the defendant police officers." (Surreply p. 2.) Plaintiffs argue
that this handling of their charge "was part of a significant
contribution to the pattern of reckless abuse of citizens [sic]
rights as charged in the Complaint." (Id.)
The court rejects plaintiffs' arguments. First, the complaint
does not really allege any wrongdoing on Nolan's or Rosas' part.
The complaint does not allege that the determination was made in
bad faith, or that there was any procedural deficiency in the
processing of the complaint, except that the Office took a year
to reach its determination. (¶ 16.) Even taking all of
plaintiffs' allegations of police misconduct as true, for
purposes of this motion, those allegations support at most an
inference that Nolan and Rosas made an erroneous determination.
The allegations entitle plaintiffs to no greater inference, and
an erroneous determination would not amount to a violation of
Second, and equally important, plaintiffs' allegations do not
support an inference of any causal relation between Nolan's and
Rosas' handling of their complaint and any violation of
plaintiffs' rights or injury to them. Plaintiffs' memoranda argue
only that the handling of their complaint contributed to the
general pattern of abuse alleged to have caused the violation of
plaintiffs' rights. It hardly needs to be pointed out that the
handling of plaintiffs' complaint occurred after the alleged
incident, and could not possibly have caused it. The suggestion
of a causal relation being completely implausible, plaintiffs'
claim must fail. Cf. Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736,
742 (1st Cir. 1980) (unsuccessful conspiracy to cover up
excessive use of force did not itself violate plaintiff's rights,
although some measures taken in furtherance of conspiracy might
constitute independent violations). Plaintiffs thus fail to state
a claim against Nolan and Rosas under § 1983.
Nolan and Rosas — § 1981
As noted above, plaintiffs do allege a certain amount of
personal involvement on the part of Nolan and Rosas, but they do
not allege sufficiently that that personal involvement was
wrongful. Conceivably, the Office of Professional Standards
investigation may have constituted "proceedings for the security
of persons and property." § 1981. Even under this view, which the
court accepts only arguendo, plaintiffs' § 1981 claim against
Nolan and Rosas is insufficient, since plaintiffs allege at most
that Nolan's and Rosas' determination was erroneous.
Nolan and Rosas — § 1985(3)
Plaintiffs do allege a certain amount of personal involvement
on the part of Nolan and Rosas, and, since Nolan and Rosas signed
the same letter, it is plausible to assume a certain amount of
cooperation between them. Nonetheless, plaintiffs' allegations do
not support an inference that Nolan or Rosas conspired with the
other, or with anyone else, to wrong plaintiffs in any way.
Plaintiffs do not allege wrongful conduct on the part of Nolan or
Rosas, and they do not allege plausibly that Nolan's or Rosas'
conduct caused them injury or deprived them of their rights.
Plaintiffs name as a defendant "City of Chicago Department of
Police." Defendants contend that the Department of Police is not
a suable entity, and plaintiffs do not respond to this
contention. Accordingly, the Department of Police is stricken
from the complaint as a defendant. See Jordan v. City of Chicago,
Department of Police, 505 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (N.D.Ill. 1980).
The court dismisses all federal claims asserted against
defendants Byrne, Brzeczek, Nolan, and Rosas. It generally is not
proper for federal courts to continue their exercise of pendent
state-law claims when all federal claims are dismissed before
trial. The court finds no valid reason for retaining the pendent
claims against these defendants, so it dismisses them without
Defendants Ganison, Carter, and the City of Chicago remain in
the case. It appears to the court that plaintiffs' case against
the City will be vastly greater in scope than their case against
Ganison and Carter. For instance, plaintiffs allege inadequate
training and disciplinary procedures. Proving up such allegations
might require comparison of Chicago's programs with those of
other large cities. Possibly, plaintiffs' case would have to
include expert witnesses on the administration of police
departments. Proof of official cover-ups of police misconduct, as
alleged, might even require mini-trials on other instances of
misconduct. The court is concerned that this litigation could
become unmanageable. As a first step in keeping this case under
control, at the next status hearing the court will expect
plaintiffs' counsel to report on his plans for taking discovery
necessary to his case against the City.
The court grants defendants' motion in part and denies it in
part. Counts I through XIII are dismissed as against defendants
Byrne, Brzeczek, Nolan, and Rosas; of those counts, Counts IV,
VIII, and XII are dismissed without prejudice, for want of
subject-matter jurisdiction. The City of Chicago Department of
Police is not a suable entity, and it is stricken from the
complaint as a defendant.
It is so ordered.
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