United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, E. D
August 6, 1982
CITIZENS PARTY OF ILLINOIS BRUCE D. KAPLAN, LOUIS HIRSCH, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, COMMUNIST PARTY OF ILLINOIS, RICHARD L. GIOVANONI, AND ELIZABETH MITTERER, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ARTHUR L. TURNER PARTY, ARTHUR L. TURNER, AND DELORES SIMS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS,
ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS J. PHIL GILBERT, MICHAEL J. HAMBLET, JOHN W. COUNTRYMAN, RICHARD A. OWEN, CAROLYN R. EYRE, JOSHUA JOHNSON, JOHN J. LANIGAN, AND THERESA M. PETRONE, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Getzendanner, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1988, plaintiffs seek an order temporarily
enjoining defendants' proposed enforcement of Section 10-2 of the
Illinois Election Code. For the reasons to follow, plaintiffs' motion for
relief is granted.
Plaintiffs Citizens Party of Illinois, Communist Party of Illinois, and
Arthur L. Turner Party are unincorporated associations principally
headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. Each wishes to place on the November
1982 ballot a candidate for election to the Illinois House of
Representatives. Each is a non-"established political party" as that term
is defined under Illinois law.
Plaintiffs Bruce D. Kaplan, Richard L. Giovanoni, and Representative
Arthur L. Turner are the proposed candidates of the Citizens Party, the
Communist Party, and the Arthur L. Turner Party,*fn1 respectively.
Plaintiff Louis Hirsch alleges that he is registered to vote and that he
wishes to vote for Kaplan. Plaintiffs Elizabeth Mitterer and Delores Sims
make similar allegations with respect to Giovanoni and Turner.
Defendant Illinois State Board of Elections is the administrative body
with enforcing the Illinois Election Code. The individually named
defendants sit on and comprise the Board.
By virtue of the Election Code, "political groups" that poll more than
5% of the vote in a gubernatorial election are recognized as "established
political parties." Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 46, § 10-2. As such, their duly
nominated candidates are automatically entitled to placement on the
printed ballot in the next subsequent election. id., § 10-1.*fn2 All
other political groups must petition for this right. Specifically, a
non-"established" organization that wishes to field candidates in some,
but not all, of the races to be held in an election*fn3 must submit for
each contest a petition "signed by qualified voters equaling in number
not less than 5% of the number of voters who voted at the next preceding
regular election in such district or political subdivision in which such
district or political subdivision voted as a unit for the election of
officers to serve its respective territorial area," Id., § 10-2.
However, because the 1982 elections are the first to follow a
redistricting, a special rule governs the plaintiffs' present access to
the ballot: "For the first election following a redistricting of
legislative districts, a petition to form a new political party in a
legislative district shall be signed by at least 3,000 qualified voters
of the legislative district." Id.*fn4 Defendants' interpretation of the
latter provision lies at the heart of this controversy.
Prior to the November 1980 elections, Illinois contained 59
"legislative districts." Each "district" elected one Senator and three
Representatives. The votes for the latter office were cast on a
cumulative basis. In 1980 the voters approved the so-called "Cutback
Amendment" to the Illinois Constitution. This measure drastically altered
the foregoing arrangement. Under the present law, Senators are still
elected from 59 "Legislative Districts," but Representatives are now
elected from 118 separate "Representative Districts," each district
electing one Representative. Each "Legislative District" contains two
The Illinois Legislature has not yet completely amended the Election
Code to reflect the changes brought forth by the "Cutback Amendment."
This failure to act has generated considerable confusion as to the
interrelationship between these two bodies of law. An Advisory Opinion
prepared by the General Counsel to the State Board of Elections highlights
the most glaring incongruity:
Section 10-2, when enumerating the various districts
and political subdivisions for which new political
parties can be formed, still refers to "legislative"
districts but makes no reference to the
recently-created representative districts. If read
literally, Section 10-2 would thus permit the
formation of a new political party for candidates for
the office of State Senator, but would not permit
ballot access to new political parties for candidates
to the office of Representative.
