The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bua, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Julius C. Collins, a black man, was employed by
defendant, Car Carriers, Inc. (Car Carriers or employer). In
October, 1979, Collins was discharged from that position.
Defendant, Local Union No. 710 of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters (Local 710 or union) represented
Collins. Collins submitted a grievance through Local 710,
alleging that he had been discharged because of his race.*fn1
In accord with the collective bargaining agreement between Car
Carriers and Local 710, a grievance hearing was held on
October 23, 1979 at which Collins was represented by the
union. Collins' request for reinstatement was denied. On
November 8, 1979, Collins' case was submitted to the Joint
Auto Transport Committee which upheld the discharge.
On January 2, 1980, Collins filed a charge of race
discrimination against Car Carriers with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC issued Collins a right
to sue letter on February 29, 1980. Collins filed a pro se
complaint in this court against Car Carriers on June 3, 1980,
alleging that the company discharged him because of his race.
Counsel was appointed to represent Collins and an amended
complaint was filed adding Local 710 as a defendant. Count I of
the amended complaint alleged that the company and the union
had violated Collins' civil rights under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Count II alleged that the
union had failed to fairly represent Collins in his unlawful
discharge action against Car Carriers. The action was brought
under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),
29 U.S.C. § 185.
In a prior order, this court found that the plaintiff was
aware of his breach of duty of fair representation claim
against the union on January 2, 1980*fn2 (see Minute Order of
December 17, 1981), and that, as a result, plaintiff's cause of
action was barred by Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 10, § 112(b). The case
is presently before this court on plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration. The court has,
upon further reflection, reconsidered its prior order and
holds as follows:
1) The union's motion for summary judgment on
that portion of Count I alleging a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15 is granted.
2) The union's motion for summary judgment on
the portion of Count I alleging a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 is denied.
3) Plaintiff's § 301 claim (Count II) is
dismissed as to the union, as it is barred by
the appropriate statute of limitations,
29 U.S.C. § 160(b). Plaintiff may, however, go
forward with its § 301 claim against the
employer. The latter is not time-barred.
Plaintiff contends that he was not discharged for just cause
as required by the collective bargaining agreement governing
the terms and conditions of his employment. The nominal
parties to the collective bargaining agreement are the
employer and the union. Plaintiff's pro se complaint, as
originally filed on June 3, 1980, focused solely on the
employer's breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
Plaintiff's amended complaint, filed on September 19, 1980 by
his court-appointed attorney, again raised plaintiff's claim
against the employer and added a second count alleging the
union's breach of its duty of fair representation.
The union has moved for dismissal of and/or summary judgment
on Count I, arguing that the claim under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15 is barred because plaintiff did not file a
timely EEOC charge against the union. The union also argues
that the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should be discharged
because it is frivolous.
Both defendants have moved for dismissal of and/or summary
judgment on Count II, arguing that the § 301 claim is barred
because plaintiff did not file suit within the applicable
statute of limitations.
The union's motion for summary judgment with respect to that
portion of Count I alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e —
2000e-15 is granted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Timely filing of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to bringing suit under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-15. United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97
S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977). Plaintiff admits he did not
satisfy this jurisdictional prerequisite as to Local 710.
The union's motion for summary judgment on the portion of
Count I alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is denied. ...