a warrant, but they ultimately settled for the opinion of another law
enforcement officer who was not an attorney.
True, the facts in the record might also support defendants' argument
that they acted in utmost good faith under the circumstances in this
case. But, where the facts support conflicting inferences, summary
judgment is inappropriate. See, e.g., Winters v. Highlands Insurance
Co., 569 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1978) (although basic facts were not in
dispute, summary judgment was inappropriate where parties disagree
regarding the material inferences to be drawn from those facts).
Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to
the arrest and their good faith defense will be denied.
The two Lombard police officers, Glennon and Laitsch, named as
defendants in this action argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment because they were not involved and did not participate in any
meaningful way in the incidents that form the basis for this lawsuit.
Plaintiff contends, on the other hand, that although Glennon and Laitsch
played no part in the decision to enter Steven's house without a warrant
or the planning and execution of the arrest, and never entered Steven's
house but instead remained outside to guard against a possible escape,
they are nevertheless liable for their failure to prevent all or part of
what happened during the night in question. Plaintiff cites Byrd v.
Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972), for the principle that police
officers have a duty to protect persons from the unwarranted brutality of
their fellow officers which occurs in their presence or otherwise within
In the Court's view, the record evidence, even when viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, is insufficient to support an
inference of liability with respect to Glennon and Laitsch as a matter of
law. Although it is true that "one who is given the badge of authority of
a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office and fail
to stop other officers who summarily punish a third person in his
presence or otherwise within his knowledge," Byrd v. Brishke, supra, 466
F.2d at 11, the case at bar does not present such an extreme situation
with respect to officers Glennon and Laitsch. There is no evidence that
the Lombard officers were in any position to stop the Villa Park officers
from making an allegedly unlawful entry into Steven's house or to prevent
the harm that befell Steven once the Villa Park officers were inside the
house. They did not help to plan the raid or to carry it out, and there
is no evidence that they were even aware of the circumstances surrounding
the Villa Park officers' decision to arrest Steven that night.*fn4
The facts in the instant case are much different than those in Byrd,
for example, in which the defendant officers were actually present when
other officers beat the deceased and they failed to intercede with their
fellow officers despite their proximity to the alleged wrongs.
Similarly, in Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974), the
defendant officers were found liable for their failure to prevent their
fellow officers from beating the plaintiff whom they knew to be nonverbal
and unable to call for help or defend himself and whom they knew had been
beaten on at least twenty prior occasions. In the case at bar, it is
undisputed that the Lombard officers' involvement in the events of August
15, 1980, was limited to their assignment to watch the side and rear of
Steven's house while the other officers
actively participated in the events that resulted in Steven's death. See
Final Pretrial Order, Statement of Uncontested Facts at ¶ 20.
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of defendants Glennon
and Laitsch but denied as to the other moving defendants. It is so