decided: April 4, 1983.
LOCAL 926, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO, ET AL
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF GEORGIA.
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Powell and O'connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 684.
[ 460 U.S. Page 671]
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a state-court action brought by one who is a "supervisor"*fn1 within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act § 2 (11), 29 U. S. C. § 152(11), for interference by a union with his contractual relationships with his employer is pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act).
Respondent Robert C. Jones*fn2 was offered a supervisory position by the Georgia Power Co. (Company). Jones reported for work on June 12, 1978. By agreement, he took vacation time after his second day on the job and reported for work again on June 20, 1978. On this latter date he was discharged.
[ 460 U.S. Page 672]
Jones believed that the Company had been persuaded to discharge him by the union bargaining agent, Local 926 of the International Union of Operating Engineers (Union). The reason for the Union's hostility, he believed, was his decision years ago to work for a nonunion employer. On June 28, 1978, Jones filed a charge with the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) against the Union, alleging that the Union had "procured" his discharge, "and thereby coerced [the Company] in the selection of its supervisors and bargaining representative, because [Jones] had not been a member in good standing of said labor organization." Allegedly, this action violated §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and (B) of the Act.*fn3 App. to Juris. Statement 25a.
In a letter dated July 19, 1978, the Regional Director said that further proceedings on respondent's charge were unwarranted and that he would not issue a complaint.*fn4 He explained
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that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the Union had caused Jones' discharge; there was also a lack of evidence indicating that the Union had restrained or coerced the Company in the selection of its representative for purposes of collective bargaining. The Regional Director had instead come to the conclusion that Jones' discharge had been a part of changes in the Company's supervisory structure and that the Union had merely participated in discussions regarding the changes.
Instead of appealing to the General Counsel,*fn5 Jones proceeded to state court, suing both the Union and the Company. Count I of his complaint claimed that the Union had interfered with the contract between him and the Company. The allegations were simple. He pleaded that he had been a member of Local 926 from 1969 to 1974, when he resigned
[ 460 U.S. Page 674]
from the Union. More recently, the Company had offered him the job of equipment supervisor at one of its plants, and he and the Company had entered into a contract in reliance on which he had terminated his prior employment. The crucial allegation was that petitioner Thomas D. Archer, the business agent and representative of the Union, had "maliciously and with full intent, intimidated and coerced Georgia Power Company, or caused Georgia Power Company to be intimidated and coerced, into breaching its employment contract with the Plaintiff." Respondent prayed for a judgment of $80,000 against petitioners, to be composed of $25,000 in lost wages, $50,000 in punitive damages, and $5,000 in attorney's fees, interest, and costs. Count II of his complaint sought relief against the Company and alleged that the Company had breached its employment contract.
The Georgia trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the common-law tort action had been pre-empted because the subject matter of the complaint was arguably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. The court observed that there was no justification for allowing joint federal-state control over the alleged conduct, since the state interest in protecting state citizens from the alleged conduct was insignificant and the risk of interference with the Board's jurisdiction was substantial.
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the case against the Union.*fn6 159 Ga. App. 693, 285 S. E. 2d 30 (1981). Following Georgia precedent it considered to be controlling, Sheet Metal Workers International Assn. v. Carter, 133 Ga. App. 872, 212 S. E. 2d 645 (1975), and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Briscoe, 143 Ga. App. 417, 239 S. E. 2d 38 (1977), the State Court of Appeals held the cause of action not pre-empted because Georgia had a deep and abiding interest in protecting its citizens' contractual rights and because the cause of action, which sounded in
[ 460 U.S. Page 675]
tort, was so unrelated to the concerns of the federal labor laws that it would not interfere with the administration of those laws. As an additional reason for not finding pre-emption, the court stated that the Union's acts were not even arguably within the ambit of § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA, thus purporting to distinguish Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963). The Georgia Supreme Court denied review, and petitioners appealed.
We postponed to the hearing on the merits consideration of our appellate jurisdiction. 456 U.S. 987 (1982). Petitioners now acknowledge that this is not a mandatory appeal.*fn7 We agree, but, treating the papers as a petition for writ of certiorari, we grant the petition. Concluding that the Georgia Court of Appeals erred, we reverse.
