Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

SCHANUEL v. ANDERSON

September 9, 1982

LARRY SCHANUEL, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFF,
v.
JOAN ANDERSON, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Foreman, Chief Judge:

ORDER

Currently before the Court are Cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff on November 6, 1980, and by defendant on January 12, 1981.

The standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 are well established. The purpose of summary judgment is to prevent an unnecessary trial where, on the basis of the pleadings and supporting documents, there remains no material issue of fact to be tried. Kirk v. Home Indemnity Co., 431 F.2d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 1970). Summary judgment is appropriate only if it appears that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fitzsimmons v. Best, 528 F.2d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 1976); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden is upon the moving party to show that there is no issue of material fact in dispute. Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 1973), and all doubts as to the existence of an issue of material fact must be resolved against the movant. Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Electric, Inc., 295 F.2d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 1961). In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court may only determine whether or not there exists a dispute as to a material issue of fact. It is not permitted to resolve that dispute. Carter v. Williams, 361 F.2d 189, 194 (7th Cir. 1966).

The facts of the case are simple and undisputed and established for purposes of this motion. They are as follows:

1. Plaintiff Larry Schanuel applied for a position as a security guard or investigator with the Allied National Detective Agency, Inc., in Belleville, Illinois, in July 1978.

2. The manager of the Allied National Detective Agency informed plaintiff that under Chapter 111, paragraph 2622 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, plaintiff was ineligible for employment with any detective agency and refused to hire him.

3. Plaintiff in fact had a record of criminal felony conviction which included a plea of guilty to Second Degree Robbery in California on April 18, 1963, and a plea of guilty to a federal charge of Transferring Government Obligations on July 25, 1967. The parole periods for these offenses expired on or about September 1972.

4. Rich Yale, the President of Allied National Detective Agency could not say whether plaintiff would have been hired or performed satisfactorily but for his convictions, but it was his opinion that an individual with a criminal record could perform satisfactorily as an unarmed security guard.

5. Plaintiff has not applied for a detective certificate with the Department of Registration and Education.

6. Defendant Joan Anderson is the Director of the Illinois Department of Registration and Education. Her office is created by Illinois Revised Statutes chapter 127, paragraph 4, and she, together with the Department of Registration and Education, is vested with the sole authority to supervise and regulate detective agencies within the State of Illinois.

LAW

Plaintiff filed this class action suit against defendant Anderson in her capacity as Director of the Illinois Department of Registration and Education, alleging that defendant has acted under color of state law to deprive plaintiff and the class he represents of rights secured by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter 111, paragraph 2622 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He seeks to bar enforcement of paragraph 2622 and a declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. The issues as framed by the Motion for Summary Judgment are (1) whether Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter 111, paragraph 2601, et seq. meets the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) whether the classifications established by the same statute violate the Equal Protection Clause of the same Amendment.

The relevant statute provides:

  The holder of a certificate of authority may employ,
  to assist him in the work of private detective and in
  the conduct of such business, as many unlicensed
  persons as may be necessary, pursuant to the
  following provisions:
  (1) No person may be employed by the holder of a
  certificate of authority as an armed guard or
  investigator if he is under 21 years of age, or as an
  unarmed guard if he is under 18 years of age, is not
  a citizen of the United States, has been convicted in
  this or another State of any crime which is a felony
  in this State, has been convicted of a felony under
  the laws of the United States, has been convicted in
  this or another State or under the laws of the United
  States of any crime involving moral turpitude or has

  had a certificate denied, suspended or revoked under
  this Act. However, if a person has been convicted of
  a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude and 10
  years shall have expired from the time of discharge
  from ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.