says that his permanent transfer was prompted by the same, untrue
allegations of fraternization which led to his temporary removal
Watts also claims that he suffers from an unidentified eye
disease which requires medical treatment twice daily. He says
that during the 23 day period in which he remained idle, he did
not receive or received irregularly his treatment at the Clinic.
Watts claims that as a result he suffered much pain.
Watts asserts a property interest in prison employment which
cannot be disturbed absent due process. He also argues, in
effect, that his alleged deprivation of good time impaired his
liberty interest in a speedy release from incarceration.
A. Liberty or Property Interest
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving all
persons, including incarcerees, of life, liberty or property
without due process. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 94
S.Ct. 2963, 2974, 41 L.Ed.2d 336 (1974). But, every interference
by the state which results in some discomfort or deprivation is
not actionable. Only where a claimant can satisfy both parts of
a two part test may he recover for an unconstitutional
deprivation. Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1982).
First, the Court must establish whether a protected interest
exists. If it does, then the Court looks to see if the interest
was disturbed without due process. The key inquiry is whether an
individual has a right or a legitimate expectation in a tangible
benefit, based on the Constitution, state law or practice the
revocation of which is conditioned upon the occurrence of
specified events. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490, 100 S.Ct.
1254, 1262, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980); Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365,
1369 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121, 99 S.Ct. 1033,
59 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). Property interests generally are not
created by the Constitution. Their primary source is state law.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709,
33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Liberty interests may stem from the
Constitution or state law.
If either a liberty or property interest is identified, the
minimum required procedural protections are defined by federal
constitutional law, not state law. Shango v. Jurich, supra at
1098. Not every change in the conditions of confinement having a
substantial adverse impact on a prisoner invokes due process
protection. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, 96 S.Ct. 2532,
2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976).
There is no constitutional right to work in prison. Garza v.
Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 103 S.Ct. 796, 74 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1983); Alitzer v. Paderick,
569 F.2d 812-13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009, 98 S.Ct.
1882, 56 L.Ed.2d 391 (1978). Moreover, the expectation of keeping
a particular job is not a property or liberty interest entitled
to due process protection. Gibson v. McEvers, 631 F.2d 95 (7th
Cir. 1980); Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1975).
Instead, assignments of work to prisoners is a matter of prison
administration, within the discretion of prison administrators.
Alitzer v. Paderick, supra. See also Zemblidge v. Lane, No. 82 C
0200, at p. 4, (N.D.Ill. June 24, 1983). Thus, where discharge
from a job does not result in an increased period of confinement,
no constitutional interest is impaired. Wolff v. McDonnell,
Accordingly, any actionable right Watts may have in a prison
job must be found, if at all, in state statute or policy. Watts
concedes that he has no right to a particular job. However, he
cites Ill.Rev.Stat. 1979, ch. 38, §§ 1001-1-2(c), 1003-2-2(d),
1003-8-3 and 1003-12-1, along with IDOC administrative regulation
("A.R.") 802 as the sources of his right to a job.
Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 1001-1-2 states that one of its
purposes is the prevention of "arbitrary or oppressive treatment
of persons adjudicated offenders and delinquents." In section
1003-2-2, a duty to "develop and maintain programs of control,
rehabilitation and employment of committed persons" is imposed on
the IDOC. Such general policies "do not give rise to a
protectible `liberty interest' of entitlement." Larson v.
Mulcrone, 575 F. Supp. 1 at 3 (N.D.Ill. 1982). Likewise, sections
1003-8-3 and 1003-12-1 do not create an entitlement sufficient to
invoke due process safeguards. Those sections respectively state
that "work, education and other program assignments shall be
made, insofar as practicable" and "the Department shall, insofar
as possible, employ at useful work committed persons." (emphases
It is clear from the "insofar as practicable or possible"
clauses that the IDOC is given discretion over job assignment
decisions. If employment is impracticable or impossible, the IDOC
remains in compliance with state law. Recently the Seventh
Circuit stated that the exercise of such discretion "preclude[s]
the implication of a liberty interest deserving of due process
protection." Shango v. Jurich, supra at 1100.
Another Seventh Circuit decision supports the conclusion that
the cited Illinois statutes do not create a protected property
interest in prison employment. In Garza v. Miller, supra, the
court held that the federal prison employment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4122(b),
did not create a substantive right to employment for
inmates. That subsection states "[i]ts [the Federal Prison
Industries] board of directors shall provide employment for all
physically fit inmates in the United States penal and
correctional institutions." (emphasis added). However, the court
found that subsection 4122(a) qualifies subsection 4122(b).
18 U.S.C. § 4122(a) states:
Federal Prison Industries shall determine in what
manner and to what extent industrial operations shall
be carried on in Federal penal and correctional
institutions for the production of commodities for
consumption in such institutions or for sale to the
departments or agencies of the United States, but not
for sale to the public in competition with private
The Court held that in light of subsection 4122(a), the operation
of prison industries, despite the mandatory language of
subsection 4122(b), is fully within the discretion of the Federal
Prison Industries Board.