The issue before us "is a variant of a familiar theme." San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239 (1959). The Court has often been asked to determine whether particular state causes of action or regulations may coexist with the comprehensive amalgam of substantive law and regulatory arrangements that Congress set up in the
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NLRA to govern labor-management relations affecting interstate commerce. E. g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Garmon, supra. Our approach to the pre-emption issue has thus been stated and restated. First, we determine whether the conduct that the State seeks to regulate or to make the basis of liability is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. Garmon, supra, at 245; see Sears, supra, at 187-190. Although the "Garmon guidelines [are not to be applied] in a literal, mechanical fashion," Sears, supra, at 188, if the conduct at issue is arguably prohibited or protected otherwise applicable state law and procedures are ordinarily pre-empted. Farmer, supra, at 296. When, however, the conduct at issue is only a peripheral concern of the Act or touches on interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, it could not be inferred that Congress intended to deprive the State of the power to act, we refuse to invalidate state regulation or sanction of the conduct. Garmon, supra, at 243-244. The question of whether regulation should be allowed because of the deeply rooted nature of the local interest involves a sensitive balancing of any harm to the regulatory scheme established by Congress, either in terms of negating the Board's exclusive jurisdiction or in terms of conflicting substantive rules, and the importance of the asserted cause of action to the State as a protection to its citizens. See Sears, supra, at 188-189; Farmer, supra, at 297.*fn8
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Not only is this case a variant of a familiar theme, but we have heard this same tune before. In Iron Workers v. Perko, supra, the Court considered whether a common-law tort action for interference with a contract of employment was pre-empted by the NLRA. Perko, a member of the Iron Workers' Union, was employed at times as a superintendent and at other times as a foreman. While acting as a superintendent, he violated a Union rule, and his membership was suspended in consequence. Union representatives then told Perko's employer that because of Perko's transgression Union members would no longer take orders from him. Some weeks thereafter he was discharged on account of his dispute with the Union.
We concluded that Perko's common-law cause of action was pre-empted because it was founded on conduct that for several reasons was arguably within the ambit of § 7 or § 8. First, Perko was discharged both as a superintendent and a foreman. Even conceding that the position of superintendent was supervisory and beyond the reach of the Act, the foreman's position was arguably nonsupervisory and covered by the Act. Hence, Perko's discharge arguably violated the proscription of § 8(b)(1)(A) against a union interfering with the protected rights of employees and that of § 8(b)(2) against causing an employer to discriminate against an employee contrary to § 8(a)(3). Second, the Union arguably violated § 8(b)(1)(A), since causing the discharge of a supervisor might coerce employees, who would fear meeting their supervisor's fate, into forgoing their § 7 rights to engage in concerted action. Third, the Union's conduct might also have violated § 8(b)(1)(B), which prohibits unions from restraining or coercing "an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." Perko, we concluded, may well have had sufficient grievance-handling responsibilities to come within the realm of supervisors whose selection the Union could not seek to dictate.
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Since Jones, unlike Perko, had a job only as a supervisor and not also as an employee, the Union does not rely on the first reason given in Perko for finding the challenged conduct arguably subject to the proscriptions of the Act. It is urged that the other two reasons given in Perko for such a holding are fully applicable here. The Union adds that Jones' cause of action threatens to punish the workers' arguably protected conduct in protesting, noncoercively, the selection of people for supervisory positions whether or not they entail collective-bargaining responsibilities. For these reasons, the Union submits that Jones' state-court action is pre-empted. We agree.
