The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bua, District Judge.
This suit is brought under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and § 16(b) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).*fn1
Plaintiffs are 20 current and former employees of the Levy
Company (Levy). Defendants are Levy, several labor local
unions, and an international labor organization (the unions).
Plaintiffs also allege that they have been required to work,
and did work, in excess of 40 hours per week, without being
paid minimum overtime wages. To require such overtime without
overtime compensation would be in violation of the contract
and § 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
As to the unions, plaintiffs allege breach of the duty of
fair representation. The unions have repeatedly ignored
plaintiffs' complaints regarding Levy's discriminatory
practices, and have taken no action to correct them.
Plaintiffs further assert that the unions are "in connivance"
Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint on various
grounds, each of which will be discussed below.
When considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the
complaint are taken as admitted and the complaint is liberally
construed in favor of the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1848, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969).
Applying this standard to the facts set forth in the complaint
now before the Court, it is clear that the plaintiffs have
stated a claim sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
A. Statute of Limitations
Both Levy and the unions argue that the plaintiff's claims
are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Court
Courts have been far from unanimous as to what limitations
period to apply to a suit under § 301. See, e.g., Bigbie v.
Local 142, Int'l. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 530 F. Supp. 402
(N.D.Ill. 1981) (applying a 90-day limitations period); King v.
Corn Products, 538 F. Supp. 569 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (applying a
10-year limitations period); Canada v. United Parcel Service,
Inc., 446 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D.Ill. 1978) (applying a 5-year
limitations period); and Kaftantzis v. D & L Transport Co.,
531 F. Supp. 566 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (applying a 6-month limitations
period). This confusion was resolved in DelCostello v.
Teamsters, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (U.S.
1983), in which the Supreme Court held that the 6-month
limitations period of § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), governs a suit based on § 301 against
both the employer and the union. ___ U.S. at ___, 103 S.Ct. at
As noted in DelCostello, there is no federal statute of
limitations expressly applicable to this suit. ___ U.S. at ___,
103 S.Ct. at 2286. In such situations, courts have generally
looked to the most closely analogous statute of limitations
under state law. Id. The Court recognized that "In some
circumstances, however, state statutes of limitations can be
unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law. In
those instances, it may be inappropriate to conclude that
Congress would choose to adopt state rules at odds with the
purpose or operation of federal substantive law." Id. at ___,
103 S.Ct. at 2289. The Court reasoned that analogies to the
suggested state statutes of limitations contained flaws of both
legal substance and practical application. First, it noted,
short limitations periods for vacating arbitration awards
(typically 90 days) fail to provide an employee adequate
opportunity to vindicate his rights. Id., at ___, 103 S.Ct. at
2290. Furthermore, the Court added, the analogy of an action to
vacate an arbitration award to an unfair labor practice claim
is unsatisfactory. Moreover, the Court reasoned because a party
to commercial arbitration will ordinarily be represented by
counsel or have some experience in contract negotiation, while
a labor employee will often be unsophisticated in collective
bargaining matters and represented only by the union, the
analogy of an action to vacate an arbitration award to an
unfair labor claim is less than satisfactory.