APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. ARTHUR
J. CIESLIK, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE DOWNING DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
Rehearing denied July 27, 1982.
Petitioner Carlo Raimondo (Raimondo) sought a writ of habeas corpus (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 65, par. 1 et seq.) ordering his release from the custody of the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (the Department). The Department has maintained custody of Raimondo since 1975 pursuant to a criminal court order which committed him following a finding he was not guilty by reason of insanity (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, pars. 6-2, 1005-2-4) of certain crimes with which he had been charged. The circuit court denied the requested relief and set a date for the expiration of Raimondo's commitment to the Department.
Raimondo appeals, claiming the circuit court erred (1) in failing to address the merits of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus; (2) in denying his motion for a default judgment on the habeas corpus petition; (3) in applying the then-effective provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections (UCC) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, 1980 Supp., par. 1001-1-1 et seq.) which concerned dispositions upon findings of not guilty by reason of insanity; and (4) in calculating the expiration date of his commitment, assuming the applicability of those provisions. Raimondo has also filed a motion to strike an argument contained in the appellee's brief, which we have taken with the case.
Raimondo was arrested on April 1, 1973, charged with the commission of rape and armed robbery on March 29, 1973, and with an unrelated armed robbery on January 21, 1973. After trial for these crimes, the criminal trial court found that Raimondo was not guilty by reason of his insanity at the time the crimes were carried out. The criminal trial court also found that this insanity continued as of that dispositional date, January 9, 1975. Consequently, pursuant to the then-effective provisions of the UCC (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-4(b)), the criminal court committed Raimondo to the Department "until he shall have permanently recovered from his insanity." We note that under that statute, this initial commitment order (the "criminal commitment") covered a period not to exceed 12 months from the date of its entry. At the end of this 12-month period, Raimondo's commitment (the "civil commitment") was governed by the provisions of the then-effective Mental Health Code of 1967 (the MHC) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 91 1/2, par. 1-1 et seq.). Thus, Raimondo was in custody under a civil commitment as of January 9, 1976.
During Raimondo's continuing civil commitment, the legislature altered both relevant statutes. The relevant UCC provision was first amended effective August 1, 1977, by Public Act 80-164. (See 1977 Ill. Laws 803-06.) Briefly, the new statute provided that, when an offender was found not guilty by reason of insanity and was still in need of mental treatment, the court must order "criminal" commitment of the offender to the Department. This criminal commitment was to be for an indefinite period not to exceed the maximum length of time which the offender could have served had he been convicted of the most serious offense charged, less credit for good time behavior, before becoming eligible for parole. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 1005-2-4(a), (b).
The MHC was repealed and replaced by the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the MHDDC) effective January 1, 1979, by Public Act 80-1414. See 1978 Ill. Laws 1462; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 91 1/2, par. 1-100 et seq.
The UCC was amended again, effective September 19, 1980, by Public Act 81-1497. (See 1980 Ill. Laws 2530-35.) Briefly, this amendment required the Department to evaluate an offender found not guilty by reason of insanity. The court then held a hearing to determine which of four classifications the offender then came within. If the offender was found to fall within the "subject to involuntary admission" classification, as defined, he was to be committed to the Department for an indefinite period calculated as under the previous version of the UCC. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., ch. 38, pars. 1005-2-4(a), (b).
On January 13, 1981, Raimondo filed the present petition against respondents, who are employees of the Department, seeking a writ of habeas corpus ordering his release from the custody of the Department. This petition alleged Raimondo was being unlawfully detained and restrained of his liberty by respondents. The petition further alleged that Raimondo's lawful period of confinement had expired under any version of the UCC which might be applied.
A hearing was held before the circuit court on January 29, 1981. The circuit court ruled the most recent version of the UCC applied, and continued the case so that an evaluation of Raimondo's condition could be made. The court ruled the burden would be on the State to prove Raimondo was still in need of commitment.
At the next court appearance, February 26, 1981, Raimondo filed a motion for default judgment against respondents for their alleged failure to properly file a return as required by the provisions of the Illinois habeas corpus statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 65, par. 12). The circuit court continued the motion.
On March 12, 1981, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss Raimondo's petition, asserting Raimondo's circumstance did not fall within those for which a writ of habeas corpus was proper (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 65, par. 22), and that he should have filed a petition for discharge under the UCC (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1980 Supp., par. 1005-2-4(e)). The circuit court denied the motion for default and continued the motion to dismiss.
At the next hearing held March 20, 1981, the circuit court ruled the petition for writ of habeas corpus was the improper procedure because Raimondo had not exhausted his "administrative remedies." The court denied the petition, but stated it would treat the petition as one for discharge under the UCC. The court ruled that the most recent version of the UCC should be applicable. Since that provision set a criminal commitment period based upon the maximum sentence which could have been entered upon conviction of the most serious crime which led to the not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdict, and since Raimondo had never been given such a maximum sentence at the time of the initial criminal commitment, the court set the matter for a sentencing hearing.
That sentencing hearing took place on April 9, 1981. The State called a single witness in aggravation, and Raimondo called three witnesses in mitigation. The court then sentenced Raimondo hypothetically to serve 100 to 300 years for the rape and armed robbery committed March 29, 1973, and 50 to 100 years for the armed robbery committed January 21, 1973. These sentences were to run consecutively. The court then proceeded to calculate the maximum possible period of criminal confinement of Raimondo to the ...