The opinion of the court was delivered by: Baker, District Judge.
This is a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
concerning the First and Eighth Amendment rights of a Black
Muslim prisoner who was placed in segregation for some 91/2
months following his refusal on religious grounds to handle
pork during a kitchen clean-up detail.
The case is here on its second remand. Chapman v. Pickett,
586 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1978) (Chapman II); Chapman v.
Kleindienst, 507 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1974) (Chapman I).
The facts of the case to this point are set forth in
Edward Joseph X. Chapman was a prisoner in the
federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas,
when, on October 4, 1972, he was transferred to
the Marion, Illinois, penitentiary. On October 9
Chapman was assigned to the kitchen detail, which
assignment included transporting food carts and
clearing food off of them. When Chapman
discovered that the food trays in the carts
contained pork, he went to his supervisor,
defendant J.E. Brown, and informed him that
because of the beliefs of his Black Muslim faith,
he could not handle the pork on the trays.
According to his testimony at trial, Brown then
offered Chapman the use of either gloves or
various kitchen utensils to enable him to
complete the task. While Chapman at trial denied
that he was offered these, he did acknowledge
that, regardless of such an offer, he would still
have refused to do the work, since even indirect
touching was forbidden. Brown then advised
Chapman that he would be forced to write a
disciplinary report on Chapman if the task were
not performed. Chapman responded by saying that
the last man who had written a report on him
concerning an incident of this nature had been
"blown out of an oven" at Leavenworth just two
After the incident Brown filed a report
charging Chapman with violating Prison Code § 303,
"Failing to perform work as instructed by a
supervisor." His report also mentioned the
Leavenworth remark. An investigative report,
completed the day of the incident by another
official and sent to the prison's Adjustment
Committee, stated that "Chapman had a very good
attitude." It noted that "apparently through
Chapman's efforts someone had removed the pork from
the cart and Chapman had finished cleaning the
On October 11 the Adjustment Committee, which
included defendants Jack Culley, Earl Buzzard,
and E.M. Cage, met to consider Brown's report.
Chapman was present and, upon having the report
read to him admitted the facts of the incident,
again explaining that his refusal was the result
of his Black Muslim beliefs. The Committee
decided to punish Chapman by placing him in the
segregation unit for an indeterminate term.
Chapman's status in segregated confinement was
reviewed periodically. At least once during this
confinement Chapman sought a formal explanation
of his confinement from defendant George Pickett,
warden at Marion, and requested immediate
release. No reply from Pickett
was received. During Chapman's confinement on
March 15, 1973, Pickett received a copy of a
letter dated March 9, 1973, from the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Norman A. Carlson,
in which the Director stated to Congressman
Charles Rangel that "[w]e have reexamined the
situation and have communicated to the heads of
our facilities instructions not to assign
individuals to the details where they must work
with pork if it is against the religious beliefs
of those men." Chapman was not returned to the
general prison population, however, until July
The procedural history of the case is somewhat lengthy.
Chapman brought suit for injunctive and declaratory relief and
for damages alleging (1) violation of his First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion, (2) denial of procedural
due process at the disciplinary hearing which preceded his
segregation, and (3) cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment by assignment to segregation for over
nine months. In the first trial, the district court, after
hearing testimony from two witnesses, refused to hear further
evidence. Thereafter, the court entered judgment for the
defendants on the grounds that Chapman had failed to prove any
of the allegations in his complaint and that his claim for a
mandatory injunction was moot since he had already been
released from segregation.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a
mandatory injunction ordering release but reversed the
dismissal of the claims for damages and for declaratory and
prohibitive injunctive relief as well as "further appropriate
relief, including the expurgation of his prison record." 507
F.2d at 1249. The reviewing court further held (1) that the
facts made out a prima facie case of a First Amendment
violation, (2) that the trial court had erred in terminating
testimony, (3) that the plaintiff had not been denied
procedural due process. The appellate court made no rulings on
the Eighth Amendment claim due to the inadequacy of the record.
The case was remanded for a new trial.
At retrial, the district court never reached the merits of
plaintiff's First Amendment claim. The court found that the
defendants had a qualified official immunity from liability
for damages under the First Amendment and that the plaintiff's
request for injunctive and declaratory relief was mooted by
his release on parole and by the new policy adopted by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons exempting Black Muslims from
handling pork. The trial court also found that the plaintiff's
confinement was disproportionate to his offense after May 5,
1973, and violated the Eighth Amendment, but ruled that the
plaintiff was not entitled to money damages because he had
failed to prove actual damages.
On appeal the second time, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's finding of qualified immunity on the First
Amendment issue. It also affirmed the district court's finding
that the plaintiff's request for declaratory and injunctive
relief against future infringement of his religious beliefs
was moot, but ruled that a request for an injunction against
future use of the plaintiff's punishment record was not moot.
The appellate court also affirmed the district court's finding
of an Eighth Amendment violation, but reversed the ruling as
to the date of the violation and the plaintiff's entitlement
to damages. The case was again remanded.
The issues remanded by the Court of Appeals are:
(1) Whether Chapman's First Amendment right to free exercise
of religion was violated and, if so, whether the record of his
punishment should be expunged.
(2) The date the Eighth Amendment violation began.
(3) What damages Chapman is entitled to receive as a result
of the Eighth Amendment violation.
(1) On October 11, 1972, Chapman was initially assigned to
"short-term segregation" status, where he remained for some 2
to 3 months before being reassigned to "long-term segregation"
or "control" status.
(2) Chapman was returned to "short-term segregation" status
in June, 1973, and returned to the general prison ...