APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Hancock County; the Hon. MAX
B. STEWART, Judge, presiding.
MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE ALLOY DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT:
The defendant was convicted of three violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-100 et seq.) arising from an incident on November 11, 1979.
According to the police, the defendant was observed driving at a speed in excess of the posted limit. Two officers, in a single patrol car, gave chase. They proceeded across a two-lane bridge, upon which the defendant passed several cars. They continued to pursue the defendant into the city of Keokuk, Iowa. There the defendant made several elusive maneuvers. The Keokuk police were radioed and joined in the chase. When surrounded by police cars, the defendant finally surrendered. At trial, the defendant acknowledged that he had exceeded the posted speed limit, although by a lesser amount than claimed by the officers. He also admitted to having passed cars on the bridge. He denied having tried to elude the officers or even to having been aware that he was being pursued by them until just prior to his "voluntary stop." On December 27, 1979, the three counts were tried together at a bench trial and the defendant was convicted of all three charges. The convictions and sentences were as follows:
Cause No. 79-TR-1682, fleeing or attempting to elude police officer (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-204), for which defendant was sentenced to seven days in the Hancock County Jail plus $20 costs.
Cause No. 79-TR-1683, speeding (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-601), for which defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of $25 plus $20 costs.
Cause No. 79-TR-1684, improper passing (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-702), for which the defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of $25 plus $20 costs.
Although all three of the causes listed above are included in the defendant's notice of appeal, the argument on appeal only refers to the charge of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (cause No. 79-TR-1682). The crime of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer is a Class B misdemeanor (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-204), for which the penalty is a fine of not more than $500 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-9-1(a)(3)) and/or a sentence of imprisonment for not more than six months (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-3(a)(2)).
The defendant appeared at his trial pro se. His sole contention on appeal is that he did not effectively waive his right to counsel because the trial court failed to admonish him as to the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law. Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 401(a)) states:
"(a) Waiver of Counsel. Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following:
(1) the nature of the charge;
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and
(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court."
No verbatim transcript of the proceedings was made. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 401(b); People v. Rivers (1961), 22 Ill.2d 590, 177 N.E.2d 154; People v. Bobo (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 274, 275-76, 337 N.E.2d 227.) However, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 323(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110A, par. 323(c)), the defendant submitted a proposed report of the proceedings, and the State supplemented this with its own proposed report. Both were certified by the trial court. In neither of these reports was it affirmatively stated that the defendant was advised of the minimum and maximum sentence to which he might be subjected, although the record indicates that the other Rule 401(a) admonitions were properly given.
In order for a waiver of counsel to be effective, Rule 401(a) mandates that the record affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant was given the requisite warnings. People v. Woods (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 938, 945-46, 405 N.E.2d 1238, 1243-44; ...