law claims is Roark's purchase of a security interest in 500
shares of Oakhill from Callahan on December 29, 1978. In those
counts, Roark alleges that Callahan, Guess, and Hannon all
induced Roark's purchase of an interest in the Oakhill shares
by making material misrepresentations and omissions about the
financial health of Oakhill. The asserted factual nexus
between Roark's securities law claims and Oakhill's state law
claims against Hoosier is Roark's allegation that among the
material information of which Callahan, Guess, and Hannon all
failed to apprise Roark was that certain assets of Oakhill had
been improperly withdrawn from the fund during Hoosier's
trusteeship. Hence, Oakhill's claim against Hoosier and
Roark's securities law claims do have some common factual
However, Oakhill's claim against Hoosier calls upon the
Court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over not only an
additional claim, but both of the parties to that claim. Gibbs
and its progeny in the Supreme Court have yet to resolve the
constitutional question of the availability of pendent party
jurisdiction. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 6-15, 96 S.Ct.
2413, 2416-20, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976). While a majority of the
circuits have permitted the joinder of additional parties
pursuant to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, see Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 713-14 nn. 29 and 30, 93 S.Ct.
1785, 1798 nn. 29 and 30, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973), the law of
this Circuit indicates that the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction should not be extended to additional parties. U.S.
General, Inc. v. City of Joliet, 598 F.2d 1050, 1054-55 (7th
Cir. 1979); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 611 (7th
Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 1413, 39
L.Ed.2d 471 (1974); Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797,
799 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964, 85 S.Ct. 655,
13 L.Ed. 558 (1965); but see United Pacific Insurance Co. v.
Capital Development Board, 482 F. Supp. 541, 545-47 (N.D.Ill.
1979). The view that holds that pendent jurisdiction may not be
employed to bring additional parties before a federal court has
been most forcefully argued by the Ninth Circuit. Ayala v.
United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed,
435 U.S. 982, 98 S.Ct. 1635, 56 L.Ed.2d 76 (1978); Aldinger v.
Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 1, 96
S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976); Moor v. Madigan,
458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973); Hymer v.
Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969). The Ninth Circuit's cases
hold that to extend pendent jurisdiction to additional parties
is to work an unconstitutional enlargement of the limited
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Ayala v. United States, 550
F.2d at 1200. When the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit
in both Moor and Aldinger it was able to do so
on non-constitutional grounds and therefore avoid explicitly
endorsing or rejecting the Ninth Circuit's position. See id. In
Aldinger, however, the Supreme Court did voice some implicit
support for the Ninth Circuit's position when it stated:
The situation with respect to the joining of a
new party, however, strikes us as being both
factually and legally different from the
situation facing the Court in Gibbs and its
predecessors. From a purely factual point of view,
it is one thing to authorize two parties, already
present in federal court by virtue of a case over
which the court has jurisdiction, to litigate in
addition to their federal claim a state-law claim
over which there is no independent basis of federal
jurisdiction. But it is quite another thing to
permit a plaintiff, who has asserted a claim
against one defendant with respect to which there
is federal jurisdiction, to join an entirely
different defendant on the basis of a state-law
claim over which there is no independent basis of
federal jurisdiction, simply because his claim
against the first defendant and his claim against
the second defendant "derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact." True, the same consideration of
judicial economy would be served insofar as
plaintiff's claims "are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them
all in one judicial proceeding. . . ." But the
addition of a completely new party would run
counter to the well-established principle that
federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts
of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited
jurisdiction marked out by Congress.
Aldinger v. Howard 427 U.S. at 14-15, 96 S.Ct. at 2420