to strike Maddox' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated
herein, all motions are denied with the exception of respondent's motion
to dismiss the petition which is granted.
Petitioner asserts three grounds in support of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus. The first of these grounds, alleged error in federal bail
bonding procedures, was previously dismissed by this Court because that
claim is presently the subject of an appeal before the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. See Maddox v. United States, No. H 82-32
(N.D.Ind. Apr. 8, 1982) (order Maddox' 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition),
appeal docketed, No. 82- 2180 (7th Cir. Apr. 19, 1982). The remaining
grounds asserted before this Court (loss of personal jurisdiction and
deprivation of Maddox' due process rights by the Bureau of Prisons'
administrative remedy process), although seeking relief similar to
Maddox' present appeal, are properly before this Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241.*fn2
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The following facts are alleged in Maddox' petition (including
exhibits). For purposes of this motion, the Court assumes they are true.
On February 2, 1978, Maddox was arrested by the Cook County Sheriffs'
Police for possession of a controlled substance (hereinafter "the state
charge"). Maddox posted bail and was at liberty pending trial. While
awaiting trial on the state charge, Maddox was charged with receiving and
concealing stolen motor vehicles by federal authorities in Chicago
(hereinafter "the federal charge"). Maddox was tried, convicted and
sentenced to eight years imprisonment on the federal charge by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Pending
appeal of his federal conviction, Maddox was at liberty on a federal
On July 18, 1979, while at liberty on the federal appeal bond, Maddox
was tried, convicted and sentenced to six years imprisonment for the
state charge. Maddox was placed into state custody immediately following
his state trial. Maddox unsuccessfully exhausted all appeals of his
federal and state convictions. While serving his state sentence in
January, 1981, a detainer was filed by the United States Marshal against
Maddox with the Illinois authorities. In January, 1982, Maddox was
released from state custody and was immediately transferred to federal
custody to commence service of his federal sentence.
In August, 1982, Maddox filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Indiana. According to Maddox, the issue
presented in that petition was whether Maddox was "entitled to credit on
his federal commitment for time served in State custody." Exhibit H to
Respondents' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. Addressing that
issue, the district court held that Maddox' federal and state sentences
ran consecutively and not concurrently. Accordingly, Maddox was not given
credit for his state sentence. Maddox v. United States, No. H82-32, slip
op. at S (N.D.Ind. Apr. 8, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-2180 (7th Cir.
Apr. 19, 1982). That issue is presently before the Seventh Circuit and
therefore will not be considered by this Court. Maddox, however, asserts
two additional grounds in support of his petition. First, Maddox argues
that the federal district court in Indiana lost in personam jurisdiction
over Maddox when it failed to revoke his federal appeal bond in 1979.
Second, Maddox argues that he was denied procedural due process by the
Bureau of Prisons
in the processing of his administrative request for credit for his state
A. Loss of In Personam Jurisdiction Claim
After his conviction in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Maddox remained at liberty after posting an
appeal bond. According to Maddox, his continued liberty was conditioned
upon the following provisions:
1) Petitioner shall abide by all orders and rules of
2) Petitioner shall not leave the Northern Districts
of both Indiana and Illinois;
3) Petitioner shall as a condition of bail report to
the United States Marshal for the Northern District of
Indiana, Hammond Division, once a week.
Maddox argues that while he was in state custody he breached the
condition of reporting to the Marshal in Hammond, Indiana. Maddox further
argues that the Marshal and the court, by failing to revoke his bond,
waived in personam jurisdiction over Maddox.
In Piper v. Estelle, 485 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1978), the Court stated the
applicable standard for determining when the government waives personal
jurisdiction over a criminal defendant:
[I]t is not sufficient to prove official conduct that
merely evidences a lack of eager pursuit or even
arguable lack of interest. Rather the waiving state's
action must be so affirmatively wrong or its inaction
so grossly negligent that it would be unequivocally
inconsistent with "fundamental principles of liberty
and justice" to require a legal sentence to be served
in the aftermath of such action or inaction.
Id. at 246 (emphasis added). Maddox' petition contains no facts
indicating that the government's conduct in this case was either
"affirmatively wrong" or "grossly negligent." In fact, Maddox admits
that the United States Marshal filed a detainer with state officials
while Maddox was serving his state sentence. Shields v. Beto,
870 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967), relied upon by Maddox, is
distinguishable. Unlike Shields, the United States Marshal in this case
filed a detainer with the Illinois authorities. Maddox pleads no facts
suggesting that the federal authorities abandoned him while he was
serving his state sentence. The mere refusal to forfeit Maddox' federal
appeal bond was neither "affirmatively wrong" nor "grossly negligent"
within the rule of Piper. See also Caches v. Third Judicial District,
etc., 416 F. Supp. 767 (W.D.Okla. 1976).
B. Denial of Procedural Due Process Claim