The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bua, District Judge.
This cause comes before the court on the motions of the
Democratic Organization of Cook County; the Democratic Central
Committee of Cook County; Richard J. Elrod, the Sheriff of Cook
County; Morgan M. Finley, the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook
County; Sidney R. Olsen, the Recorder of Deeds of Cook County;
Stanley T. Kusper, Jr., the County Clerk of Cook County; Edward
J. Rosewell, the Treasurer of Cook County; Thomas C. Hynes, the
Assessor of Cook County; George W. Dunne, President, Cook County
Board of Commissioners; the Chicago Park District; and the City
of Chicago [hereinafter the Democratic defendants] to have the
judgment order of this court dated September 24, 1979,
481 F. Supp. 1315, certified for appeal under Rule 54(b),
Fed.R.Civ.P.,*fn1 and on the motion of the plaintiffs for entry of
judgment granting relief as to hiring practices. For the reasons
hereinafter stated, all of these motions will be denied. The
September 24, 1979 judgment order, however, will be certified for
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Under Rule 54(b), however, only judgment orders which are final
in nature can properly be certified for appeal.*fn2 Ryan v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1978);
Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1978). A non-final order,
even when it pertains only to some of the parties in the
litigation, is not appealable under the rule.
In the order entered by this court on September 24, 1979,
partial summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs on the
question of whether the Democratic defendants, in their
capacities as governmental employers, by conditioning their
hiring of certain public employees upon party or political
affiliation violated the candidate-plaintiffs' constitutionally
protected right to an equal chance to be elected, and the
voter-plaintiffs' right to have a reasonably effective voice in
the electoral process. The judgment order was, by its terms,
limited to the issue of the Democratic defendants' liability,
with the question of relief left for later resolution. Shakman v.
Democratic Organization of Cook County, 481 F. Supp. 1315, 1325
n. 4 (N.D.Ill. 1979). The September 24, 1979 order thus was quite
similar to that at issue in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1967),
regarding which the United States Supreme Court noted:
. . The order . . . constitutes a grant of partial
summary judgment limited to the issue of petitioner's
liability. Such judgments are by their terms
interlocutory, see Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(c), and
where assessment of damages or awarding of other
relief remains to be resolved have never been
considered to be `final' within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Id. at 744, 96 S.Ct. at 1206 (emphasis supplied).
After Liberty Mutual, the judgment order entered by this court
on September 24, 1979 cannot reasonably be considered final for
purposes of Rule 54(b). Lewis v. Tobacco Workers' International
Union, 577 F.2d 1135, 1138-39, 1138 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1978); Acha v.
Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1978). That being true, the
Democratic defendants' motions to have that order certified for
appeal under Rule 54(b) must be denied.
Motion for Entry of Judgment Granting Relief as to Hiring
Through their motion for entry of judgment granting relief as
to hiring practices, the plaintiffs propose to have the
Democratic defendants implement a number of hiring-related
procedures which, if followed, would insure that the defendants'
hiring practices did not operate to impermissibly impinge upon
their [the plaintiffs'] Constitutionally protected rights.
Their proposed procedures, the plaintiffs quite properly
contend, while comprehensive, are not so complex or extensive as
to make implementation of them oppressive to the defendants.
Implementation of these procedures, however, as they are rather
numerous and reasonably involved, would very probably prove
costly to the defendants, a point of significance when it is
remembered that it is public money which will be expended in this
regard. Further, because the plaintiffs' proposed procedures
represent a substantial change from the hiring procedures
presently being utilized by the defendants, implementation of
them likely will, at least at the outset, be quite burdensome and
cumbersome to the defendants' personnel.
When consideration is given to these facts,*fn3 as the legal
questions associated with this aspect of the Democratic
defendants' liability also are reasonably unsettled, the court
believes that the interests of justice would best be served if
the question of the defendants' liability is resolved more
completely before any affirmative relief is imposed upon them.