Advisory Opinion No. 82-10, May 17, 1982, at 5. Recognizing that "such a
ballot access to Representative candidates of new political parties would
probably render Section 10-2 constitutionally invalid," id., the Advisory
Opinion holds that the term "legislative district" should be construed to
mean "either a Legislative District or a Representative District as the
case may be." Id. at 6. The Opinion further addresses the "incidental
issue" of how many signatures a new party's petition must contain in an
election immediately following a redistricting:
Having already concluded that the term "legislative"
district, as it appears in Section 10-2, should be
construed to refer to either a Legislative District or
a Representative District, as the case may be, (as
they exist in Article IV of the Constitution, as
amended), it is my opinion that for purposes of the
November 2, 1982, General Election, a new political
party petition for candidates for either the office of
State Senator or the office of Representative must
contain at least 3,000 qualified voters of either the
Legislative District or the Representative District,
Id. at 9.
Plaintiffs challenge the last interpretation as being unduly
restrictive of their right to be on the ballot. They argue that a new
party seeking the election of one of its members to the House is doubly
burdened compared to a second party wishing to elect one of its members
to the Senate. This is so because while both entities need 3,000
signatures, the party interested in the Senate seat can draw from an
available pool of voters that is roughly twice as large. Plaintiffs
further contend that this discrimination serves no rational purpose. For
under the Board's construction of the statutory term "legislative
district," in every election that does not follow a redistricting, both
Senate and House candidates are obligated to file signatures in an amount
that equals the same percentage — five — of the votes cast in
the preceding election held in the relevant electoral district. Thus, in
every election but one, plaintiffs suffer no discrimination whatsoever,
rendering the discrimination which does occur "freakish" and irrational.
Plaintiffs conclude that the Equal Protection clause has been violated,
and that, in the interest of parity, they should be required to submit
only 1,500 signatures. They seek an order to this effect.
A preliminary injunction can issue only if:
(1) The plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law and
will be irreparably harmed if the injunction does
(2) The threatened injury to the plaintiffs outweighs
the threatened harm the injunction may inflict on
(3) The plaintiffs have at least a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits; and
(4) The granting of a preliminary injunction will not
disserve the public interest.
In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248
, 1261 (7th Cir. 1980).
The evidence in the record clearly shows that the Turner plaintiffs
will suffer irreparable injury if the requested injunction does not
issue. On August 2, 1982, the last day for filing petitions, the Turner
party submitted a petition that contained only 2,185 signatures. (Hudson
Aff. at ¶ 2).*fn5 On August 4, Representative Turner testified to
the harm his campaign had already suffered
as a result of his apparent failure to comply with Section 10-2. Numerous
volunteers, he reported, have left his camp and have joined forces with
other candidates who are more assured of a position on the ballot. The
uncertainty as to his status has also obstructed the planning of
fund-raising events, and has delayed the start of a door-to-door canvass
Turner plans to make throughout the Seventeenth Representative District.
The latter project is especially important because the bulk of the voters
in the Seventeenth District have never (due to redistricting) been
represented by Turner in the past. Representative Turner further
testified that many political action committees are scheduled to decide
upon their endorsements and campaign contributions in the near future. A
candidate who is certain not to be on the ballot stands virtually no
chance of receiving such largesse. It thus seems clear that if
preliminary relief is not granted, the Turner plaintiffs will suffer
injuries which are irreversible and which cannot be redressed in an
action at law.*fn6
Defendants' threatened injury, moreover, is slight in comparison to the
Under state law, defendants need not certify any candidate for ballot
placement until September 2, 1982. Past experience in ballot access cases
indicates that appellate review can be had before the latter deadline
arrives. See Bowe v. Rd. of Election Com'rs of City of Chicago,
614 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1980) (case submitted on February 11, 1980 and
decided on February 13, 1980); Richards v. La Velle, 620 F.2d 144 (7th
Cir. 1980) (same).