In Perko, the Court thought the Board could reasonably construe § 8(b)(1)(A) to prohibit the discharge of a supervisor for failure to observe Union rules because the discharge would inevitably tend to coerce nonsupervisory employees to submit to Union regimentation and hence coerce them in the exercise of their § 7 rights. In that event, the Board could also order the Union to reimburse the supervisor for his lost wages. The Board's subsequent holdings apply a variant of this approach in the construction industry, where it is not unusual for workers to fluctuate, as Perko did, 373 U.S., at 706, between supervisory and nonsupervisory positions. In Local Union No. 725, Plumbers, 225 N. L. R. B. 138 (1976), enf'd, 572 F.2d 550 (CA5 1978), the Union caused the employer to breach a promise to hire the charging party as a supervisor. For two reasons, the Board held that the Union had violated § 8(b)(1)(A) and was liable to the charging party for backpay. First, it was found that certain employees depending on Union job referrals had learned of the Union's conduct and were thereby intimidated in the exercise of their rights under the Act. Second, the Board reasoned that "because workers in the construction industry frequently cycle in and out of supervisory jobs, discrimination against [an individual] in his attempt to become a supervisor would carry
[ 460 U.S. Page 679]
over to intimidate him once he again became a statutory employee." See 572 F.2d, at 552. The Board's "fluctuating status" approach is arguably applicable to this case. Jones was employed in the construction industry, and, in view of the low-level supervisory position he held, it was not unlikely that he would from time to time serve in a nonsupervisory position.*fn9 It also is as clear here as it was in Perko that the Union's conduct was arguably prohibited by § 8(b)(1)(B), which forbids a union to coerce an employer in the choice of his bargaining representative. In Perko, there was some doubt whether Perko was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act; here there is no doubt in that respect. Of course, not every supervisor is a "representative 'for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances'" within the meaning of § 8(b)(1)(B), Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 811, n. 21 (1974). But in this case, Jones was to occupy the position of equipment supervisor; it is enough if in this position he would be authorized or expected to deal with grievances arising under the collective-bargaining agreement, American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 427, n. 25 (1978);*fn10 and Jones' complaint
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filed with the Regional Director indicated that he would have collective-bargaining responsibilities. It is at least arguable that this was the case; and it was for the Board, not the state courts, to decide whether Jones was the kind of a supervisor who could invoke § 8(b)(1)(B). We thus agree with the Union and the Board that the Union, if it was responsible for Jones' discharge, arguably coerced the Company in the choice of its collective-bargaining representative.
For several reasons, none of them sound in our view, the Georgia Court of Appeals thought that the Act did not pre-empt the cause of action that Jones submitted to the state courts. First, the Court of Appeals may have interpreted the Regional Director's letter as indicating that the Board lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Jones' complaint because of Jones' supervisory status. That is plainly not the case, for the Regional Director's statement did not decline jurisdiction but addressed the merits of the complaint. See generally Garmon, 359 U.S., at 245-246.
Second, the Court of Appeals believed that the Regional Director's rejection of the complaint for insufficient evidence of a violation satisfied all of the interests of the federal law and cleared the way for a state cause of action. If this position was grounded on the notion that supervisors do not have a cause of action in any circumstances, it is contrary to Board cases and to Perko. If, as seems more likely, the argument is that the complainant adequately submitted his dispute to the Board, it is untenable. Jones did not exhaust his administrative remedies, for he did not appeal to the General Counsel. Beyond that, the Garmon pre-emption doctrine not only mandates the substantive pre-emption by the federal labor law in the areas to which it applies, but also protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board over matters arguably within the reach of the Act. Even if Jones had satisfied ordinary primary-jurisdiction requirements, which he did not, he
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would not have taken adequate account of the decision of Congress to vest in one administrative agency nationwide jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies within the Act's purview. Matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board are normally for it, not a state court, to decide. This implements the congressional desire to achieve uniform as well as effective enforcement of the national labor policy.
