The opinion of the court was delivered by: Shadur, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Anne Pawelek ("Pawelek") has filed each of these lawsuits as a
purported class action against Paramount Studios Corporation, its
Chairman Barry Diller and all other Paramount "owners and
executives" (collectively "Paramount" in the singular). Both
suits share a single gravamen: the claimed impropriety of
Paramount's inclusion of "Polish jokes" in its motion picture
"Flashdance."*fn1 Paramount has now moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
("Rule") 12(b)(6) to dismiss each of Pawelek's pro se Complaints
(collectively the "Complaint" in the singular) for failure to
state a claim. For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion
and order, Paramount's motion is granted.
Understandably only the Complaint in 83 C 5109 identifies a
specific jurisdictional source:*fn2 18 U.S.C. § 241-42, federal
criminal statutes defining civil rights violations. But as
Paramount points out, it is well settled no private right of
action inheres in those criminal provisions. Aldabe v. Aldabe,
616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Weiland v.
Byrne, 392 F. Supp. 21, 22 (N.D.Ill. 1975).
However, in keeping with our judicial system's solicitude
towards pro se litigants,*fn3 this Court has searched for other
viable claims that might lurk within the Complaint. It has
considered three possibilities:
1. a claim under the various federal civil rights
statutes (such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985(3));*fn4
2. and 3. state law claims for defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.*fn5
As for the Complaint's arguable civil rights claim, this
Court's independent research has disclosed no authority for the
proposition that group defamation by private actors — the
gravamen of the Complaint — infringes any federal constitutional
or statutory rights. Rather the case law establishes just the
opposite. See, e.g., United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America v. Scott, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 3356-57, 77
L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983) (Section 1985(3) does not apply to "wholly
private conspiracies" to abridge federal rights that shield the
individual from government action); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
701-10, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160-65, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (mere
defamation even by state officials is not actionable under
Section 1983*fn6). Absent any supporting authority, this Court is
certainly not willing to embrace such a bizarre theory of federal
civil rights liability.
Pawelek's failure to plead special (i.e., pecuniary) damages*fn7
defeats any possible defamation claim. As such cases as Whitby v.
Associates Discount Corp., 59 Ill.App.2d 337, 340,
207 N.E.2d 482, 484 (3d Dist. 1965) teach, Illinois law requires proof of
special damages unless the defamatory statement (whether
characterized as libel or slander) falls within one of the four
"per se" defamatory categories:
1. those imputing the commission of a criminal
2. those imputing infection with a communicable
disease of any kind which, if true, would tend to
exclude one from society;
3. those imputing inability to perform or want of
integrity in the discharge of duties of ...