The opinion of the court was delivered by: Leighton, District Judge.
This action arises out of alleged violations of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., in the termination of
plaintiff's funding as a VISTA sponsor. This cause is presently before the
court on the motion of defendant to dismiss Count 1 of plaintiff's
complaint. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion is granted.
In 1973, plaintiff Cook County Legal Assistance Foundation (CCLAF), was
selected as a VISTA sponsor. In 1978, it was reselected. A Memorandum of
Agreement was entered into between CCLAF and defendant ACTION, the
federal agency which operates the VISTA program. The agreement, effective
July 1, 1978, provided for the funding of a community program for one
year, unless it was terminated earlier. The agreement was subsequently
extended to April 30, 1980.
On April 1, 1980, ACTION notified CCLAF that it would not be refunded
for the next year. VISTA guidelines effective at that time required
"community organization" to be a primary goal of a VISTA sponsor. ACTION
determined that CCLAF's programs were geared toward "direct service"
rather than "community organization"; therefore, CCLAF was considered a
low priority with regard to refunding. Consequently, CCLAF was not
refunded after April 30, 1980. CCLAF has never reapplied to be a VISTA
sponsor since funding was terminated in 1980.
Although CCLAF was denied refunding in 1980, it did not file this suit
until October 26, 1982. Count I alleges that ACTION acted capriciously in
its refasal to continue funding plaintiff. Plaintiff also contends that
the agreement between the parties was terminated arbitrarily because
CCLAF complied substantially with the VISTA guidelines.
On the basis of these claims, plaintiff in Count I seeks: (1) an
injunction against termination of the VISTA agreement and an injunction
requiring ACTION to enter into a multi-year agreement with CCLAF for
funding; (2) an injunction requiring ACTION to continue funding until a
full hearing is held; (3) a declaratory judgment finding ACTION's
termination of funding to be unlawful; (4) in the alternative, to have a
trial de novo and remand with instructions; and (5) compensatory damages
of $8,900 for wages paid since the termination of the agreement.
Defendant contends that Count I must be dismissed because none of the
relief can be granted; and even if the relief could be granted, the
action is barred by the doctrine of laches.
[1, 2] CCLAF seeks to enjoin ACTION from terminating the VISTA
agreement, and an order compelling ACTION to enter into a multi-year
agreement with CCLAF. The agreement between CCLAF and ACTION explicitly
states that "[it] shall become effective on July 1, 1978 and shall
terminate one year from the effective date unless sooner terminated." An
amendment to the agreement extended the period "from July 1, 1979 to
April 30, 1980 to benefit the departure of the last VISTA volunteer
assigned to this project." Plaintiff has waited over two years since the
agreement has, by its own terms, expired to seek to enjoin its
termination. A court will not enjoin a contract from terminating when by
its very terms the contract has expired. Economics Laboratory, Inc. v.
Donnolo, 612 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1979).
Plaintiff also seeks an injunction to continue funding until a full
hearing is held. Plaintiff has not been funded since April 1980. Prior to
or at the time of termination of funding, plaintiff could have sought an
order from a court to continue funding pending a full hearing. This court
will not now enter an order restoring funding when the plaintiff has not
received any funds for the past two years, nor has plaintiff fulfilled
the requirements and obligations of a VISTA sponsor in the last two
 Plaintiff, in the alternative, seeks to have the court remand the
action to the agency with instructions. A VISTA sponsor is only
considered for refunding in the year in which its funding expires.
Plaintiff at this time is not an applicant for refunding. Accordingly, at
this time there is no action of the agency for the court to remand with
[5, 6] Plaintiff also asks this court to enter a declaratory judgment
finding unlawful defendant's denial of refunding. A court will only enter
a declaratory judgment when declaratory relief will achieve a useful
objective. Spivey v. Barry, 665 F.2d 1222 (D.C.Cir. 1981). The 1979 VISTA
guidelines, which controlled denial of CCLAF's refunding in 1980, have
been superseded. The new VISTA guidelines specifically retract the policy
responsible for the denial of refunding to CCLAF in 1980. A declaration
that ACTION's denial of refunding in 1980 was unlawful would serve no
useful purpose because the guidelines which determined ACTION's decision
are no longer in effect.
 In addition to the fact that the relief sought by plaintiff is not
appropriate, this cause must also be dismissed because the equitable
relief sought is barred by the doctrine of laches. Laches applies both to
unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and prejudice to a defendant as a
result of the delay. Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956,
958 (9th Cir. 1979); Independent Bankers Ass'n. of America v. Heimann,
627 F.2d 486 (D.C.Cir. 1980). As discussed above, plaintiff has waited
over two years since refunding was denied to file suit. It could have
sought injunctive and declaratory relief back in 1980 when it was an
applicant for refunding, and the 1979 VISTA guidelines were in effect.
 Defendant has been prejudiced by plaintiff's delay in filing this
action. The Director of State Programs, who was responsible for the
decision not to continue funding plaintiff, is no longer with the
agency. "Classic elements of undue prejudice include unavailability of
witness [and] changed personnel. . . ." EEOC v. Dresser Industries,
Inc., 668 F.2d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 1982), citing EEOC v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 622 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1980). Defendant is further
prejudiced because of the substantial decline in available funds since
1980. In 1980, Congress appropriated $29,963,000 to fund VISTA sponsors.
However, when plaintiff filed suit, only $11,831,000 was appropriated.
Furthermore, defendant would be required to defend a policy which it no
longer follows. Therefore, the court finds that all of plaintiff's
requests for equitable relief are barred by the doctrine of laches.
[9, 10] Plaintiff's final claim is for money damages. Both sides
concede that money damages are not available under the Administrative
Procedure Act. Plaintiff, however, claims that the Tucker Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1346, entitles it to money damages. The Tucker Act is
only jurisdictional; and as the supreme Court stated, this statute "does
not create any substantive
right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114
(1976). Plaintiff must rely on another statute which confers either a
right to recover money damages or waives sovereign immunity. United
States v. Testan, supra at 399, 96 S.Ct. at 953. Neither statute on which
plaintiff relies, the Administrative Procedure Act or the Domestic