In addition to relying on the reasoning of the Georgia Court of Appeals, Jones argues that there should be no pre-emption because the state cause of action and the unfair labor practice charge are not sufficiently alike. Jones relies on Sears, Roebuck & Co., where we said that "the critical inquiry" in deciding whether a state claim is pre-empted because the challenged conduct is arguably prohibited by the federal labor laws is "whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to . . . or different from . . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board." 436 U.S., at 197. Jones asserts that a § 8(b)(1)(B) unfair labor practice claim is made out only by proving coercion of an employer in the selection of its bargaining representative, whereas, he explains, to make out his state cause of action it need only be shown that the Union caused, either coercively or noncoercively, the employer's selection of a supervisor. Because federal law does not forbid noncoerced, but union-caused discharges, it is said that the state cause of action is as distinct from the federal unfair labor practice claim as were the causes of action this Court found not pre-empted in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977); and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra.*fn11
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We reject this argument. First, the argument concedes that the state cause of action is pre-empted to the extent that it covers coercive influence on the employer; and we note that Jones' complaint in the state court alleged that the Union agent had "intimidated and coerced" Georgia Power into breaching its contract with Jones. Jones thus sought to prove a coerced discharge and breach of contract, the very claim that is concededly pre-empted. Second, permitting state causes of action for non-coercive interference with contractual relationships to go forward in the state courts would continually require the state court to decide in the first instance whether the Union's conduct was coercive, and hence beyond its power to sanction, or non-coercive, and thus the proper subject of a state suit. Decisions on such questions of federal labor law should be resolved by the Board.
Third, even if the Georgia law reaches non-coercive interference with contractual relationships, a fundamental part of such a claim is that the Union actually caused the discharge and hence was responsible for the employer's breach of contract. Of course, this same crucial element must be proved to make out a § 8(b)(1)(B) case: the discharge must be shown to be the result of Union influence. Even on Jones' view of the elements of his state-law cause of action, the federal and state claims are thus the same in a fundamental respect, and here the Regional Director had concluded that the Union was not at fault.
This was not the case in Sears. There the state-court action was for trespass. It challenged only the location of the Union picketing. The unfair labor practice charge, however, would have focused on whether the picketing had recognitional or work reassignment objectives, issues "completely
[ 460 U.S. Page 683]
unrelated to the simple question whether a trespass had occurred." 436 U.S., at 198. Permitting the trespass action to go forward accordingly created "no realistic risk of interference with the Labor Board's primary jurisdiction to enforce the statutory prohibition against unfair labor practices." Ibid. The same cannot be said here. The Regional Director concluded that the Union had in no way been responsible for Jones' discharge. That same issue of causation would have been presented for decision had Jones' case come before the Board, just as the issue would recurringly be at the core of § 8(b)(1)(B) cases. Despite the Regional Director's determination, and the Board's undoubted jurisdiction to decide the issue had a complaint issued, Jones sought to relitigate the question in the state courts. The risk of interference with the Board's jurisdiction is thus obvious and substantial.
We thus cannot agree that Jones' efforts to recover damages from the Union for interference with his contractual relationships with his employer was of only peripheral concern to the federal labor policy. Our decisions in Perko and its companion case, Plumbers v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963), refute Jones' submission. They also foreclose any claim that Jones' action against the Union for interference with his job is so deeply rooted in local law that Georgia's interest in enforcing that law overrides the interference with the federal labor law that prosecution of the state action would entail.
Beyond this is the proposition, pressed by the Union, that although an employer may not be coerced in its choice of a collective-bargaining agent employees have the protected right to exert non-coercive influence on the choice of low-level supervisors.
"[Courts] have generally held over Board protest that employees' strikes over changes in even low level supervisory personnel are not protected. See Henning & Cheadle, Inc. v. NLRB, [522 F.2d 1050, 1055 (CA7 1975)];
[ 460 U.S. Page 684]
Jones filed suit in the Georgia courts alleging that an agent of Local 926 (Union) had "maliciously and with full intent intimidated and coerced Georgia Power . . . , or caused Georgia Power . . . to be intimidated and coerced, into breaching its employment contract with plaintiff." In addition, Jones alleged, in an amendment to his complaint, App. to Juris. Statement 18a-19a, 2a, that the Union and Georgia Power Co. (Company) jointly conspired to interfere with his contractual relations. The Court apparently acknowledges, ante, at 682, and I agree, that Jones' complaint fairly may be read as stating two claims under Georgia tort law -- a claim that the Union coerced the Company into firing Jones and a claim that the Union noncoercively caused his discharge.*fn1 The trial court dismissed Jones' complaint, reasoning that the tort doctrines on which it rested were pre-empted. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, ordering reinstatement of Jones' complaint. 159 Ga. App. 693, 285 S. E. 2d 30 (1981).
