The opinion of the court was delivered by: Nordberg, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action is before the Court on defendant's motion for
summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, defendant's
motion is granted.
Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she has been
discriminated against in her employment on the basis of race
and sex. In Count I, she alleges that the defendant violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
by failing to promote the plaintiff to the position of
Supervisor of Union Relations, and failing to provide training
necessary to insure such a promotion.*fn1 In Count III,
plaintiff alleges that the same failures by the defendant
constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Count II contains a
claim of retaliatory discharge under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3.
The four-part test enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973),
applies to employment discrimination cases brought under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Crawford v. Western
Electric Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980). This test
therefore applies to Count I and Count III. Under McDonnell
Douglas, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she was black and a
female; (2) that she applied for and was qualified for a job
for which her employer was seeking job applicants; (3) that
despite her qualifications she was rejected; and (4) that after
her rejection the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants with her qualifications.
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Cedillo v. International Assoc. of Bridge and Structural Iron
Workers, 603 F.2d 7, 10 (7th Cir. 1979). The nonmoving party is
entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be drawn in her
favor. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct.
1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). She may not, however, merely rely
upon the allegations in her complaint, nor upon conclusory
allegations of discrimination. Patterson v. General Motors,
Inc., 631 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1980). She must affirmatively
set forth specific facts in affidavits or otherwise showing
that there are genuine material issues of fact which must be
decided at trial. First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities
Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575,20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968);
Kirk v. Home Indemnity Co., 431 F.2d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 1970).
The plaintiff in this case has failed to meet this burden
with respect to two crucial elements of her cause of action.
She has not raised a genuine issue of material fact that she
was qualified for the position of Supervisor of Union
Relations, or that she actually applied for the position.
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a Personnel
Supervisor at the time she was allegedly discriminated
against. She claims to have sought the position of Supervisor
of Union Relations. The position description for this job
specifies the following educational requirements for the
Bachelor's degree in Business Administration or
related field or equivalent experience plus
specialized training in labor-management
relations, labor law and labor history.
Among the "Special Knowledge or Skills" required in the
position description are knowledge of union philosophy and
practices. The position description further states that
desirable prior experience would include 2-4 years labor
Plaintiff, by her own admissions, has demonstrated that she
did not possess these required job qualifications. In her
deposition, she stated that she has a bachelor's degree in
office administration, not business administration. Her
office administration degree program included courses such as
typewriting and shorthand.*fn2 She admitted in her deposition
that she has never completed a single course in labor law,
labor-management relations, or labor history, the areas in
which specialized training was specifically required in the
position description.*fn3 Thus, she clearly lacked the
educational background required by the defendant for the
The plaintiff has also stated in her deposition that the
duties of the Supervisor of Union Relations included handling
union grievances, union problems, contract negotiation, and
arbitrations. Yet, in her deposition, plaintiff admitted that
she had no experience in any of these areas. She stated that
she had never negotiated a collective bargaining agreement or
participated in such a negotiation, or even read an entire
collective bargaining agreement. She also admitted that she
had never participated in an arbitration or in any proceeding
leading to an arbitration.
Further, in her position as Personnel Supervisor, she had
little exposure to any aspect of labor relations. Her duties
involved benefits administration, wage and salary
administration for dealerships, training, affirmative action,
and some recruiting. She admitted in her deposition that, as
Personnel Supervisor, she was not involved in negotiations of
the benefit plans that her contact with the union
representatives was primarily with the "grievance man," and
that she did not attend any grievance proceedings or any
formal union-management meetings. She also admitted that any
problems with interpretation of the benefit plans were taken
over by the labor relations manager. Her duties with regard to
the Affirmative Action Program were restricted to salaried
employees, and she supervised no union employees. The
plaintiff therefore has had no experience of any consequence
in the area of labor-management relations or labor law to
qualify her for the position of Supervisor of Union Relations.
Thus, she clearly failed to satisfy either the educational or
experience requirements for the position she allegedly sought.
She has therefore failed to raise any genuine issue of fact as
to whether she was qualified for the position she allegedly
sought. This failure to raise a question of fact as to this
crucial element of her cause of action requires dismissal of
both Count I and Count III. Clark v. Chrysler Corp.,
673 F.2d 921, 930 (7th Cir. 1982).
The Court notes that, with regard to plaintiff's specific
allegation in the complaint that the defendant hired a less
qualified male for the position, a cursory review of the
resume of Andrew Bacharach, the person hired for the
Supervisor of Union Relations position, reveals that he was
unquestionably more qualified than the plaintiff, and that he
met all the qualification requirements listed in the position
description. Bacharach has a Master's degree in Industrial
Relations and experience with his former employer in union