The granting of the injunction will also not disserve the public good.
Decrees which promote "the continued availability of political
opportunity", Clements v. Fashing, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 2886, 2844, 73
L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (plurality opinion), are clearly in the public
interest. Three of the four requisites for a preliminary injunction have
thus been satisfied. Plaintiffs' entitlement to relief turns on whether
they have shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.
It is fundamental that constitutional questions must be avoided
whenever possible. E.g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,
213 U.S. 175, 29 S.Ct. 451, 58 L.Ed. 753 (1909). Before leaping into an
equal protection analysis, it is thus necessary to consider the
possibility that, properly construed, Illinois law itself obligates the
submission of only 1,500 signatures.
In his Advisory Opinion reaching the contrary conclusion, the Board's
General Counsel read the pertinent language in Section 10-2 quite
literally. He substituted the phrase "Legislative Districts or
Representative Districts" for the statutory term "legislative districts"
and concluded that the 3,000 signature requirement applied in both the
Senate and the House contexts. He does not appear to have considered the
de facto disparate impact of such an interpretation.
This logic stands in stark contrast to the analysis underlying the
predicate conclusion that the term "legislative" need not be read
literally and can in fact refer to both "Legislative" and
"Representative" races. The General Counsel reached the latter judgment
by drawing upon several principles of construction — primarily,
that statutes should be read to avoid constitutional problems, and to
reflect a consistent legislative purpose. Advisory Opinion, supra, at
5-7. Yet both of these doctrines could equally support a conclusion that
only 1,500 signatures need be submitted by entities in plaintiffs'
situation. Obviously, such a reading of Section 10-2 would moot
plaintiffs' constitutional claim. Moreover, by eliminating the
freakishly-occurring, disparate burden placed on House candidates, this
reading would grant the statute more cohesiveness than it presently has
under the Board's contrary approach.
As a federal judge, though, it is not my function to decide what
Illinois law should be. My function is solely to determine how the
Illinois courts would interpret Section 10-2 under these circumstances.
Ordinarily, I would abstain on this question. The issue is "unclear,"
especially since the Illinois judiciary has never directly addressed this
specific point. See Railroad Commission of Texas v, Pullman, 312 U.S. 496,
61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). Unfortunately, abstention is not a
realistic option. Given the pendency of the upcoming election, there is
simply no time for the abstention machinery to run its course.
I must therefore decide whether the Illinois courts would uphold the
Board's construction of Section 10-2. My criticisms of this analysis
notwithstanding, the fact remains that the statute's plain language
specifies 3,000 signatures and never once contains a reference to the
figure 1,500. It can thus hardly be said that the Board's position is
untenable. The conclusion
reached in the Advisory Opinion also finds support in the manner the
Illinois Legislature recently amended Section 8-8 of the Election Code to
conform to the "Cutback Amendment." Section 8-8 outlines the ballot
requirements in "established political party" primaries. As amended, the
statute provides that candidates of such parties must satisfy a 1%
signature requirement when running for either a House or a Senate seat,
except that in the first primary following redistricting, each must
obtain 600 signatures. The post-"cutback" Legislature thus deliberately
imposed a unitary signature requirement in the first election following
redistricting. The Board has done nothing more.
Moreover, the Illinois courts may adopt the Board's position simply
because it is the Board's position:
While a court is not formally bound by the
administrative decision as to legal effect of
statutory words, it should give that conclusion great
weight, using it as a substantial factor in its own
construction of the statute. The importance of the
agency's interpretation derives from the legislative
decision to remedy harms through an administrative
body. In using this method the legislature
acknowledges the existence of complex problems
requiring a variety of solutions and the need for an
efficiency and expertise unavailable from specific,
Ranquist v. Stackler, 55 Ill. App.3d 545, 550, 13 Ill.Dec. 171, 175-76,
370 N.E.2d 1198, 1202-03 (1st Dist. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926, 99
S.Ct. 309, 58 L.Ed.2d 318 (1978) (citations omitted). For the above
reasons, I am unable to conclude, for purposes of this motion, that the
cited Advisory Opinion inaccurately interprets Section 10-2. Plaintiffs'
constitutional claims must be reached.
