the context of this complaint, this language does nothing more
than describe a respondeat superior theory.
Furthermore, the element of causation is absent from
plaintiff's complaint. The Supreme Court in Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), held that
municipalities and supervisory personnel are not liable for civil
rights violations perpetrated by individual police officers
absent an "affirmative link between the occurrence of the various
incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or
policy by (the defendants) — express or otherwise — showing their
authorization or approval of such misconduct." Id. at 371, 96
S.Ct. at 604. Plaintiff's complaint fails to describe any link
between alleged police misconduct and an official policy of the
City of Chicago, nor does it allege the city's acquiescence in or
condonation of such misconduct.
The second issue with which this court is presented is whether
the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under § 1985(3).*fn2
In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29
L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), the Supreme Court held that "(t)he language
[of 1985(3)] requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or
equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some
racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." Id. at
102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798. See also Murphy v. Mount Carmel High
School, 543 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1976); Potenza v.
Schoessling, 541 F.2d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1976); Lesser v. Braniff
Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1975). Clearly, all
racially based discrimination is within the ambit of § 1985(3).
See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979); The
Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 38, 103 (1971). The
Court in Griffin, however, did not decide whether a conspiracy
motivated by discriminatory intent other than racial bias would
be actionable under 1985(3).*fn3 403 U.S. at 102 n. 9, 91 S.Ct.
at 1798 n. 9.
In this case, however, we need not consider what types of
class-based motives are sufficient to state a claim under
1985(3). Plaintiff's complaint is clearly insufficient. It
alleges a conspiracy between defendant City of Chicago, its
police officers, its women attendants and/or other employees and
agents, for the purpose of depriving plaintiff of various
constitutional rights. The pleadings, however, contain no
allegation of racial or any other class-based discriminatory
animus on the part of the conspirators.*fn4
The defendant has also moved that the Department of Police be
stricken from the caption and body of the complaint. Plaintiff
has admitted that the verbiage Department of Police is mere
"surplusage." In Ellis v. City of Chicago, 478 F. Supp. 333
(N.D.Ill. 1979), Judge Grady held that the
Chicago Police Department is not a suable entity, but merely a
department of the City of Chicago which does not have a separate
legal existence. Cf. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc.
v. City of Chicago, 435 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D.Ill. 1977).
Accordingly, the Department of Police will be stricken from the
For the above stated reasons, the defendant City of Chicago's
motion to dismiss is granted. The plaintiff is given leave to
file an amended complaint within thirty days.