Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois No. 78 C 4345 -- James L. Foreman, Judge.
Bauer, Nichols,*fn* and Wood, Circuit Judges.
At issue in this appeal is whether section 10(b) of the Illinois Detectives and Investigators Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 2622(1), deprives ex-felons of their rights to due process and equal protection in contravention of the fourteenth amendment. The district court held that the challenged statute offended neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause. Schanuel v. Anderson, 546 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Ill. 1982). We affirm.
The Illinois Detectives and Investigators Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 2601 et seq., requires all private detectives and detective agencies to secure a certificate of registration or authority from the Illinois Department of Registration and Education. Under the statutory scheme, the Department administers written examinations for registration of detectives, promulgates and enforces rules and regulations, and conducts hearings on suspension, revocation, or renewal of certificates of authority and certificates of registration. Among the provisions enforced by the Department is section 2622 which sets forth the qualifications for unlicensed employees of a detective agency holding a certificate of authority.
The representative plaintiff in this case, Larry Schanuel, applied for employment with the Allied National Detective Agency of Belleville, Illinois, in July of 1978. Schanuel was denied employment because of his criminal record;*fn1 section 2622(1) prohibits the holder of a certificate of authority from employing any individual who has been convicted of a felony or crime of moral turpitude unless ten years have passed "from the time of discharge from any sentence imposed therefor." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 2622(1).
Schanuel then brought this action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. He alleged that section 2622(1) violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. On this basis, Schanuel sought a declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional on its face and an injunction against its enforcement.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court upheld the constitutionality of section 2622(1). This appeal followed; we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Schanuel raises three separate arguments in support of his contention that section 2622(1) violates the due process clause. First, he argues that section 2622(1) impermissibly creates an irrebuttable presumption that ex-offenders are unfit for employment as security guards. Second, he argues that there is no rational relationship between the proscription against ex-offenders and the qualifications for a security guard jub. Last, Schanuel contends that the statute denies an applicant the right to a meaningful hearing. We reject each of these arguments.
A. The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine
Schanuel relies on Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S. Ct. 791, 39 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1974), for the general proposition that due process is offended by any conclusive statutory presumption that is neither a necessary presumption nor a universal truth. Br. of Appellant at 16. In LaFleur the Supreme Court held that rules requiring pregnant teachers to take leave after their fifth month of pregnancy were unconstitutional. The Court based its decision on the fact that family planning decisions are protected by the fourteenth amendment; the ...