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January 12, 1982


  Before Cudahy, Circuit Judge, and Grady and Bua, District

                            Rybicki I

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Cudahy, Circuit Judge.


In these consolidated reapportionment cases, three groups of plaintiffs challenge the validity, under the federal and Illinois constitutions and related law, of Illinois' 1981 state legislative redistricting plan (the "Commission Plan"). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reject the Rybicki plaintiffs' allegations, on behalf of Republican and suburban interests, of noncompactness, partisan unfairness and impermissible fracturing of counties (and other political subdivisions) and suburban communities. We accept, in part, the Crosby plaintiffs' claim, on behalf of black voters, that the Commission Plan unconstitutionally dilutes black voting strength. As a remedy for this unconstitutional dilution of the black vote, we adopt certain modifications to the Commission Plan, identified as Court Exhibits 1A, 2A, 7D and 7E (and related documents). We also approve as fair, adequate and reasonable a Settlement Agreement reached between the DelValle plaintiffs, on behalf of Hispanic voters, and the Commission defendants, and therefore approve certain further modifications to the Commission Plan, as stipulated in the Settlement Agreement.


Three groups of plaintiffs in these consolidated cases challenge the redistricting plan adopted by the Illinois Legislative Redistricting Commission (the "Commission") for the election of candidates to the Illinois General Assembly.*fn1 Plaintiffs in Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6030, allege that the Commission Plan fails to accord suburban voters equal protection of the laws by disproportionately concentrating voting power, and therefore legislative representation, in the City of Chicago. They also allege that the plan is politically unfair, contains numerous non-compact districts and indiscriminately fractures political subdivisions. Plaintiffs in Crosby v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6093, allege that the Commission Plan intentionally discriminates against black voters by diluting their voting strength and providing white voters a disproportionate opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Plaintiffs in DelValle v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6052, allege that the Commission's redistricting effort similarly dilutes the voting power of Hispanics, thereby depriving them of a reasonable opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. All three complaints charge that the Plan violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), and Article I, § 2 and Article IV, § 3 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.*fn2 Jurisdiction in each case is alleged under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) and the principles of pendent jurisdiction.

Defendants in all three cases are James Edgar, the Secretary of State of Illinois, who is charged under Article IV, § 3 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, with publication of the legislative redistricting map; the Illinois State Board of Elections and its members who, pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stats. ch. 46, § 1A-8 (1979), are primarily responsible for the administration and supervision of elections in Illinois; and the Illinois Legislative Redistricting Commission (and its Democratic members individually), which is charged pursuant to Article IV, § 3 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution with the task of promulgating a redistricting plan in the event that the legislature fails to adopt such a plan.*fn3

On November 2, 1981, a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1976) to hear these cases and, on November 23, all three cases were consolidated for expedited consideration. Trial was concluded on December 7, 1981, after the court had heard testimony from 25 witnesses and received into evidence more than 200 exhibits.

I. Facts

  A.  Procedural Background of the 1981 Legislature
      Redistricting in Illinois

Article IV, § 3 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution requires a redistricting of the Illinois General Assembly in the year following each federal decennial census. The Illinois Constitution provides the legislature with the first opportunity to adopt a plan that redistricts all legislative seats in the Illinois House and Senate in a manner such that an equal share of the population, under the most recent census, resides in each district.*fn4 If the legislature does not adopt a plan by June 30 of the first year following the census, an eight-member Legislative Redistricting Commission must be formed. The Speaker and Minority Leader of the Illinois House and the President and Minority Leader of the Illinois Senate each appoint two members to the Commission. The Commission may not include more than four members from one political party nor more than four members who hold seats in the General Assembly. The constitution further requires that the Commission complete a plan by August 10 of the year it is convened. If the Commission fails to agree on a plan, the Illinois Supreme Court provides the Secretary of State with the names of two persons from different political parties, one of whom is chosen by lot to become the ninth member of the Commission. The Commission then has until October 5 to file a redistricting plan approved by a majority of its members.

