APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Macon County; the Hon. DONALD
W. MORTHLAND, Judge, presiding.
MR. JUSTICE CRAVEN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
The defendant, 15 years old when he committed the offenses alleged in this case but tried as an adult, appeals from convictions for armed robbery and home invasion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 18-2, 12-11); he received two concurrent 7-year sentences of imprisonment. The defendant raises three issues on appeal — whether he should have been discharged under the speedy-trial provisions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103-5); whether the jury should have received a cautionary instruction regarding an accomplice's testimony; and whether the prosecution of him as an adult was proper — but we need discuss only the first question. We hold that section 103-5(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103-5(a)) requires the defendant's discharge and relates back to include the time before his case was transferred to the adult docket.
The defendant was declared a delinquent minor during 1978 for an offense unrelated to this prosecution and placed under supervision for one year. At an adjudicatory hearing held June 14 (or 15), 1979, the defendant admitted several violations of the terms of his supervision and was declared a ward of the court, to remain in detention pending a dispositional hearing. Before the dispositional hearing, however, the defendant was charged with the offenses involved in this cause. On June 25, 1979, a petition was filed to declare the defendant a delinquent minor on charges of armed robbery, home invasion, and armed violence, offenses allegedly occurring May 29, 1979, and to remove the cause to adult docket. A summons, stamped "Impounded Juvenile," was issued that same day.
The dispositional hearing to determine the appropriate sanctions for the defendant's violations of his supervision was held June 26, 1979. The defendant was ordered committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, and placed in a juvenile detention center in Macon County pending the transfer of custody.
On June 28, 1979, the defendant was served with the summons for these offenses. A Macon County deputy sheriff delivered the defendant to the juvenile division, St. Charles, July 2, 1979. The State's petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was granted July 23, 1979, and served on the defendant three days later in St. Charles.
The State's motion to try the defendant as an adult was heard August 2, 1979; the trial court granted the motion August 10, 1979. The State then indicted the defendant as an adult August 30, 1979, for armed robbery, home invasion, and armed violence.
The defendant's trial began November 19, 1979, 119 days after July 23, with the court first hearing arguments on the defendant's motion for discharge. The parties stipulated that the defendant was in custody beginning June 28, 1979. The trial court denied the motion for discharge, finding that the defendant was not in custody for this offense until July 23, 1979, when the State filed its writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
• 1 The relevant portions of section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103-5) provide:
"(a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody * * *.
(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial * * *.
(d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections (a), (b) * * * of the Section shall be discharged from custody or released from the obligations of his bail or recognizance.
(e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, or simultaneously demands trial upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county * * *."
For purposes of section 103-5(a), the State would begin the period of custody July 23, when it filed the writ, or August 10, when the trial court granted the motion to try the defendant as an adult. Even if the earlier date is used, section 103-5(a) would not compel discharge of the defendant, for only 119 days elapsed between July 23 and November 19, when the trial began; the periods are computed by skipping the day when custody ...