It can scarcely be denied that Section 10-2 restricts the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs:
Restrictions on access to the ballot burden two
distinct and fundamental rights, "the right of
individuals to associate for the advancement of
political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters,
regardless of their political persuasion, to cast
their votes effectively."
Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. 173
184, 99 S.Ct. 983, 990, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979) (quoting Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968)). Yet it is
equally clear that the State of Illinois has legitimate reasons to
condition access to the ballot on a candidate's showing of a "significant
modicum of support." Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431
, 442, 91 S.Ct.
1970, 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); accord, e.g., American Party of Texas
v. White, 415 U.S. 767
, 782 n.14, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 1307 n.14, 39 L.Ed.2d
744 (1974). A contrary rule that "permit[ted] every citizen to present
himself to the voters on the ballot without some means of measuring the
seriousness of the candidate's desire and motivation would make rational
voter choices more difficult because of the size of the ballot and hence
would tend to impede the electoral process." Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709
715, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 1319, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974). A ballot that contains
many candidates also increases the possibility of a fractured vote. The
Supreme Court has "expressed concern for the States' need to assure that
the winner of an election `is the choice of a majority, or at least a
strong plurality of those voting, without the expense and burden of
runoff elections.'" Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist
Workers, supra, 440 U.S. at 185, 99 S.Ct. at 990 (quoting Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134
, 145, 92 S.Ct. 849, 856, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972));
accord, Lubin v. Panish, supra, 415 U.S. at 712, 94 S.Ct. at 1318.
The question in this case, however, is not whether Illinois has the
authority to impose some conditions on access to the ballot. The question
is rather whether the particular scheme Illinois has chosen falls within
the limits of its constitutional discretion. Because "fundamental rights"
are at stake, Illinois is not entitled to distribute rights to
access in whichever way it chooses. See, e.g, Illinois State Board of
Elections v. Socialist Workers, supra.
The decision in Socialist Workers strongly indicates that the
challenged provisions in Section 10-2, as construed by the State Board of
Elections, are unconstitutional. In that case, the Supreme Court held
that Illinois could not constitutionally enact an election scheme in
an independent candidate or new political party in
Chicago, a city with approximately 718,937 voters
eligible to sign nominating petitions for the mayoral
election in 1977, had to secure over 10,000 more
signatures on nominating petitions than an independent
candidate or new party in state elections, who had a
pool of approximately 4.5 million eligible voters from
which to obtain signatures.
Id., at 440 U.S. at 183-84, 99 S.Ct. at 989-90 (footnotes omitted). The
Court's reasoning ran as follows:
The Illinois Legislature has determined that its
interest in avoiding overloaded ballots in statewide
elections is served by the 25,000 signature
requirement. Yet appellant has advanced no reason,
much less a compelling one, why the State needs a more
stringent requirement for Chicago.
Id. at 186, 99 S.Ct. at 991. This same line of argument, plaintiffs
maintain, dictates a decision in their favor. Here, as in Socialist
Workers, Illinois "has advanced no reason, much less a compelling one"
justifying a requirement that burdens candidates for the House twice as
much as candidates for the Senate in one election every ten years.
To be sure, Socialist Workers must be read with caution. It must be
analyzed "against the constitutional backdrop of prior election cases,"
Bowe v. Rd. of Election Com'rs of City of Chicago, 614 F.2d 1147, 1151
(7th Cir. 1980); accord, Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 632 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 219, 62 L.Ed.2d 142 (1979),
and broad generalizations must be eschewed:
The plaintiffs apparently take the position that the
Socialist Worker's Party case stands for the broad
proposition that a state may never impose a higher
signature requirement for an office of a smaller
subdivision than the requirement imposed for any
office of a larger subdivision. We cannot agree.