In view of the importance of legislative history to proof of a claim of intentional discrimination,*fn5 we set forth in some detail the background evidence of the redistricting efforts of both the legislature and the Commission.*fn6 During the first few months of 1981, the results of the federal census were delivered to ranking Illinois legislative and executive officials.*fn7 Figures in hand, the leaders of both parties immediately engaged the services of consultants to aid in both the development and political analysis of the possible redistricting plans. The political data utilized by both parties included voting results and patterns at the census tract level for a variety of legislative and state-wide races run from 1978 through 1980.

In the course of their preparations, the Democratic staff, under the direction of House Minority Leader Michael Madigan, solicited the views of all Democratic legislators. A number of black legislators told Madigan that blacks were underrepresented both in the legislature as a whole and in the party caucuses. A House Select Committee on Reapportionment also conducted public hearings to solicit the views of citizens in general. The Committee was advised at these hearings in Chicago of the desire of the black community for greater representation in the legislature.

By May, 1981, Republican legislators had created a plan which they introduced in the Illinois House. The Democrats had also succeeded in developing a plan which they submitted to the state Senate.*fn8 A major impediment to passage of both plans, however, was Madigan's fear that Governor Thompson, a Republican, would exercise his amendatory veto with respect to any plan presented to him. Consequently, neither plan passed and, in July, the Legislative Redistricting Commission was formed.*fn9

Before making his appointments, Madigan circulated among House Democrats a form requesting that they submit their recommendations for potential Commission appointees. Madigan stated that he had committed himself to the appointment of one member from a racial or ethnic minority. Although most of the black legislators recommended the appointment of Rep. Emil Jones, currently an Assistant Minority Leader, Madigan followed the advice of other black legislators, two of whom are plaintiffs in this case, and appointed a former State Representative and black community leader, Corneal A. Davis. Apart from Davis, there was no black or Hispanic representation on the Commission or on its staff.

The Democratic and Republican Commission members and their staffs worked separately and developed their own proposals. On the Democratic side, Madigan*fn10 and Martin Murphy (who is the Commissioner of Planning for the City of Chicago), worked on the Chicago and Cook County portions of their redistricting plan. Rep. Michael McClain, a Madigan appointee, drew the map for the so-called "collar counties" (which are those counties adjacent to Cook), while Senator James Donnewald busied himself with the downstate region. Commissioner Davis drew no district lines.

The Democratic Map*fn11 for Chicago and Cook County, which is the prototype for the map of those areas ultimately adopted by the Commission, was drawn according to a systematic procedure. The drafters began with the districts as they appeared in the 1971 redistricting map.*fn12 They intended to enlarge those districts that had lost population and shrink those that had gained. Throughout the process, Madigan solicited the views of all legislators, including black legislators, concerning various aspects of the map. The map was completed in rough form by the end of June. Although Madigan testified that he made no attempt to hide the Cook County map from various black legislators and community leaders and Hispanics, only Commissioner Davis had the opportunity to study the entire Chicago and Cook County portions of the map at this stage or at any time prior to its adoption as the Commission Plan on October 2, 1981.*fn13

Notwithstanding the fact that the Democrats had completed drafting the major portions of their map, the Commission held public hearings in Chicago on July 23, 1981, to obtain public suggestions for redistricting. A number of witnesses, including representatives of the black and Hispanic communities, presented their views on redistricting at these hearings. Several black witnesses testified that in the past blacks had fared poorly in the redistricting process; that percentage-wise the black population had increased in relation to the white population in Chicago between 1970 and 1980; and that any redistricting should accord blacks greater representation. The Hispanics pointed out that they had no representation in the General Assembly and urgently requested an opportunity to secure such representation. See Plaintiffs' Ex. 52.*fn14

Among the other witnesses who testified at the hearings were representatives of the villages of Oak Park and Evanston, as well as the Chicago neighborhood of Hyde Park. These communities, which had been fractured by prior redistricting, all requested that each be included in only one district. Although the protestations of black witnesses produced no changes in the draft plan, the drafters did revise the plan to accommodate the desires of these three geographical communities.

Pursuant to the constitutional procedure (of drawing by lot), former Governor Samuel Shapiro, a Democrat, was then selected to become the ninth member of the Commission on September 2, 1981. Governor Shapiro unsuccessfully urged a compromise between the Republican and Democratic Commission members before he ultimately acceded to the Democratic proposal.*fn15 On October 2 the Commission met to vote on what had then become known as the "Shapiro Plan."*fn16 The Republican Commissioners, now comprising an unenviable minority of four, criticized the plan as being unduly partisan and having a discriminatory impact on minorities in Chicago. Plaintiffs' Ex. 39 at 39-42. The Shapiro Plan was adopted by a vote of five to four, and it was officially filed with the Illinois Secretary of State on October 5, 1981.

