Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss Count I is denied
on all grounds.
Count II of the amended complaint alleges that plaintiff
relied to his detriment on G.E.'s fraudulent misrepresentation
that it would continue to employ plaintiff if he moved to
Illinois and if he substantially complied with its directions
during the course of that employment. First Amended Complaint,
¶¶ 5-6. In addition to the arguments raised and rejected herein
for a dismissal of Count I, defendant moves to dismiss Count II
on an additional ground.*fn5 Specifically, defendant argues
that plaintiff cannot sustain Count II in the absence of an
allegation that G.E. misrepresented a pre-existing or present
material fact. This argument rests on the general rule that a
promise to perform a future act, even if not an accurate
reflection of present intention, is not sufficient to
constitute fraud in Illinois.
It is true as a general rule in Illinois that a promise to
perform a future act, even if accompanied at the time with an
intention not to perform that act, is not a false
representation as will constitute fraud. Roda v. Berko,
401 Ill. 335, 340, 81 N.E.2d 912 (1948). However, a false
representation of intent to perform an act in the future is
actionable in Illinois when that representation is the scheme
used to accomplish the fraud. Carroll v. First National Bank of
Lincolnwood, 413 F.2d 353, 358-59 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1003, 90 S.Ct. 552, 24 L.Ed.2d 494 (1970);
Wilhoite v. Fastenware, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 856, 858 (N.D.Ill.
1973); Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill.2d 320, 334,
13 Ill.Dec. 699, 371 N.E.2d 634 (1977); Willis v.
Atkins, 412 Ill. 245, 260, 106 N.E.2d 370 (1952). In some
respects, this exception appears to "engulf and devour much of
the general rule." Vance Pearson, Inc. v. Alexander, 86 Ill. App.3d 1105,
1112, 42 Ill.Dec. 204, 408 N.E.2d 782 (4th Dist.
1980). In any event, the Court is persuaded that the
misrepresentation alleged here can be characterized fairly as
part of a scheme to defraud and does state a claim for which
relief can be granted. According to plaintiff's allegations,
G.E.'s misrepresentation was a deliberate device to induce
plaintiff to enter this agreement to his detriment. The
misrepresentation was an integral step in achieving the
agreement. Moreover, the misrepresentation alleged here related
to the binding character of the agreement reached between the
parties as well as G.E.'s intention to engage in particular
future conduct. In this respect, therefore, the
misrepresentation involved an allegedly untrue statement of
present fact as well as future intention. Accordingly,
defendant's motion to dismiss Count II is denied.
Count III of plaintiff's complaint alleges that his
discharge from employment was in retaliation for his
resistance to pressure from G.E. to hire and promote female
employees solely on the basis of sex. Plaintiff's claim is
predicated on the retaliatory discharge doctrine in Illinois
which recognizes a cause of action when an employee is
discharged in retaliation for his activities in contravention
of a clearly mandated public policy. See Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 134, 52 Ill.Dec.
13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). The specific nature of the public
policy contravened by this discharge is, however, in dispute.
In its motion to dismiss, the defendant argues that the
retaliatory discharge doctrine does not apply in a case such
as this where the public policy allegedly contravened
by the discharge can be vindicated through the express
mechanisms established by federal and state law. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1976); Illinois Human
Rights Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1979, ch. 68, § 6-101(A). Indeed, the
Illinois courts acknowledged the need to recognize the tort of
retaliatory discharge precisely because there was no other
remedy available to vindicate the public policy involved.
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 187, 23 Ill.Dec. 559,
384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). Cf. McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing
Co., 489 F. Supp. 24, 26 (E.D.Wisc. 1980). In the present case,
however, both federal and state law specifically provide that
it is an unlawful employment practice to discharge an employee
in retaliation for his opposition to unlawful employment
practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1976) and Ill. Rev.Stat. 1979,
ch. 68, § 6-101(A). Moreover, both federal and state law
establish exclusive remedies for the enforcement of their terms
and the corresponding vindication of the public policies
involved.*fn6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976) and Ill.Rev.Stat.
1979, ch. 68, § 8-111(D). See also Manuel v. International
Harvester Co., 502 F. Supp. 45, 48-49 (N.D.Ill. 1980). In light
of these statutory remedies, the Court will not imply an
independent cause of action in this context.
Plaintiff attempts to avoid his obligation to pursue
administrative remedies under federal and state law by
recasting the nature of the public policies allegedly
contravened by his discharge. The substance of plaintiff's
argument appears to be that his discharge was caused by his
unwillingness to be compelled to comply with G.E.'s
discriminatory practices rather than his unwillingness to
comply with those practices as such. The public policies
contravened by plaintiff's discharge, therefore, involve an
employee's right to be "free from undue pressure and threats"
from his employer and the right "[t]o be free from allowing
such an illegal scheme [discriminatory personnel practices] to
become a condition of his further employment." Plaintiff's
Response at p. 20. In light of these "other" policies
threatened by his dismissal, plaintiff argues that the
remedies provided by federal and state civil rights laws
relating to discrimination itself are insufficient.
Plaintiff's argument advances a distinction without a
difference. The amended complaint itself identified the public
policy contravened by plaintiff's discharge as that
established in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act and the
Illinois Human Rights Act. First Amended Complaint, Count III,
¶ 8. The theoretical policy against being compelled to violate
these laws is subsumed by the underlying policy against
employment discrimination. If plaintiff were permitted to
maintain an independent tort on such dependent grounds, the
remedies provided by state and federal law would have no
meaning. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss Count III
Count IV of plaintiff's amended complaint alleges conduct on
defendant's part purportedly rising to the level of an
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois
law. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he suffered severe
emotional distress as the result of G.E.'s repeated
accusations and attempts to elicit admissions to the effect
that he caused irregularities in job order processing during
course of his employment. Plaintiff also claims to have
suffered emotional distress from G.E.'s efforts to compel him
against his will to participate in a discriminatory personnel
policy. Defendant's motion to dismiss is predicated on the
theory that plaintiff has failed to allege the extreme and
outrageous conduct necessary to sustain an action alleging
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant also
argues that plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to
support his assertion that he has in fact suffered the kind of
severe distress necessary to sustain this cause of action.
Although the Court is not unmindful that the conduct and
distress giving rise to this cause of action must be extreme
in nature under Illinois law, the factual issues raised in
defendant's motion are not appropriately resolved on a motion
to dismiss. That these allegations are not likely to rise to
the level of a tort under state law cannot control our
determination here. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss
Count IV is denied.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is
granted in part and denied in part. It is denied as to Counts
I, II, and IV and is granted as to Count III. It is so