The opinion of the court was delivered by: Shadur, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Donald Wright ("Wright") brings this action under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e and following ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
1985 and 1988,*fn1 based on his allegedly unlawful
termination as an employee of Methodist Youth Services, Inc.
("Youth Services").*fn2 Defendants have moved to dismiss the
Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.*fn3 For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion
and order, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in
Youth Services is a not-for-profit corporation providing social
services to minors, primarily those who are wards of the State of
Illinois. Wright, a black male, was employed by Youth Services
from approximately June 1976 until July 1979. Wright alleges that
during the course of his employment his supervisor, Hillerman,
made overt homosexual advances towards Wright and that as a
result of Wright's resistance to those advances his employment
was terminated. Wright has exhausted his Title VII administrative
remedies and now seeks
both damages and injunctive relief in this action.
Wright charges that his termination violated his rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore Section 1983. By its terms
Section 1983 only applies to actions taken "under color" of state
law. Wright contends that several factors justify a finding of
state action despite Youth Services' being a private entity:
1. Youth Services receives and relies heavily on
2. Children are referred to Youth Services by a
3. Welfare programs are traditionally a public
function dealt with by government agencies.
Such linkages are insufficient to invoke the "under color" of
state law doctrine. Our Court of Appeals dealt with like claims
in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1071 (7th Cir.
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60
L.Ed.2d 560 (1977):
But, even assuming financial aid and assistance by
the state in whatever amounts, such aid and
assistance is insufficient for jurisdiction under §
1983 unless it can be shown that the State has
"affirmatively supported" the particular conduct
Wright fails that test, for the Complaint does not allege that
either the state funding or the system of referral is in any way
responsible for or promotes the alleged discrimination.
In limited circumstances a plaintiff need not establish such a
nexus between state support of a private activity and the alleged
discriminatory act — but only "by an allegation of facts
suggesting that the ostensibly private activity has acted as a
state instrumentality or a `joint participant,' in the language
of Burton v. Wilmington Park Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 [81
S.Ct. 856, 861-862, 6 L.Ed.2d 45] (1961)." Musso v. Suriano,
586 F.2d 59, 63 (7th Cir. 1978). As Musso went on to say, "Such an
allegation is dependent upon more than funding; it is dependent
upon facts suggesting control." Thus state action may be found
where a federal statutory program requires some private
involvement in the management of the program. See, Ginn v.
Matthews, 533 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1976). Again the Complaint
alleges no facts to permit the inference that Youth Services and
the State of Illinois became so intertwined that activities by
Youth Services constitute state action. See, Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 641 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1981).
Wright's claims under Section 1983 are ...