The opinion of the court was delivered by: Shadur, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Knorr Brake Corporation ("Knorr Brake") initially sued
Harbil, Inc. ("Harbil") and P.E.P. Industries, Ltd. for
rescission, breach of contract and injunctive relief based on
their alleged breach of an agreement between Knorr Brake and
Harbil. Harbil responded with a counterclaim charging Knorr
(the collective term used in this opinion to denote Knorr
Brake and its corporate parent, Knorr-Bremse GmbH
("Knorr-Bremse")) with various torts and breaches of contract
and fiduciary duties. Harbil also moved to join seven
individuals as additional counterdefendants,*fn1 but this
Court denied that motion, 550 F. Supp. 476 (N.D.Ill. 1982).
(2) under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 ("Section 1927")*fn3 for an
assessment against Harbil's attorneys requiring them to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred by Knorr in opposing Harbil's motion. For
the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order,
Knorr's motion for an assessment against Harbil is denied and
for an assessment against Harbil's counsel*fn4 is granted.
This opinion need not recount the procedural history of this
action. See 550 F. Supp. at 477-78. Only Harbil's joinder
motion is relevant here.
Harbil's Counter-Complaint Count V (¶ 39) alleged the seven
individuals had conspired with Knorr to cause the injuries
Harbil had asserted against Knorr in the four preceding counts.
When that pleading was first tendered to this Court at one of
its daily motion calls, this Court (having reviewed Count V in
a preliminary way) directed Harbil to address two issues in its
(1) whether this Court could exert personal
jurisdiction over those individuals; and
(2) whether under Illinois law*fn5 a
conspiracy claim will lie against individuals for
allegedly conspiring with their own corporation.
Despite that clear directive Harbil initially failed to
address the personal jurisdiction issue at all, and then its
later memorandum ignored Knorr's answering citation of
controlling Illinois law. 550 F. Supp. at 479 & n. 8. On the
intracorporate conspiracy issue Harbil was largely evasive,
and insofar as it addressed even a tangential issue it
persisted in misciting and misusing precedent. Id. at 479-80 &
To compound its sins Harbil also unilaterally delayed
completion of the briefing on Knorr's motion for attorneys'
fees, filed in response to Harbil's joinder motion.
Id. at 477-78 n. 3. In fact Harbil failed to respond to Knorr's
fees motion despite this Court's specific orders to address
Harbil has now filed its belated answering brief on Knorr's
fees motion, and Knorr has filed an additional reply brief.
Thus the ...