APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Peoria County; the Hon.
DONALD C. COURSON, Judge, presiding.
MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE SCOTT DELIVERED THE DECISION OF THE COURT AND THE FOLLOWING OPINION:
The minor respondent, D.W.S., was adjudicated a delinquent on July 7, 1980, based on his commission of burglary and theft. Following a dispositional hearing he was placed on probation for a period of 18 months.
On appeal the 16-year-old respondent raises two issues related to the trial court's admission of his confession as voluntary: whether his right to remain silent was scrupulously honored where the police resumed interrogation of him after his request to cease questioning; and whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
From the somewhat abbreviated transcript of proceedings and agreed statement of facts filed as a part of the record in this case, the following facts emerge. Three witnesses testified for the State at the minor's adjudicatory hearing. The first witness was Patricia Knighton, the older sister of D.W.S., who testified that on June 20, 1980, she left her house unoccupied and with the front door unlocked. She later discovered a buck knife and $.85 in United States currency had been taken from her dresser.
The second witness, Vernon Beaty, testified that at about 7:30 p.m. on June 20, 1980, he discovered a buck knife in the restroom of a Hardee's Restaurant in which he was eating. Mr. Beaty identified D.W.S. as the young man who approached him in the restaurant a short time later and asked if he had found a buck knife, which he then returned to the minor.
The final witness for the State was Officer William Gaskins. His testimony regarding the interrogation of D.W.S. and the obtaining of inculpatory statements from the minor generated the issues raised in this appeal.
Officer Gaskins testified that he first interrogated D.W.S. for approximately one hour on the evening of June 21, 1980. This interrogation, which began at 7:36 p.m., was conducted at the Peoria Heights police station. D.W.S. was informed of his Miranda rights before the interrogation began. He denied any involvement in the burglary and then indicated that he did not wish to say anything else. Questioning ceased at that time.
At approximately 9 p.m. the same evening, D.W.S. was transported by Officer Gaskins from the police station to the Peoria County juvenile detention center located on Gift Avenue. At approximately 11 p.m., D.W.S. was again questioned by Officer Gaskins. This interrogation took place in the presence of another uniformed officer in a small anteroom at the Gift Avenue house. Officer Gaskins testified that he had made attempts to contact four of the minor's relatives prior to the second interrogation, but he had been unable to reach anyone.
Before questioning began at the Gift Avenue facility, D.W.S. was again advised of his Miranda rights. Specifically, he was told that he had a right to remain silent, that he had a right to the presence of counsel and that counsel would be appointed if he could not afford one. He was not specifically admonished that he had a right to cut off questioning at any time. The trial court correctly ruled that such an admonition was not necessary to comply with Miranda. See Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 411 N.E.2d 132.
By admission of the defense counsel at the suppression hearing, it is uncontested that D.W.S. knowingly waived his rights when he responded that he understood his rights and that he wanted to speak without an attorney. D.W.S. then admitted his involvement in the burglary. He was not questioned again following the termination of this interrogation.
Officer Gaskins testified that prior to the second interrogation of D.W.S. he had discovered new information concerning the buck knife stolen from Ms. Knighton's home. This information inculpated the minor to a greater degree.
• 1, 2 We are asked to decide, initially, whether the second interrogation of D.W.S. violated his right to cut off questioning. We hold that it did not.
It is clear that a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent or to cut off questioning does not prevent all subsequent interrogation by the police. Reinterrogation is allowed if the defendant's right to cut off questioning is scrupulously honored under the circumstances. (Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 96 S.Ct. 321; People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 411 N.E.2d 132.) Several factors enter into such a determination. Recently this court has examined a number of those factors in People v. Payton (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 78, 414 N.E.2d 283, People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 411 N.E.2d 132, People v. Robinson (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 621, 410 N.E.2d 121, and People v. Savory (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 767, 403 N.E.2d 118.
The approach utilized in those cases to determine whether a defendant's right to remain silent is honored under Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 96 S.Ct. 321, involved a consideration of all the facts concerning the defendant's custody, his exercise of his right to remain silent, and his subsequent decision to speak to the police. As discussed in People v. Pleasant (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 984, 988, ...