Bowe v. Rd. of Election Com'rs of City of Chicago, supra, 614 F.2d at
1151. Plaintiffs cannot, and do not, take issue with this statement. They
concede that certain disparities might be justifiable, that "the
differences in duties, responsibilities and importance of various
offices," id. at 1152, might warrant a differential in the relative
signature requirements demanded by the state. Plaintiffs' argument is
simply that these contentions are irrelevant. Regardless of what the
state might be able to justify in some other case, the fact remains that
no justifications have been put forth here. Judgment must therefore be in
Defendants' rejoinders are unpersuasive. Neither in their written
response to plaintiffs' motion nor in oral argument have they articulated
any reason justifying the discrimination about which plaintiffs
complain. Defendants have instead taken the position that they need not
offer a rationalization because "plaintiffs' contentions do not rise to
constitutional dimensions." (Response Memorandum at 14). This argument
derives from three subordinate claims: first, that there is no
constitutional "rule of proportionality,"*fn7 second, that
classifications between elective offices are not a
federal constitutional concern; and finally, that plaintiffs have failed
to establish that the 3,000 signature requirement is a substantial
impediment to the ballot. None of these contentions are appropriate bases
First of all, plaintiffs are not advocating a "rule of
proportionality." They have not argued that they are entitled to relief
solely because defendants' interpretation of Section 10-2 imposes upon
them a signature requirement which is higher in percentage terms than the
one placed upon Senatorial candidates. Plaintiffs instead stress that the
above disparity occurs freakishly, only once every ten years. This
infrequency justifies, I believe, an inference that few, if any, state
interests are served by the challenged discrimination under any
circumstances. Thus, the Court need not adopt a "rule of proportionality"
in order to place on the defendants the burden of coming forward with
some explanation for the state's behavior.
Defendants' second argument also fails. Whether or not there is a
general federal interest in the manner a state differentiates between its
elective offices, see Clements v. Fashing, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 102 S.Ct.
2836, 2849, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment), there is clearly such an interest when the
differentiation affects the constitutional rights of candidates and
voters. Id. at 2843-48 (plurality opinion) (subjecting such restrictions
to federal equal protection review); id. at 2850-54 (Brennan, J.,
Finally, plaintiffs are not obligated to prove that the 3,000 signature
requirement is onerous in, of and by itself.*fn8 They are also entitled
to relief if they can show that they have been forced to endure a burden
which is irrational in a comparative sense. The Socialist Workers Court,
for example, struck down on comparative grounds a statutory requirement
which had been upheld when analyzed in isolation. See Jackson v.
Ogilvie, 325 F. Supp. 864, 868 (N.D.Ill.), aff'd. mem., 403 U.S. 925, 91
S.Ct. 2247, 29 L.Ed.2d 705 (1971)*fn9
In sum, it was defendants' burden at least to articulate a
justification for the discrimination attacked in the complaint. In light
of their failure to do so, I hold that plaintiffs have established a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.*fn10
The decision in Bowe v. Rd. of Election Com'rs of City of Chicago,
supra, is consistent
with this result. Plaintiffs there sought inclusion on the Democratic
Party primary ballot as candidates for Ward Committeeman in two wards of
the City of Chicago. Each plaintiff argued that it was unconstitutional
for his access to be conditioned on a requirement that his petitions be
signed by 10% "of the primary electors of his party of his ward."
Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 46, § 7-10. Plaintiffs established that this
percentage figure translated into an actual requirement of 834 to 2,280
signatures, depending on the ward involved. They contrasted this range
with the 100 signature requirement levied on candidates for State Central
Committeeman. The latter individuals could solicit signatures in a much
larger and more populous area — an entire Congressional District.
Arguing that these rules operated in combination to discriminate against
them unconstitutionally, plaintiffs sought an order enjoining the
defendants to accept the petitions they had submitted.
The District Court refused to grant the order and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed, ruling that "because of the lack of a fully developed record .
. . we find no abuse of discretion in denying a preliminary injunction."