The Court recognizes that, if the conduct of the Union on which Jones' complaint was predicated was "arguably prohibited" by the Act, then the proper standard for pre-emption analysis is found in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra : is "the controversy presented to the state court . . . identical to. . . or different from" the federal labor law claim. Id., at 197 (emphasis added).*fn2 Other passages in
[ 460 U.S. Page 686]
our Sears opinion elaborate upon this rule, requiring, for example, that a federal claim must be "the same as the controversy presented to the state court." Id., at 198; see also id., at 196-197.
The Court offers two basic arguments as to why Jones' claim of non-coercive interference with contractual relations and the federal labor law claims in this case were identical.*fn3 In doing so, it interprets the "identical controversies" standard of Sears in a new and unjustified manner. The Court first reasons that "permitting state causes of action for non-coercive interference with contractual relationships to go forward in the state courts would continually require the state court to decide in the first instance whether the Union's conduct was coercive, and hence beyond its power to sanction, or
[ 460 U.S. Page 687]
non-coercive, and thus the proper subject of a state suit. Decisions on such questions of federal labor law should be resolved by the Board." Ante, at 682.
This argument rests on a basic misunderstanding of our prior decisions. In stating the "identical controversies" standard in Sears, we said that a claim brought in state court is unpre-empted unless "the controversy presented to the state court is identical to . . . that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board." 436 U.S., at 197 (emphasis added). Plainly, Sears envisioned that state courts would decide in the first instance whether a particular claim is pre-empted under the "identical" controversy standard. Likewise, Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) -- relied upon in Sears' formulation of the "identical" standard, 436 U.S., at 197 -- indicated that state courts may, and in fact must, sort out pre-empted from nonpre-empted portions of a complaint, even when no action before the Board has been taken. See 430 U.S., at 304-305. The Farmer and Sears models are analogous to the situation presented in this case. Just as state courts may distinguish the abusive manner of discrimination from discrimination itself, in cases modeled on Farmer, supra, at 305, and the pure trespass aspects of picketing from the objectives of the same picketing in Sears cases, they could distinguish claims of coercive interference from those of non-coercive interference in cases like this one. As Farmer and Sears hold, state courts are competent to make such judgments without interfering with federal labor law policy. In short, while it is correct that the Board, and not state courts, is charged with deciding national labor policy, it is equally clear that no such exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Board with respect to questions of pre-emption.*fn4
[ 460 U.S. Page 688]
The second argument relied on by the Court is that "a fundamental part of . . . a [non-coercive interference with contractual relations] claim is that the Union actually caused the discharge . . . . [This] same crucial element must be proved to make out a § 8(b)(1)(B) case: the discharge must be shown to be the result of Union influence. . . . [The] federal and state claims are thus the same in a fundamental respect . . . ." Ante, at 682.
This view amounts to a substantial reformulation of the Sears requirement that state and federal controversies be identical before a claim based on arguably prohibited conduct is pre-empted. On its face the Court's definition of identical is dubious: two items or concepts are not ordinarily thought to be identical merely because they share a common element, or, in the Court's words, because they are "the same in a fundamental respect," ante, at 682 (emphasis added). Moreover, Sears supports no such definition of identical. Sears illustrated the standard by reference to our decisions in Farmer v. Carpenters, supra, which was given as an example of "nonidentical" controversies, and Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), representing controversies that are "identical." See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S., at 197. Given the reference, it is worth examining Farmer and Garner in somewhat greater detail.
In Farmer, one Richard Hill belonged to the local of a national union, which operated a hiring hall. Hill was apparently subjected to discrimination in job referrals from the hall and to a campaign of personal harassment. He filed suit in
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state court claiming, first, that the local had discriminated against him, and, second, that it had intentionally engaged in conduct causing him emotional distress. We observed that "these allegations of tortious conduct might form the basis for unfair labor practice charges before the Board," Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S., at 302, and that Hill's tort claims were intertwined with "federally prohibited discrimination," hence creating "a potential for interference with the federal scheme of regulation." Id., at 304.
