The opinion of the court was delivered by: Moran, District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on motions of two of three
sets of defendants to dismiss for lack of in personam
jurisdiction and improper venue. The underlying controversy is
a § 1983 action which alleges violations of plaintiff's
constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments, breach of guardianship duties,
professional malpractice and medical malpractice. Federal
subject matter jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, §
1332 and § 1343. It is submitted that the Court has pendant
jurisdiction over the breach of duty and malpractice claims.
For the reasons set forth herein, both jurisdictional and venue
objections raised by defendants must be sustained. Accordingly,
the motions are granted and the cause is dismissed as to those
At age 12, plaintiff, Janice Chancellor, was determined to
be a neglected minor by the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, Juvenile Division, and adjudged a ward of the state.
On June 26, 1970, Janice was committed to the care of the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("IDCFS")
and Richard S. Layman, Guardianship Administrator at IDCFS,
was appointed her legal guardian.
After a number of apparently unsuccessful experiences in
private foster homes, the IDCFS, in early 1971, deemed it
advisable to place Janice in the Meridell Achievement Center
("Meridell"), a residential group care facility located near
Austin, Texas. Plaintiff arrived at Meridell on April 6, 1971.
She was accompanied by Frankie Laird, her IDCFS caseworker,
who spent the rest of that day processing Janice's admission
and inspecting the facility. Ms. Laird, on behalf of IDCFS,
also executed an individual placement agreement with Meridell
for Janice's care.
Janice Chancellor was not the first child IDCFS had placed
at Meridell. Rather, numerous wards had been sent to the
Center prior to 1971 pursuant to a general written operating
agreement. Under this general agreement, IDCFS would send a
monthly check to Meridell, as reimbursement for the daily care
provided to IDCFS placements during the preceding month,
computed at the then applicable per diem rate. Vouchers or
receipts supplied by Meridell indicate that over 100 IDCFS
children were at Meridell at any one time during 1971, and
Meridell received almost $800,000 for the care of these
In late 1971, while plaintiff was in residence at Meridell,
she complained of abdominal pain. Plaintiff was taken to
Meridell's regular outside pediatrician, Dr. Miles Sedberry,
for treatment. Dr. Sedberry examined plaintiff and took X-ray
photographs of her intestinal tract. These photographs
indicated the possible presence of a calcium "mass" in Ms.
Chancellor's abdomen. Dr. Sedberry thus referred plaintiff to
Dr. George Tipton, a surgeon in Austin.
Consent for the operation and the related procedures was
obtained by Meridell from plaintiff's guardian in Illinois at
IDCFS. On November 23, 1971, an operation was performed by Dr.
Tipton, assisted by Drs. Bailey and Pelphrey, in Austin,
Texas. During the surgery a cyst was discovered in plaintiff's
right ovary, which after subsequent pathological analysis was
determined to be benign. However, for reasons which are wholly
undetermined at this stage of the lawsuit, not only was Ms.
Chancellor's right ovary extracted, but her left ovary, uterus
and appendix were removed as well.
The complaint alleges that at no time prior to the surgery
was plaintiff informed either of Dr. Tipton's pre-operative
diagnosis or of the extent of the operation. Meridell's staff
merely informed Ms. Chancellor that an appendectomy was to be
performed. In May of 1972, about six months after surgery,
plaintiff was removed from Meridell and transferred to Chicago
State Hospital, a public mental institution in Illinois. While
at this latter institution, Janice was informed that her
ovaries and uterus had been removed and her procreative
On November 13, 1978, plaintiff filed the current action in
federal district court against 13 individual defendants. For
purposes of these motions, the defendants can be divided into
three groups: (1) former officials at IDCFS ("The IDCFS
defendants"); (2) those relevant officials of the Meridell
clinic in Texas ("The Meridell Defendants"); and (3) the three
Austin, Texas physicians who participated in and performed
plaintiff's operation (The "Texas Physicians")*fn1. There are
six counts in the complaint alleging: (1) denial of the
plaintiff's right to procreate; (2) denial of due process of
law; (3) denial of plaintiff's right to treatment; (4) breach
of guardianship duties; (5) professional malpractice; and (6)
medical malpractice. Counts 1 through 3 are directed toward
all defendants. Counts 4 and 5 are directed toward the IDCFS
and Meridell Defendants, and Count 6 is alleged against the
Texas Physicians only. Both the Texas Physicians and the
Meridell Defendants have moved to dismiss herein. Since each
group has raised different defenses and because in personam
jurisdictional defenses are necessarily fact sensitive, the
respective motions are discussed individually.
Although it is not clear from plaintiff's brief, presumably
she intends to assert Illinois jurisdiction under the
"transacting business within the state" provision of Illinois
long arm statute, Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 110 § 17(1)(a) (1980). The
determination of in personam jurisdiction involves a two-tiered
analysis both statutory and constitutional. However, since the
legislative intent of the Illinois long-arm statute is to
assert jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted under the
due process clause, Hutter Northern Trust v. Door County
Chamber of Commerce, 403 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1968); Nelson v.
Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957), the statutory and
constitutional analyses are merged here.
The Supreme Court on numerous occasions has articulated the
limits of in personam jurisdiction under the due process
clause. See e. g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Shaffer v.
433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977),
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct.
154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The thrust of these decisions is that
sufficient "minimum contacts" must exist between the defendant
and the forum state so that jurisdiction over non-residents
does not violate "traditional concepts of fair play and
substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
supra at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. It is well settled that there is
no specific formula for ascertaining which "contacts" will
satisfy the constitutional minima. Rather, the court must
examine the facts of each case in light of certain factors
including the burden on the defendant, the forum's state's
interest in adjudicating the dispute and the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining effective relief. World-Wide Volkswagen
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed.2d
490 (1980). See also, Kulco v. Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 92,
98 S.Ct. 1690, 1697, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); McGee v.
International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct.
199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). Certainly, a fundamental
inquiry of the "minimum contacts" analysis is whether the