B. General Considerations

We briefly describe the more salient features of the Commission Plan, together with an overview of the demographics of the State of Illinois before turning in detail to the evidence presented by the challengers and defenders of the Plan at trial. With respect to general characteristics, the Plan divides the State into 59 Senate districts, each of which is in turn divided geographically into two House districts.*fn17 The ideal population for each Senate district is 193,533. The total deviation of the Senate districts in the Commission Plan from this ideal is 1.59%, with an average deviation of .29%. The ideal population for each of the 118 House districts is 96,767. The total deviation from this ideal is 1.97%, with an average deviation of .42%.*fn18

A better understanding of the details of the Commission Plan and its impact on the plaintiffs in this case is facilitated by reviewing the demography of Illinois and, in particular, of metropolitan Chicago. Evidence presented at trial indicated that Illinois may, for reapportionment purposes, be divided into three or four areas: (1) Chicago, (2) Cook County outside Chicago, (3) the five counties adjacent to Cook (the "collar counties": DuPage, Kane, Will, McHenry and Lake), and (4) the remaining counties (i.e., the "downstate counties"). Of the 11,418,000 residents of Illinois, the 1980 census reveals that Chicago accounts for 3,005,000 (28%), Cook County (including Chicago) for 5,253,000 (46%), the collar counties for 1,849,000 (16%) and the downstate counties for 4,316,000 (38%). See Defendants' Ex. 121.

Chicago and Cook County constitute, of course, the largest urban and suburban center in Illinois. The collar counties are generally characterized as suburban and the downstate counties as rural. The tripartite (or quadrapartite) division of the state also generally correlates with political affiliation: Chicago is heavily Democratic while suburban Cook and the collar counties are predominantly Republican, as are many of the downstate counties.

Of the 5,253,190 residents of Cook County, 1,308,763 are black (21.5%). Approximately 84% of the Cook County black population resides in Chicago, where the blacks comprise nearly 40%, of the city's total population. The black population of Chicago is concentrated in two areas. The largest concentration is found in the South and Southeastern portions of Chicago, extending roughly from the city-center "Loop" area to Chicago's southernmost boundary. This area is, for the most part, over 85% black and it contains 792,000, or 66.2%, of the city's blacks. The area in question is commonly referred to as the South Side and is so denominated in this opinion. A smaller concentration of blacks exists in the West Central portion of Chicago, centered in the Austin neighborhood. It too is over 85% black and contains approximately 300,000 blacks or 23%, of Chicago's black population. This area has been frequently denominated the West Side in this litigation and is referred to as such in this opinion. Blacks also constitute a significant percentage of the population in and around the southern suburban municipalities of Harvey, Robbins and Markham. The concentration of blacks in this area of Cook County is not as high as on the South and West Sides, but it ranges from 35% to over 85%. The total black population in this area — 46,000 — is also relatively small. This southern area where blacks are concentrated has been denominated the South Suburban area.

A substantial Hispanic*fn19 population also resides in Illinois. The majority of Hispanics live in Chicago, where they number 422,061, or approximately 14% of the city's population. In general, the Hispanic population is not as highly concentrated as the black population. The Hispanic population is more dispersed than the black population, with Hispanics residing in various areas throughout Chicago. Notwithstanding this general dispersal, at least two major Hispanic aggregations are easily identified in Chicago, one on the Northwest Side and the other on the Southwest Side.

C. Evidence Adduced at Trial

1. The Rybicki Plaintiffs

The Rybicki plaintiffs submitted various testimonial and documentary evidence to support their claims of suburban vote dilution, lack of compactness of certain districts, excessive fracturing of political subdivisions and political unfairness.

Suburban Vote Dilution. The Rybicki plaintiffs argued that, based on changes in population between 1970 and 1980,*fn20 the collar counties are "entitled" to more and Chicago is "entitled" to fewer legislative districts than were accorded to these areas under the Commission Plan.

