court to decline to exercise its pendent jurisdiction over the
Initially, the court determines that there is a substantial
doubt as to the viability of Carrillo's asserted state claims.
As a general rule, Illinois does not recognize a cause of
action for the termination of any employment contract at will.
The one recognized exception is the relatively new tort of
retaliatory discharge, which was judicially created in 1978.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has thus far only applied
this tort in two situations, where the discharge stems from an
employee's filing of a workman's compensation claim,
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559,
384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); and where the discharge is for cooperating
with a local law enforcement agency's prosecution of another
employee, Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124,
52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
Carrillo argues that the tort of retaliatory discharge
applies whenever the challenged discharge is for a reason that
contravenes public policy, and that the public policy of
Illinois is to prevent discrimination because of sex or
national origin in connection with employment, Illinois Human
Rights Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, ¶ 1-102. In Palmateer,
however, after reasoning that the tort is available when a
public interest is involved and unavailable when the interest
at stake is private, the Illinois Supreme Court referred to a
discharge in retaliation for opposition to sexual
discrimination as involving "muddled" public and private
interests. The court also noted that decisions in other states
are split on the question whether the tort is available in such
cases. Palmateer, supra, 85 Ill.2d at 131, 52 Ill.Dec. at 16,
421 N.E.2d at 879. Moreover, the very completeness of the
statutory remedies for employment discrimination that are
codified in the Human Rights Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 68, ¶ 1-101
et seq., argue against the application of the tort to
employment discrimination cases.
It is thus not at all clear that Illinois courts will apply
the tort of retaliatory discharge to allegedly discriminatory
discharges.*fn5 Similarly, one Illinois court has held that
the discharge of an employee under a contract at will is not
the type of conduct that would give rise to an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. App.3d 50, 40 Ill.Dec. 589,
406 N.E.2d 595 (3d Dist. 1980), aff'd on this point and rev'd
on other grounds, 85 Ill.2d 124, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981). Were this court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
Carrillo's state claims, it would be necessary to resolve novel
and complex issues of state law.
Due in part to this uncertainty, this court declines to
exercise its jurisdiction as to the state claims.
Additionally, in a similar case involving a sex discrimination
claim under Title VII and a state tort claim for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Judge Shadur
declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction, finding that
judicial economy would not be served and that the state issues
would predominate over the federal issues, Hughes v. Marsh, 27
Empl.Prac.Dec. ¶ 32,333 (N.D.Ill. July 21, 1981). He reasoned
Hughes' state theory requires consideration of
numerous factual questions irrelevant to her
Title VII claim, questions that would
significantly prolong the federal litigation.
Proof of emotional damage and the specific acts
Hughes alleges to have caused such damage would,
in terms of time and difficulty, almost certainly
"predominate" over Title VII issues. From a
judicial economy standpoint, the fact that
Hughes' Title VII claim would be considered by
the Court but her state claim by a jury might
very well lead to protraction and complexity,
avoidable were each claim tried separately.