Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Duggan

OPINION FILED MARCH 25, 1983.

HARRIS TRUST & SAVINGS BANK, TRUSTEE, APPELLEE,

v.

WILLIAM L. DUGGAN ET AL., APPELLEES (322 WEST OAKDALE, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS).



Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. James C. Murray, Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE MORAN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:

Rehearing denied May 27, 1983.

Plaintiff, Harris Trust & Savings Bank (Harris), filed three suits in the circuit court of Cook County against the city of Chicago and William Duggan, Commissioner of the Chicago Department of Inspectional Services. The actions involved the Kellogg mansion properties located in the 2900 block of North Lake Shore Drive. In the first suit, Harris, as trustee of the Helen L. Kellogg trust, sought a writ of mandamus compelling the city to issue demolition permits for the subject property. Harris subsequently challenged, in two separate suits, the validity of a zoning ordinance and landmark ordinance. The trial court ruled in plaintiff's favor in all three actions, and awarded plaintiff a substantial money judgment. The city and Harris subsequently executed a settlement agreement whereby Harris promised to abandon its money judgment and the city agreed to issue the permits and forgo its right to appeal. Following execution of the settlement agreement, 322 West Oakdale, Inc. (Oakdale), Alderman Martin J. Oberman and Hedwig Braun sought leave to intervene, post-judgment, in the mandamus and landmark cases. The trial court denied intervention. Oakdale was allowed to intervene in the zoning case and appealed the judgment which was entered in plaintiff's favor. The appellate court consolidated the cases and affirmed the judgments of the trial court, holding that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and that Oakdale lacked standing to intervene in the mandamus and landmark cases. (105 Ill. App.3d 839.) Oakdale, Oberman and Braun sought review here of this judgment. In a separate case, No. 56976, the same parties seek review of the denial of their petition challenging the validity of the settlement agreement. We granted leave to appeal and consolidated the cases for purposes of review.

The facts, largely adopted from the appellate court opinion, are not controverted. The subject property includes three contiguous parcels of real estate, each improved with a single-family residence. Upon the death of Helen Kellogg in 1978, the properties became assets of a charitable foundation, created to liquidate and distribute the Kellogg estate assets to various charities. In November of 1978, Harris executed a contract to sell the property for $2.6 million. The contract was subject to the purchaser's right to develop the property in accordance with R-8 (high rise) zoning. The property was zoned R-8 at the time the contract was executed, and had been so zoned for approximately 18 years.

In February of 1979, Harris applied to the city for demolition permits to raze the mansions. The permits were granted on March 6, 1979, but were revoked the following day. In the letter of revocation, the city indicated that the property was located in an area under consideration for landmark designation. No landmark proceeding was pending at that time.

In April of 1979, Harris filed a two-count complaint seeking a writ of mandamus compelling reissuance of the demolition permits. While this action was pending, the city enacted an ordinance "down-zoning" the property from R-8 to R-5 (medium rise). In October 1979, Harris filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the amendatory zoning ordinance was unconstitutional and void. Oakdale sought, and was granted, leave to intervene in this action as a party defendant. In June of 1980, the trial court entered judgment in the zoning case, determining that the amendatory ordinance was unconstitutional. The court held that the property could be used in any manner consistent with R-8 zoning.

The following October, the court entered judgment for Harris in the mandamus case, ordering the city to reissue the demolition permits. The court also awarded Harris in excess of $1 million for the city's wrongful failure to issue the permits. However, the court stayed execution of its judgment pending a determination as to whether the property would be designated a landmark. The writ was later stayed again pending appeal.

On February 11, 1981, the city council enacted an ordinance designating the subject properties as Chicago landmarks. The following month, Harris notified the Commission on Chicago Historical and Architectural Landmarks (Commission) that it planned to demolish the buildings and the city should either allow the demolition or acquire the property through eminent domain. Harris also waived its right to any administrative hearing and requested the Commission to follow the applicable administrative procedures set forth in section 21-64.1 of the Municipal Code of Chicago. The city rejected Harris' demands and denied an obligation to pay any compensation for the alleged "taking."

In May of 1981, Harris added count III to its mandamus complaint. This count alleged that the city's actions regarding the subject property deprived Harris of all reasonable use of the property for two years, and that the property was taken without due process or just compensation. The case proceeded to trial on the theory of inverse condemnation. Harris later amended its prayer for relief under count III, requesting a declaratory judgment that the ordinance designating the property as a landmark was unconstitutional and void.

On September 2, 1981, the court entered judgment for Harris on count III. It determined that the landmark ordinance, together with the city's refusal to issue the permits, deprived Harris of all reasonable use of the property and constituted a taking requiring payment of just compensation. The court found that $3.65 million would be just compensation, but did not enter the money judgment because the city was unwilling to acquire the property and compensate Harris therefor. Instead, the court entered a declaratory judgment declaring the landmark ordinance unconstitutional and void. The court also awarded Harris $1,037,849.76 under section 5 of "An Act to revise the law in relation to mandamus" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 87, par. 5), for the city's wrongful failure to issue the permits. (As previously noted, this judgment had been rendered in October of 1980, but was stayed pending a determination as to whether the property would receive landmark designation.)

As related earlier, following judgment in this final action, the city and Harris executed a settlement agreement. The city agreed to issue the demolition permits and forgo its right to appeal, and Harris agreed to abandon the money judgment. In September of 1981, shortly after learning of the agreement, Oakdale, Oberman, and Braun sought post-judgment intervention in the mandamus and landmark cases. The petition was denied, and they subsequently filed a separate lawsuit challenging the validity of the settlement agreement. Summary judgment was entered in Harris' favor, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal.

Further facts will be recited where relevant to a disposition of the issues.

I. MANDAMUS AND LANDMARK CASES (Cause No. 56607)

Oakdale, a not-for-profit corporation with approximately 53 members, Martin Oberman, who was alderman of the ward in which the Kellogg mansions are located, and Hedwig Braun allege standing to intervene, post judgment, in the mandamus and landmark cases. We agree with the appellate court that the petitioners have not alleged a sufficient interest or injury so as to establish their standing to intervene. It should be kept in mind that intervention was sought after judgments were entered in the mandamus and landmark cases, and also after the settlement agreement had been completed.

Oakdale asserts that it is located 18 feet from the subject property and will be adversely affected by a razing of the mansions located thereon. The relevant portion of ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.