Under the 1971 redistricting plan, Chicago voters constituted part of the population in 20 Senate districts. Defendants' Ex. 12. Plaintiffs argue that in proportion to the City's 1980 population, the voters of Chicago should control or constitute a majority in 31 House districts and only 15.5 Senate districts. However, under the Commission Plan, Chicago voters "control" 35 House districts and 17 Senate districts.*fn21

Plaintiffs similarly observe that the number of districts controlled by collar county voters has not increased between 1970 and 1980, despite the population shifts from Chicago and Cook County to the collar counties evident in the 1980 census. Under the 1971 plan there were six Senate districts (then referred to as "Legislative" districts) entirely within the collar counties and five that overlapped into adjacent counties. Under the Commission plan, there are still six Senate districts wholly within the collar counties, but the number of overlap districts has increased to nine.*fn22

Compactness. The Rybicki plaintiffs allege that 15 House districts and 2 Senate districts are not compact.*fn23 The noncompactness of these districts is evident, according to plaintiffs, both under a visual analysis and as demonstrated by mathematical standards. In Schrage v. State Board of Elections, 88 Ill.2d 87, 58 Ill.Dec. 451, 430 N.E.2d 483 (1981), the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated former Commission House District 89, which extended 125 miles at its longest point and six miles at its narrowest, a length to width ratio of roughly 21:1. By comparison, Commission Senate District 19, the most egregious district on plaintiffs' list, extends 36 miles at its longest point and is two miles wide at its narrowest, a ratio of 18:1.*fn24

Defendants sought to minimize the significance of plaintiffs' compactness complaints by introducing examples of oddly shaped districts from the court-approved 1971 redistricting effort. See Defendants' Exs. 61 and 62. Moreover, the Commission's expert witness, Mr. Brace, testified that the irregular shapes appearing in the Commission Plan were necessitated in some circumstances to comply with the low (1%) population deviation standard employed as a goal by the Commission. Mr. Brace also stated that the desire to achieve some other redistricting goals, such as respect for the integrity of political subdivisions, communities of interest or natural boundaries contributed to the irregularly shaped districts. Plaintiffs attempted to rebut these arguments by presenting their own "Coalition Plan" which, they alleged, contained more compact districts.*fn25 But this alternative map also indicates the difficulty of achieving uniform compactness. The Coalition Map was drafted utilizing a less stringent population deviation standard;*fn26 nonetheless, as Defendants' Exhibit 62 demonstrates, even the Coalition Plan contains a number of highly irregular, elongated districts.*fn27

Political Fairness. The Rybicki plaintiffs also assert that the presence of noncompact districts is evidence of the Commission's intent to preserve a disproportionate number of Democratic incumbents. Moreover, plaintiffs allege that the extensive use of "overlap" districts designed to maintain the power of Chicago (and hence, the Democratic Party) by fracturing suburban areas, demonstrates the political unfairness of the Commission Plan. Defendants vigorously deny that the Commission Plan is politically unfair. Evidence submitted by the defendants indicated that historically, Illinois has been a "swing state" which elects Democrats and Republicans in equal numbers to legislative and executive offices. See Defendants' Exs. 23 and 24. In this connection, defendants analyzed the political effects of their map by examining past voting patterns for each census tract in every district.*fn28 On the basis of this analysis, defendants concluded that the Commission Plan would produce in the House 39 "firm" and 5 "soft" Democratic districts; 41 "firm" and 10 "soft" Republican districts; and 23 "swing" districts. In the Senate, it would produce 21 "firm" and no "soft" Democratic districts; 25 "firm" and 3 "soft" Republican districts; and 10 "swing" districts. Defendants observed that this alignment slightly favors the Republicans.*fn29

Fractured Counties. The Rybicki plaintiffs also introduced evidence demonstrating that the Commission Plan indiscriminately fractures political subdivisions. Representative Lee Daniels of DuPage County testified at length that fracturing can produce undesirable political consequences, particularly when a legislator is charged with representing areas that have divergent political interests. Representative Daniels pointed out that, even though Cook County and the collar counties have seemingly antagonistic interests on issues of transportation, taxation and education, nine Senate districts overlap between these two areas.

