Plaintiff in his complaint alleged that he is of East Indian
ancestry and that he was discriminated against on the basis of
his racial identification. In view of the interrelated nature of
national origin, ethnic and racial discrimination found by the
courts, see Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical
Center, 80 F.R.D. at 263, an allegation of East Indian ancestry
coupled with an allegation of racial discrimination is sufficient
to properly bring the complaint within the ambit of section 1981.
These two allegations clearly imply that the plaintiff believes
he was discriminated against because he is classified as a
non-white due to his East Indian ancestry. That is enough. In
Carrillo, plaintiff did not allege racial discrimination coupled
with her allegation of being a Hispanic, so no such inference
could be drawn. In addition, requiring the alleging of a specific
race without any consideration of the other factors seems to
imply rigid racial classifications for the purposes of section
1981, classifications already rejected by the court. See Ortiz v.
Bank of America, 547 F. Supp. at 561-62.
Defendant also argues that the statute of limitations has run
on plaintiff's claims relating to his demotion and salary
reduction. A five-year statute of limitations applies to section
1981 actions brought in Illinois. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works of International Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 488 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 137, 27 L.Ed.2d 151
(1970), (applying Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 83, § 16 (1967)). Plaintiff
filed his complaint on September 29, 1982. Plaintiff's demotion
occurred in September, 1976, and the reduction of his salary
occurred in January, 1977. Both claims occurred over five years
before the filing of the complaint. These claims, therefore,
cannot be the basis for imposition of liability. The court,
however, will look to the prelimitation period as relevant
evidence regarding Time's motivation for its discharge of Banker.
See Aponte v. National Steel Service Center, 500 F. Supp. at 203.
Defendant finally asks this court to abstain in deciding this
case in deference to a state court suit filed by plaintiff in
September, 1979. In that state court action plaintiff is also
seeking relief for his demotion, salary reduction and
termination. Apparently, plaintiff's complaint and amended
complaint were dismissed by the state court on Time's motion. A
second amended complaint seems to be still pending. Defendant
seeks dismissal of the federal action based upon considerations
of efficient judicial administration and conservation of scarce
judicial resources as enunciated in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct.
1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976).
In Colorado River, the Supreme Court stated that there was a
"virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to
exercise the jurisdiction given them." 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct.
at 1246. The Court held that only exceptional circumstances
permit the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a
concurrent state proceeding. Id. at 818, 96 S.Ct. at 1246. The
decision whether to dismiss is not based upon a "mechanical
checklist," but is instead flexible and open-ended. See Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., ___ U.S.
___, 103 S.Ct. 927, 937, 74 L.Ed.2d 765, 780 (1983). In making
this determination a court may consider, among other factors, the
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, the order in which
jurisdiction was obtained, the inconvenience of the forum and the
possibly vexatious nature of the suit. Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. at 818, 96 S.Ct.
at 1246; Voktas, Inc. v. Central Soya Co., Inc., 689 F.2d 103,
106-7 (7th Cir. 1982).
The Seventh Circuit adheres to the Colorado River rule that "a
federal suit should not be stayed or dismissed because of a
pending parallel state suit except on the clearest of
justifications." Evans Transport Co. v. Scullin Steel Co.,
693 F.2d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1982). In Evans the court
vacated the dismissal of a federal action in deference to a
concurrent state action. The district court found that the state
court action was filed a month before the federal action and that
the state court was a more convenient forum. The Seventh Circuit
found these circumstances insufficient justification to warrant
dismissal in light of a federal court's obligation to exercise
its jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit in Bio-Analytical Services
v. Edgewater Hospital, 565 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1977), held that
dismissal of a Federal Arbitration Act case in deference to a
pending state court case was improper in view of the important
federal interest in enforcement of the Act. See also Voktas, Inc.
v. Central Soya Co., Inc., 689 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1982). Though
in Microsoftware Computer Systems, Inc. v. Ontel Corp.,
686 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1982), the Seventh Circuit did order a district
court to stay federal proceedings in deference to concurrent
state litigation, that decision was based upon exceptional
circumstances. First, the court found the Colorado River balance
tipped heavily towards dismissal due to lack of a federal
interest, ability of the state court to adequately handle the
litigation and the waste of resources in maintaining two actions.
See Voktas, Inc. v. Central Soya Co., Inc., 689 F.2d at 105, n.
6. Second, plaintiff in the federal action had the option as
defendant in the state court action to remove the state court
action to a federal court. Instead, a federal suit in a different
district was filed. The court held that not staying the federal
action would allow parties to pick and choose among different
federal forums. See Evans Transportation Co. v. Scullin Steel
Co., 693 F.2d at 719.
In light of Colorado River and the recent Seventh Circuit
cases, this court refuses to dismiss the federal action. There is
no possibility of piecemeal litigation here and no indication
that the Illinois courts are a more convenient forum. In
addition, the Illinois court's dismissal of plaintiff's first two
complaints indicates that full adjudication of plaintiff's claims
might be unavailable in state court. Finally, unlike
Microsoftware, there is a strong federal interest in seeing that
discrimination cases under section 1981 be adjudicated in federal
court. See Bio-Analytical Services, Inc. v. Edgewater Hospital
Inc., 565 F.2d at 454.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is
denied as to all plaintiff's claims arising from incidents
occurring outside the five-year statute of limitations.