The opinion of the court was delivered by: Shadur, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
William Jackson ("Jackson") sues the Illinois Department of
Corrections ("Department") and six of its officials*fn1 under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), alleging he was deprived of due
process of law when he was barred from receiving visits from his
friend Sharon Sue Spencer ("Spencer") at Stateville. This Court's
July 1, 1983 memorandum opinion and order (the "Opinion,"
567 F. Supp. 1021, 1025) denied defendants' Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule")
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, §
1003-8-7(b)(2) "confers on Jackson a state-created liberty
interest (akin to that given constitutional protection in
Hewitt [v. Helms, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675
(1983)] in preserving his visiting privileges against imposition
of excessive restraint."
Jackson alleges*fn3 Mathis told Jackson on January 24,
1982*fn4 that he would arrange a visit with Spencer outside the
designated visiting area in return for a $20 payment. When
Spencer arrived at Stateville later that day to visit Jackson,
Mathis escorted her to a room outside the designated area. Lt.
Rodriguez observed Mathis doing so and filed a report of the
On January 26 O'Leary issued a Stop Order (the "Order")
prohibiting Spencer from visiting Jackson. Both Jackson and
Spencer were notified of the Order (Jackson by delivery of a copy
and Spencer by transmittal of a letter stating its terms). In
addition to identifying both Jackson and Spencer, the Order
Rationale for Stop: Inappropriate Conduct. This Stop
Order will remain in effect until further notice.
On January 29 Jackson filed a grievance with the Stateville
Institutional Inquiry Board ("Stateville's Board") challenging
the Order. On February 4 Jackson asked for a polygraph exam in a
letter to O'Leary, a request Jackson renewed on February 17 when
interviewed about the incident by Price for Internal
Investigations (March 4 Internal Investigations Preliminary
Jackson then attempted to assert his grievance before
Department's Administrative Review Board ("Department's Board").
On March 8 Department Director Michael Lane wrote Jackson
Department's Board would not consider his grievance until the
matter had been processed by Stateville's Board.*fn5 On March 11
Jackson spoke with DeRobertis about Stateville's Board's failure
to conduct a hearing on the grievance. DeRobertis responded they
were going to await polygraph results.
On March 19 T. McWilliams from Internal Investigations asked
O'Leary to order a polygraph exam. On March 23 Allen told Jackson
his grievance before Stateville's Board could not be processed
until Internal Investigations finished its investigation. On
March 25 DeRobertis asked for the administration of a polygraph
exam, and that test was finally conducted March 30. On April
29*fn6 the polygraph results were transmitted to DeRobertis, and
on May 5 O'Leary rescinded the Order. Internal Investigations
submitted its final report on June 11, a week after the Employee
Review Board dismissed the improper conduct charges against
Although the existence of a liberty or property
interest may be ascertained by reference to state
law, once such an interest is identified, the task of
defining the procedural protections which attach to
that interest is wholly a matter of federal
constitutional law and is accomplished through
application of the balancing analysis of Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18
(1976). See, e.g., United States Labor Party v.
Oremus, 619 F.2d 683, 689 (7th Cir. 1980). See
generally Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164, 94
S.Ct. 1633, 1649, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring) [416 U.S. at] 177, 94 S.Ct. at 1655
(White, J., concurring and dissenting in part) [416
U.S. at] 206, 94 S.Ct. at 1669 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). To be sure, state procedural protections
are not ignored. Rather, once it is determined what
process is due to the individual before he can be
deprived of the specific liberty or property interest
by the state, state procedures are scrutinized to see
if they comport with the federal procedural due
process requirements. However, state procedural
protections cannot define what process is due. The
Fourteenth Amendment's limitation on state action
would be illusory indeed if state practices were
synonymous with due process.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47
L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) requires this Court to consider three factors