Focusing more closely on the Chicago metropolitan area, we note that in the 1971 plan, eleven Senate districts were entirely within Chicago while nine overlapped into Cook County.*fn30 Two districts overlapped from Cook County into the collar counties. See Defendants' Exs. 9, 10. Under the Commission Plan, eight Senate districts are wholly within Chicago, eleven overlap into Cook County and seven overlap from Cook County into the collar region.*fn31

The alleged political result of overlapping districts in the metropolitan Chicago area is that a disproportionate number of seats are "controlled" by Chicago and Cook County voters. Defendant Commission members admitted at trial and in their depositions that they intended to achieve this result of widening the influence of Chicago voters.*fn32 Defendants suggest that, in the absence of overlapping districts in the Chicago and Cook County area, a redistricting plan grossly favors the Republican Party.

2. Crosby Plaintiffs

The Crosby plaintiffs introduced several types of evidence attempting to establish that the Commission Plan was the product of purposeful discrimination to dilute black voting strength and to unconstitutionally gerrymander districts in black population areas. Their proof may be categorized as evidence of (1) retrogression; (2) "packing" and "fracturing" of the black population; (3) movements of large racial populations in certain areas to preserve the incumbencies of white legislators; (4) "admissions" of certain Commission members; and (5) prior instances of discrimination allegedly practiced by the regular Democratic Party organization in Chicago.

Retrogression. The evidence showed that while the black population increased, both absolutely and especially in relation to the white population in Chicago and Cook County between 1970 and 1980,*fn33 the number of districts where black voters had a "meaningful" opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice did not increase appropriately. At the time of the 1971 redistricting, blacks constituted a majority in five Chicago Senate districts (21, 22, 24, 26 and 29). When the 1980 census figures are applied to the 1971 lines, blacks constitute a majority in six Senate districts (the former five districts plus district 28). Under the Commission Plan, blacks will constitute a majority in only five of the Commission Senate Districts (9, 12, 13, 16 and 17). Thus, although blacks increased in population, both absolutely and especially in relation to whites in Chicago between 1970 and 1980, they hold a majority in the same number of Senate districts as in 1971. Blacks are also a majority in one less Senate district than would have been the case had the current redistricting not occurred.

By contrast, white representation in districts where Chicago voters constitute at least part of the population has not diminished significantly. Under the 1971 district lines as applied to the 1980 census figures for districts wholly or partially located within Chicago, whites constitute a majority in 14 of the 19 Senate districts*fn34 even though they account for only 45.5% of the population in those districts.*fn35 The Commission Plan, under the 1980 census figures, results in whites being in the majority in 14 of 19*fn36 Senate districts wholly or partially located in Chicago. Although the white population of the City of Chicago has declined, the Commission Plan, which employs several more overlap districts than the 1971 plan, actually increased to 51.1% the white population in these Chicago-area districts, thus explaining, in part at least, why 14 of 19 districts are still populated by a majority of whites.

Packing and Fracturing. Packing and fracturing are the terms used by plaintiffs in this lawsuit to describe two somewhat different means of reducing the voting strength of a geographically unified minority group. Packing occurs when a minority group is concentrated into one or more districts so that it constitutes an overwhelming majority in those districts (and part of its vote is "wasted"). Fracturing occurs when a geographically unified minority group is unnecessarily split among a number of districts.

All five of the majority black Senate districts located in Chicago under the Commission Plan have black concentrations in excess of 80% of the total district population.*fn37 The black population is also highly concentrated in the 12 Chicago House districts in which blacks constitute a majority although black percentages in these districts are generally not as high as in the majority black Senate districts.*fn38

Plaintiffs also contend that the packing on the West and, in particular, on the South Side of Chicago was greatly furthered by drawing district lines which correspond to the racially segregated housing patterns evident in these areas. This South Side "wall," as plaintiffs refer to it, runs, for example, along the westernmost boundary of Commission House Districts 23 (94.33% black), 24 (98.43% black), 31 (98.44% black) and 34 (73.37% black), and separates these districts from predominantly white Commission House Districts 21 (4.03% black), 22 (4.18% black), 28 (9.27% black) and 29 (11.56% black).