Despite this inevitable overlap between state and federal claims, we held that Hill's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was not pre-empted. We relied on the fact that the state and federal claims -- despite sharing related factual bases -- would have had different "[focuses]." Ibid. Resolution of the state claim would turn on the abusiveness of the defendant's conduct, while the federal claim turned on whether "Union officials discriminated . . . against [Hill]." Ibid. Because the state claim required "something more" than the federal claim, id., at 305, we concluded in Sears that the two claims were not identical.*fn5
The Court's reformulation of the "identical" controversies standard of Sears -- claims are identical if they share an important
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factual element -- is inconsistent with both Sears and Farmer. In Sears the federal and state claims involved several common, fundamental factual questions -- whether any picketing had occurred; if so, where; and whether the property owner consented to it or not. These basic factual determinations, which the state courts and Board might resolve differently, would be critical to deciding both unfair labor practice claims and state trespass claims. Likewise, in cases following the Farmer model, state courts may make credibility determinations regarding whether any discrimination occurred, and if so, whether it did so in a manner supporting a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The same factual issues would be involved in deciding an unfair labor practice charge under § 8 of the Act. Our decisions in Farmer and Sears thus make clear that the mere risk of differing factual determinations by the Board and state courts is insufficient to require pre-emption. Accordingly, the Court's reliance on the fact that the state and federal controversies at issue here are the same in one respect is misplaced. Instead, Sears and Farmer demand a more searching inquiry into the relationship between state and federal controversies.
While recognizing that the question is not free from doubt, I would conclude that the state and federal controversies at issue here are not identical, and, therefore, that Jones' claims are not pre-empted. The evident purpose of § 8(b)(1)(A) is to safeguard employees in their right, secured by § 7 of the Act, to join or refrain from joining concerted actions, see NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 71 (1973). The Board's most recent discussion of the ability of a supervisor to assert a claim under § 8(a)(1) states:
"The discharge of supervisors is unlawful when it interferes with the right of employees to exercise their rights under Section 7 of the Act, as when they give testimony adverse to their employers' interest or when they refuse to commit unfair labor practices. The discharge of supervisors
[ 460 U.S. Page 691]
as a result of their participation in union or concerted activity -- either by themselves or when allied with rank-and-file employees -- is not unlawful for the simple reason that employees, but not supervisors, have rights protected by the Act." Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N. L. R. B. 402, 404 (1982).
In order for a supervisor, such as Jones, to make a claim under § 8(b)(1)(A), therefore, he must show not only that his contractual relations were interfered with, but that because of this, the various rights guaranteed by § 7 of the Act to other persons -- actual employees -- were interfered with. This "[entails] relatively complex factual and legal determinations" -- such as what the rights of those employees are, how they were interfered with by action directed at Jones, and so forth -- "completely unrelated to the simple question" whether Jones can show that the Union caused him to lose his job, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S., at 198. Because of these different factual issues, which reveal basically different focuses of policy, I do not think that Jones' state-law claims are pre-empted by § 8(b)(1)(A).*fn6
In order to state a claim under § 8(b)(1)(B), a supervisor must show coercion of his employer in the choice of bargaining representatives. The provision "[reflects] a clearly focused congressional concern with the protection of employers
[ 460 U.S. Page 692]
in the selection of representatives to engage in two particular and explicitly stated activities." Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 803 (1974) (emphasis added). "Congress was exclusively concerned with union attempts to dictate to employers who would represent them in collective bargaining and grievance adjustment." Ibid. (emphasis added). In contrast, in order to make out a claim of intentional interference with contractual relations, the question whether the plaintiff was to act as a bargaining representative, or any other particular kind of employee, is entirely irrelevant. Likewise, the question whether the employer -- with whose interests § 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act is "exclusively concerned" -- is harmed by interference with an employee's contractual relationship is irrelevant to the state cause of action. As in Sears, the state-court action will focus on a far simpler and neater set of facts than would an action before the Board.*fn7 Because of these differences between the controversies that the Board would decide and those that state courts would decide, I am persuaded that Jones' state claims were not pre-empted.*fn8