate has no standing as a matter of law, he is dismissed from the case.

TABLE #1

REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS IN AREA A

1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980   SEVEN  YEAR  TOTAL

TOTAL TRANSACTIONS        56   134   397   317   158    93    39          1194
FHA TRANSACTIONS           7    21   132    64     3     2     7           236
VA TRANSACTIONS            2    38   111    74    29    18    12           284

TABLE #2

VA AND FHA AS A PERCENT OF ALL TRANSACTIONS IN AREA  A

1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  SEVEN  YEAR  TOTAL

PERCENT FHA             12.5  15.7  33.2  20.2   1.9   2.2  17.9         19.8
PERCENT VA               3.6  28.4  28.0  23.2  18.4  19.4  30.8         23.8
TOTAL VA AND FHA        16.1  44.0  61.2  43.5  20.3  21.5  48.7         43.6

TABLE #3

               PERCENT TURNOVER (TRANSACTIONS AS A PERCENT OF THE
                     1076 RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES IN AREA A)

1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980   SEVEN  YEAR  TOTAL

TOTAL PERCENT TURNOVER   5.2  12.5  36.9  29.5  14.7   8.6   3.6         111.0
FHA PERCENT TURNOVER     0.7   2.0  12.3   5.9   0.3   0.2   0.7          21.9
VA PERCENT TURNOVER      0.2   3.5  10.3   6.9   2.7   1.7   1.1          26.3

TABLE #4

REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS IN AREA B-1

1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980   SEVEN  YEAR  TOTAL

TOTAL TRANSACTIONS        37    83    88   106   113    86    52           565
FHA TRANSACTIONS           3     2     3     0     2     0     3            13
VA TRANSACTIONS            2    18     6     4    17    10    12            69

TABLE #5

VA AND FHA AS A PERCENT OF ALL TRANSACTIONS IN AREA B-1

1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  SEVEN  YEAR  TOTAL

PERCENT FHA              8.1   2.4   3.4   0.0   1.8   0.0   5.8          2.3
PERCENT VA               5.4  21.7   6.8   3.8  15.0  11.6  23.1         12.2
TOTAL VA AND FMA        13.5  24.1  10.2   3.8  16.8  11.6  28.8         14.5

TABLE #6

               PERCENT TURNOVER (TRANSACTIONS AS A PERCENT OF THE
                    1165 RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES IN AREA B-1)

1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  SEVEN  YEAR  TOTAL

TOTAL PERCENT TURNOVER   3.2   7.1   7.6   9.1   9.7   7.4   4.5         48.5
FHA PERCENT TURNOVER     0.3   0.2   0.3   0.0   0.2   0.0   0.3          1.1
VA PERCENT TURNOVER      0.2   1.5   0.5   0.3   1.5   0.9   1.0          5.9


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.