Both fracturing and packing are allegedly evident in the voting districts on the West Side. Of the 300,000 blacks who reside on the West Side, approximately 160,000 reside in Commission House Districts 17 and 18, both of which are over 80% black. The rest of the black population is distributed among Commission House Districts 11, 19 and 20, which have black populations of 48%, 72% and 18%, respectively.*fn39 Defendants, of course, presented various reasons not related to packing and fracturing for the existence of district lines tracing racial boundaries on the South and West Sides, which will be discussed infra.

During the course of this litigation, the Crosby plaintiffs presented several alternative plans that they claim would more fairly and equitably promote the interests of black voters in Chicago. The Coalition Plan, which was offered as a completely packaged alternative to the Commission Plan, contains districts which incorporate more white areas into black-controlled districts, thereby enhancing black voting strength. By creating districts which overlap from black areas into neighboring white areas the Coalition Plan produces five Senate districts on the South Side with black populations ranging from 70% to 85%. (There are four majority black Senate districts on the South Side under the Commission Plan.) The Coalition Plan would also avoid alleged packing and fracturing of the black population on Chicago's West Side, by creating two black Senate districts (with black populations of 66% and 84%) and four black House districts (with black populations of 65%, 67%, 72% and 96%). (There is one black Senate district and three black House districts in this area under the Commission Plan.)

After trial was completed, another plan, denominated the "Crosby Plan," was presented to the court as an offer of proof. This plan reconfigures most of the Commission Senate and House districts located within Chicago and Cook County by allegedly reducing the coincidence of racial and electoral boundaries and increasing the number of districts in which blacks constitute a majority of the population.

Movements of Racial Populations To Preserve White Incumbencies. Plaintiffs presented evidence of racial population shifts in several districts, allegedly motivated by the desire to preserve the incumbencies of various white legislators or potential white candidates on both the South and West Sides. These districts included Commission Senate District 14, where incumbent Senator Jeremiah Joyce resides, Commission Senate District 18, where incumbent Senator Glenn Dawson resides, and various West Side districts, particularly Commission Senate District 8, home of Senator Philip Rock and Commission House District 15, which is part of Senate District 8. A detailed analysis of these population movements, which we regard as very significant, is included in Section III infra.

Alleged Admissions of Defendants. The drafters of the Commission Plan acknowledged that, at the time they drew the Map, they were aware of the relationship between legislative districts and racial demographics in the City of Chicago. Throughout the line drawing process, the drafters possessed color coded maps reflecting the location and the degree of concentration of blacks and Hispanics in metropolitan Chicago. Extensive population statistics reflecting the percentages of minority groups as well as statistics showing their population growth between 1970 and 1980 were also available to the Commission.

Representative Madigan who, together with Commissioner Murphy, drew the Chicago portion of the plan, stated that he studied the maps and that he was aware of the percentages of blacks placed in each district.*fn40 Representative Madigan and Commissioner Murphy also testified that racial factors, including the existence of racial feeling antagonistic to blacks in some South and Southwest Side white communities, were taken into account in drawing the district boundaries. See Tr. at 1432 (remarks of Rep. Madigan); 1838-39 (remarks of Comm'r Murphy). Neither Madigan nor Murphy indicated, however, that any district lines were drawn for the purpose of diluting black voting strength.

History of Civil Rights Violations in Chicago. To strengthen the inference of intentional discrimination against blacks, the Crosby plaintiffs introduced evidence of past racial discrimination by the City of Chicago and, allegedly, by the City's regular Democratic organization. In particular, plaintiffs pointed to several lawsuits involving the Chicago Police*fn41 and Fire Departments,*fn42 the Chicago Housing Authority,*fn43 and the Board of Education*fn44 in which the city defendants were either found to have discriminated against blacks or entered into consent decrees which recognized the existence of racial bias within the agency. Plaintiffs noted that the heads of all three city agencies are appointed by the Mayor (inevitably a Democrat). Plaintiffs also introduced evidence of the new Chicago ward map, which they asserted to be biased, and which furnished a guide in some instances for the challenged legislative redistricting.

Interests of Blacks and Hispanics. Defendants introduced evidence indicating that the Democratic Party has strongly espoused the cause of blacks in Illinois. They noted that the Democratic Party has sponsored and passed civil rights legislation, social welfare legislation and legislation providing for bilingual education — all matters of ...

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