Id., 614 F.2d at 1153. The Court of Appeals refused the plaintiffs'
invitation "to impose preliminary injunctive relief without the
development of a factual record as to the circumstances, background and
operation of the statute in question." Id. at 1152 (emphasis in
original). In this case, the factual record is similarly scant.
Nevertheless, an order in plaintiffs' favor remains appropriate.
First of all, the Bowe panel merely held that the District Court had
acted within its discretion by denying the injunction. The Court of
Appeals never stated that it would have been an abuse of discretion had
the lower court ruled the other way.
Moreover, the discrimination attached in Bowe differed qualitatively
from that at issue here. Plaintiffs in Bowe challenged a disparity that
surfaced in every primary election. By contrast, the discrimination in
this case is, to repeat, freakish; it reoccurs only once every decade, a
feature which accentuates its seeming irrationality and which undercuts
any asserted justification based on alleged differences between the
offices affected. The same was not true in Bowe.*fn11
Indeed, the classification challenged here bears a closer resemblance
to that found in Socialist Workers, not Bowe. The relevant statute
provided in Socialist Workers that candidates for statewide office needed
25,000 signatures. As originally passed, the statute further required
that these signatures be geographically dispersed: At least 200 voters in
each of 50 different counties had to be among the 25,000 signers. This
requirement was declared unconstitutional in Moore v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). Illinois then amended
its statute so that no more than 13,000 of the needed signatures could
come from one county. This provision was also invalidated. Communist
Party of Illinois v. State Board of Elections, 518 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986, 96 S.Ct. 394, 46 L.Ed.2d 303 (1975). The law
which came before the Court in Socialist Workers was thus a shadow of its
former self. Illinois had attempted to balance its relatively lenient
absolute number requirement for state candidates with a geographical
requirement that did not burden candidates in municipal elections.
However, after the
Moore and Communist Party decisions, this balance no longer existed. The
disparate burdens placed on the Socialist Workers plaintiffs were thus in
no sense a "considered product of a legislature," id., 440 U.S. at 191,
99 S.Ct. at 993 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment), and the
Court was clearly troubled by the prospect of letting stand a
discrimination that could be explained by nothing more than "historical
accident." Id. at 187, 99 S.Ct. at 991 (majority opinion); id. at 189, 99
S.Ct. at 993 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 191, 99 S.Ct. at 993 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Wilson v. Pirestone, 623 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 400, 66 L.Ed.2d 247
(1981). The Court's sensitivity to this point was understandable, for
while legislatures are presumed to act in a constitutional manner, see,
e.g., Clements v. Fashing, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 2843, no such rule has
evolved with respect to "historical accidents." This fact has relevance
because, as in Socialist Workers, the discrimination challenged in this
case was never expressly ordained by the Illinois Legislature. Rather, it
is the product of an Advisory Opinion promulgated by an administrative
official trying to fill in the gaps caused by legislative inaction. See
Part I, supra. This was simply not the case in Rowe.
Finally, and most significant, the defendants in Bowe attempted to
justify the discrimination which was challenged. They argued, inter
alia, that Ward Committeemen and State Central Committeemen served
different roles and that these differences were rationally reflected in
the disparate signature requirements Illinois had mandated. In support of
this claim, defendants presented evidence at a "limited hearing" held on
the motion for preliminary relief. Id., 614 F.2d at 1152. The Court of
Appeals' conclusion, based on a review of this record, was that enough had
been shown to justify the lower court's decision in defendants' favor.
Because of defendants' showing, the District Court had acted well within
its discretion when it had concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
establish a likelihood of success on the merits. Here, by contrast, the
issue is not even close. Defendants have put nothing in the record which
even remotely justifies the discrimination plaintiffs have attacked.
Plaintiffs are entitled to their injunction.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, defendants are enjoined,
pending the outcome of this litigation, to accept as valid, for purposes
of the November 1982 election, petitions for a new political party in a
Representative District which are signed by at least 1,500 qualified
voters of such Representative District and which meet all other
requirements imposed by law.