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LUCIEN v. ROEGNER
November 8, 1983
RUDOLPH L. LUCIEN, PLAINTIFF,
ROBERT C. ROEGNER AND LEWIS E. STONEHOUSE, DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Shadur, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Rudolph L. Lucien ("Lucien") brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983
("Section 1983") action against DuPage County police officers
Robert C. Roegner ("Roegner") and Lewis E. Stonehouse
("Stonehouse"), charging them with an allegedly unlawful search
and seizure of Lucien's apartment. This Court's April 13, 1982
memorandum opinion and order (the "Opinion") granted defendants
summary judgment on Complaint ¶ 1. Now Lucien's remaining
claims are at issue:*fn1
1. Both sides have moved for summary judgment
on Complaint ¶ 2.
For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order,
Lucien's motions are denied and defendants' are granted.
Lucien was convicted in Illinois state court on a rape
charge. This action arises out of defendants' December 13,
1979 search of Lucien's apartment where the rape took place.
Lucien's Complaint alleged three defects in that search:
1. Roegner falsely told the magistrate issuing
the warrant that the victim left her purse in
Lucien's apartment (Complaint ¶ 1).*fn2
2. Roegner, Stonehouse and other DuPage County
police officers seized items not named in the
search warrant, a seizure not authorized by any
exception to the warrant requirement (Complaint
3. Roegner and Stonehouse planted two items of
evidence in Lucien's apartment (Complaint ¶ 3).
All items seized by defendants were used in evidence against
Lucien in his state court trial after his unsuccessful motion
to suppress under Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 114-12 ("Section
114-12"). Lucien seeks return of the items seized, together
with compensatory and punitive damages of $1 million from each
Defendants contend Lucien is estopped from relitigating his
Complaint ¶ 2 allegations because he had a full and fair
hearing on the same issues via his state court motion to
suppress. Collateral estoppel does apply to such Fourth
Amendment*fn4 claims later asserted in Section 1983 actions.
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-105, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415-420,
66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Blake v. Katter, 693 F.2d 677, 682 (7th
Cir. 1982); Reineman v. Valley View Community School District
No. 356-U, 527 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D.Ill. 1981). But the
inquiry does not end there, for collateral estoppel principles
must be applied in light of the considerations identified in
Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1010 (7th Cir. 1982):
In order to determine when a party may
appropriately be precluded from relitigating an
issue decided adversely to it in an earlier
proceeding, a court must examine whether the
issue on which collateral estoppel is asserted is
identical to that determined in the prior action;
whether the controlling facts or legal principles
have changed significantly since the prior
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